Venezuela, in the probability calculation
By: Luis Beltrán Guerra G. - 02/02/2026
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Democracy, as history shows, is difficult not only to establish but also to understand, and even more so, to "make a reality." Its long history, accompanied by endless struggles, has hindered the realization of its advantages in more than one country.
It evolved as "government by the people," an alternative from the then-thriving Greece, fostering the need for its inhabitants to meet in assembly to approve or reject measures concerning collective interests—a practice that led to "suffrage" and conciliatory practices regarding the diversity of subjective situations. An undeniable mark on the building of democracies.
The social contract, which arises from this process, is therefore considered a kind of "tacit agreement," intended to help us abandon patterns of "a primitive, disordered life without any guarantee of rights and obligations." This is the adoption of "a form, prima facie, aimed at social coexistence," under the hope that power, by being subject to the law, would lead to "peace, order, and respect for everyone's rights." But also to the observance of one's "duties."
We therefore believe that, in principle, the "social contract" would become, at least within a certain logical framework, like that enshrined in "constitutional texts." Thus, for anyone wishing to know which provisions they must observe for the sake of their own stability and progress, as well as for the "republic" to be established, the suggestion of carrying the "Magna Carta" in their pocket would not be so excessive. Moreover, reading it often would be a habit that undoubtedly contributes to democracy. And perhaps we would not be confronting "the difficulties of extremes."
It is within the context of the guidelines outlined above that certain observations regarding Venezuela become pertinent, given the recent actions of the United States government, which can be characterized, in principle, as a "methodology of shared responsibility" concerning the exercise of public power in the South American country. Among other concerns, some are wondering whether this constitutes "a continental project," considering the US's borders stretching from Colombia to Argentina, Mexico, and the rest of Central America.
A concise summary of the US intervention in Caracas reveals: 1. A sophisticated military strategy, 2. Its undoubtedly high cost, 3. The rationale? Combating drug trafficking exported to the US, whose consumption was causing irreparable harm, 4. The arrest of Nicolás Maduro, who was serving as Venezuelan President, and his wife, who is currently facing legal proceedings in New York, and 5. The armed logistical deployment for land, sea, and air targeting the "Caribbean" under the name "Operation Southern Spear." It is obvious that it has produced substantial, even unimaginable, changes, among the most evident being: 1. The "co-leadership" referred to in the country's government between President Donald Trump and the Vice President of former Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, Delsy Rodriguez; 2. A methodology, certainly not very frequent, rather historically occasional, with respect to which the following should be noted: a) The surprise of the approach, since there is no doubt that a decisive majority of Venezuelans longed for "a clean slate," that is, to sweep away what existed, considering it disastrous; b) A new leadership that was consolidated as a result of the negative consequences of the government of Hugo Chavez and that continued under Nicolas Maduro, deepening, reached a degree of consolidation that was almost perfectible and, therefore, capable, as was demonstrated, of participating in the last elections for the Presidency of the Republic with favorable results, which were not recognized by the regime. c) The undeniable chaotic national situation, regardless of the perspective, despite some sectors' attempts to offer a few positive developments, which at least brought some relief to the food and services sectors. A kind of fable: "tolerance of the government and survival of the governed."
The aspiration of that majority, expressed electorally, if we assume rationality as the mechanism, seems beyond doubt, was to govern "without the others," that is, those who "were in charge." It is fair to characterize this tendency as decisive, given that it meant public power would be integrated with absolute disregard for the latter, which demanded nothing less than: 1. To preside over the Republic, 2. A legislative branch with new faces, 3. Judges at every level, including the Supreme Court of Justice, whose composition would be entirely separate from the current magistrates, 4. A new Constitution, perhaps the 27th, generated as usual by a Constituent Assembly, and 5. The condemnation of unscrupulous actions, contrary to both the law and morality.
The nation, in the process of “a total restoration like an old church,” a scenario that compels us to reflect on its viability, a scene framed by the dilemma of atypical military forces and the very likely combination of those leaving the government and “a political individuality” represented by personalities and parties in name only. Quantifying the difficulties, subjected to objective analysis, would, as seems obvious, constitute “absolute anarchy,” a path whose outcome is unknown, with some of the possible alternatives being: absence of public power, bewilderment, incoherence, uproar, anarchism, disorder, chaos, confusion, misrule, libertarianism, and many other ills. And, consequently, “absence of government and order.” Considering this hypothesis leads us, at the very least, to the revealing words of Francisco de Miranda, on his way to La Carraca: “Uproar, uproar, uproar, these people know nothing but how to make a scene.” "Chaos." But also, the anecdote of Diógenes Escalante, brought from abroad to save the nation, in one of the many chapters of our political distrust, diagnosed as mad by some, but by others as simply playing dumb in the face of a country in disarray that, in principle, seemed eternal. For Francisco Suniaga, a prominent Venezuelan writer, Harry Truman, another US President, made Escalante one of his unfortunate passengers. Both Miranda and Escalante departed from a country that, at least in their time, had not yet graduated as a "republic," much less a "democratic" one.
These carefully considered observations demand a frank answer to the question: Would it have been possible to allow the democratic election of a President, to recognize his status, and to permit him to govern in a manner as demanding as that required by “an attempt at a republic severely shaken by undeniable ‘anarchism’ by 2025,” a phenomenon feared for its damaging consequences, even for “linguistics”: 1. Absence of public power, 2. Bewilderment, 3. Incoherence, 4. Uproar, 5. Disorder, 6. Chaos, 7. Confusion, and 8. Misrule. A political regime under such conditions would have been remotely capable of overcoming what the Italians call “una diaboleza.”
Of course, the efforts made to participate in the presidential election of July 28, 1984, in which an opposition candidate was elected, are not ignored—efforts that are absolutely commendable. This nomination was not recognized by the regime, a situation that is, in reality, irreversible given its control over the military officer corps, as the absolute owner of a paper republic. The implementation of "military arbitration," as occurred in Caracas, for example, starting in January 1958, is truly remote—an event unprecedented in a democracy that had been in place for decades, and was the most advanced in Latin America.
A decisive majority of Venezuelans have found in María Corina Machado the ideal person to govern the country, and she will, for she has more than earned the necessary legitimacy. We are not in a position to advise her, but we hope that with her considerable intelligence and faith in God, she will understand that the episode orchestrated by the United States will lead to the clearing of a treacherous path so that, if the "Iron Lady" maintains her popular support, as is to be expected, she will be elevated to the Presidency in an atmosphere of complete legality and under the guidance of authorities free from any hint of illegality. It is an uphill battle for this writer to advise such a distinguished and glamorous lady; nevertheless, we ask that she allow us to tell her that Divine Providence, aware of her actions, is asking her for patience and understanding for "what is good, even if it seems bad." And that Mario Benedetti often attributed to her the maxim "difficult, but not impossible," a path to perseverance that "María" has demonstrated she possesses in abundance.
In the “democratic epic” that accompanied Venezuela from 1958 to 1998, eight presidents held the highest office, each striving to govern better than the last, but always within the bounds of legality. The model itself didn't simply change; it was replaced by not just a different one, but its complete opposite, from 1999 to 2025. There is no doubt that these models were antagonistic, which makes it legitimate to acknowledge that governing from now on will be extremely complex. And it is in this context that the challenge seems to arise of challenging the United States to reclaim its title as “guardians of peace for humanity,” for the benefit of both itself and Venezuelans, and indeed, from Caracas to Patagonia.
In the intensified process of Venezuelan restructuring, several significant measures will undoubtedly be crucial, including: 1. A proper constitutional reform, most likely through a constituent assembly; 2. A thorough analysis of the numerous legal and regulatory texts that have plunged us into a kind of "normative inflation" with contradictory and even shameful consequences; 3. A dynamic plan for economic transparency; 4. A sound fiscal policy; 5. A realistic assessment of the internal and external public debt; and 6. Uniformity in the management of our mineral resources, including, of course, oil (ironically called "black gold" due to the disparate ways in which we have managed it). This immense task would demand decisive dynamism from both the public authorities and the citizenry. It would mean, if you'll pardon the irony, forgetting our turbulent political history in order to "start anew."
It is understandable that some Venezuelans, convinced that a substantial change in the country's leadership is imperative, express concern regarding the duration of the transition period, specifically how long it will last. This has led to a focus on processes experienced in the past, such as the Monroe Doctrine. Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State under President Richard Nixon, highlights Roosevelt's interpretation of the doctrine, which on December 6, 1904, proclaimed the general right of the United States to intervene in the Western Hemisphere in all cases where "things were not done right." The concept of "protectorate" also frequently arises, referring to a form of administration whereby, through an international treaty, a state exercises control, particularly in matters of foreign affairs, defense, and public order, over a territory with its own political entity and authorities (Royal Spanish Academy). Mexican journalist Héctor Aguilar Camin is one of those who describes the US management as “a protectorate plan, characterized by the intention to dismantle the dictatorship with the very characters of the last one (30/1/2026).
The actions of the United States must be viewed within the context of a humanity that, despite its ills, continues to advocate for "the maximization of the common good," but, concomitantly, for its own good, that is, the good of the "North." For many years, it has earned the title of "guarantor of peace." We Venezuelans, while still adhering to these labels, must instead embrace the "state of necessity" as a means to restore constitutional order. This is an academically supported view, compatible with the essence of democracy as a social ideal. And therefore, we rely on the good faith of the so-called "giant of the North." For, as has been demonstrated, we could not do it alone.
Finally, it is not without a certain logic, at least relatively, that there is annoyance in Caracas at having entrusted the transition to democracy to the very government that caused it, an argument that must be analyzed between what could be called morality and pragmatism and in light of "the difficulties", which far outweigh "the advantages". This observation is perhaps best understood by looking at history: 1. In Spain, Franco's iron-fisted dictatorship ended with his death, but "the leader" laid the groundwork for the democracy that replaced it, a democracy that is now battered but still exists; and 2. In Chile, a government—call it "progressive," using a word that has certainly fallen out of favor, at least with the Republican Party in the US—has just been replaced by José Antonio Kast, who is close to the regime of Augusto Pinochet, the dictatorial general and leader of the coup that overthrew the democratically elected government of Salvador Allende. For a significant majority of analysts, without the cooperation of General Augusto Pinochet, the transition to the regime of freedoms that Chileans currently enjoy would not have occurred in the country of the distinguished Venezuelan, Andrés Bello.
We must strive for the ideal, and to achieve this, we must reject demands that, while stemming from suffering, should not be met by hanging the perpetrators by the neck or in their private parts, as was done, among others, with Benito Mussolini. The aspiration is for a true democracy, whose principles reject, among other things, taking the law into one's own hands. There will be serious and reputable jurisdictions and institutions, which will ensure the application of appropriate sanctions. The exercise of public office will, of course, be analyzed, but under the rules of the "Rule of Law," whose definition, given the closer ties we must maintain now more than ever with the United States, is, as we read, "The state subject to the all-encompassing action of the Law, in the manner proclaimed more than 200 years ago by American constitutionalists when referring to 'Government of law, not of men.'"
Given the apparent intention to make us demanding of the so-called absolutist state—if indeed the term encompasses the US military's Caribbean strategy—it would be preferable to remain passive, allowing those with more experience to guide the complex process that currently engulfs us. We don't know whether to advise, as in radiology labs, "breathe, don't breathe."
In other words, and more plainly, "it's forbidden to stir things up, because things seem to be going well."
«The opinions published herein are the sole responsibility of its author».