Venezuela and the ordeal of the transition

By: Beatrice E. Rangel - 29/09/2026

The surprising appearance of Delcy Rodríguez, acting president of Venezuela, at the UN General Assembly raised a troubling question: why is the country overseeing the transition promoting its international legitimacy before the institutional reconstruction of Venezuela has even begun?

Everything indicates that the Venezuelan transition will follow its own path, as happened in Spain and Chile when they emerged from their dictatorships. According to Secretary of State Marco Rubio, the process consists of three stages: stabilization, recovery, and transition. The first aims to prevent an outbreak of violence, manage sanctions, and use between 30 and 50 million barrels of oil to finance the state without those resources ending up in corrupt hands. Recovery involves opening the Venezuelan market to US and other foreign companies, as well as promoting reconciliation through an amnesty and the release of political prisoners. The final stage requires strengthening civil society, establishing effective institutions and security guarantees, and holding free, open, and multiparty elections.

Nine months after the historic removal of Nicolás Maduro, even stabilization appears incomplete. A paralysis persists at various levels of government, hindering citizens' daily interactions with the state. Hospitals suffer from ever-increasing shortages of medicines and supplies; schools have yet to begin the new academic year; the economy is paralyzed, with most households barely able to afford one meal a day; and air and land transportation remains unreliable and unreliable. The release of political prisoners is also incomplete: approximately 350 people remain detained in brutal conditions.

Given this scenario, the country overseeing the transition would do well to examine two Latin American experiences: Brazil and Paraguay.

In Brazil, the final stage of the opening was spearheaded by João Figueiredo, a military officer who knew the inner workings of the power structure and had directed the Army's intelligence services. Figueiredo continued the opening initiated by his predecessor and helped create the conditions for the return of civilian rule. His case demonstrates that knowledge of the regime can facilitate a transition when those who possess it are willing to open up political spaces and relinquish power.

In Paraguay, General Andrés Rodríguez overthrew Alfredo Stroessner in 1989 and ushered in political liberalization. During his presidency, elections were held and a Constitution was adopted that prohibited presidential reelection. The result was a democracy with imperfections, but one capable of sustaining institutional alternation of power since 1993.

These experiences do not prove that any member of the old regime can lead a democratic transition. They do suggest that an insider can initiate one if they are willing to build institutions capable of limiting their own power and sustaining the process after their departure. That is the crucial test for Venezuela. And it is, perhaps, the lesson the host country needs to hear.

«The opinions published herein are the sole responsibility of its author».