The Supreme Court of Justice
By: Luis Beltrán Guerra G. - 04/05/2026
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In mid-2026, Venezuela will be responsible for electing Supreme Court justices, in accordance with the 1999 Constitution, which, incidentally, was approved by the direct verdict of popular sovereignty. Indeed, the Preamble, which linguistic experts define as "that which is expressed before what is intended to be ordered," confirms this. It was thus established, constitutionally speaking, that the aforementioned Magna Carta was, is, and will continue to be the sole responsibility of "popular sovereignty." That is, the power of the State to govern itself, subject only to its own will.
The constitution, it should be reiterated, is “the fundamental law of a State, with a higher rank than all others, which defines the system of rights and freedoms of citizens and delimits the powers and political institutions.” Historically, it has arisen from the need to establish guidelines according to which human behavior develops in the most balanced way possible. It is like the extension of individual agreements to those in which the collective interest is at stake. It is therefore described as the agreements between citizens that even give rise to the State itself. It is also understood as “a theory that explains the origin and purpose of the State and the maximization of the inherent rights of those who comprise it.” In a more realistic context, it is “the agreement between citizens,” which in some hypotheses constitutes the source of the State itself, although in others, perhaps, it is from the State that these rights derive through its recognition.
The mandate to the National Assembly, concerning the integration of the Supreme Court of Justice, must be reiterated, without a doubt, that is of a decisive significance, which is why the Constituent Assembly has been as explicit as possible in the Constitutional Text itself, specifically, in Title V, On the Organization of National Public Power, Chapter III, On the Judicial Power and the Justice System, whose provisions enable the National Assembly to provide the procedure for the selection, by itself, of the members of the highest body of the judicial power, that is, the Supreme Court of Justice (called mainly by legal professionals the TSJ). The National Assembly, we must assume, will take into account, with regard to the application of the regulatory regime established by itself (Organic Law of the Judiciary): 1. Its organic character, which leads to placing it in an intermediate position between the Magna Carta and ordinary laws, and which, acting rationally, are also called “constitutional laws”; 2. The procedure for the selection of candidates has been designed with a suitable clarity, both in relation to the nominations and the evaluation that must be made of them, through a mechanism, prima facie, of a preparatory nature aimed at the selection of the applicants, a task that falls to ad hoc commissions created by the legislative body; and 3. The final selection of the magistrates and their swearing-in. It could therefore be said that the constitutionally established power for selecting the magistrates who will comprise the various chambers of the Supreme Court of Justice should be described as "regulated," meaning that the selection process cannot be made without disregarding the substantive, procedural, or adjective requirements established constitutionally and legally. There is no discretion on the part of the authority, since the procedure is legally subject to mandatory rules. Ignorance of these requirements would lead to a transgression of the law and the vice known in public law as "abuse of power." Therefore, in the judicial review of the decision, it could be annulled, in addition to facing public censure, primarily because it concerns the sensitive area of the administration of justice.
One of the guidelines for sound constitutional interpretation, a role incumbent upon the legislative, executive, and judicial branches, is to bear in mind that the constitution's validity automatically entails the binding nature of its mandates, which in other essays we have termed "constitutional entrustments." These mandates are essentially "charges" from the "constituent assembly to its constituents," as we have noted, to the "people," but also to legislators, the government, and judges—that is, to both rulers and the ruled. The effectiveness of the "constitutional order," or the "social contract," depends on the implementation of these entrusted tasks. This applies to both the principals and the agents, that is, to "those who entrust (the entrustors) and those entrusted." It is clear that, with respect to the latter, including the rulers, the "duty to comply" is absolute.
The mission that the current Magna Carta assigns to the National Assembly must be noted, in addition, as it is significant, since it must be fulfilled during the validity of the “protectorate” established by the United States, since January 3 of this year, as a consequence of which the government that has been presided over since then by Delsy Rodríguez, described, particularly, by some in “the media”, as “an interim government”.
Finally, with the best of intentions and without wishing to take advantage, it occurs to us to consider whether, given our protectorate with the United States, it might be viable to nurture the hope that our legislators would seek cooperation from the North so that they could advise us, as they have done in selecting so many prestigious judges, particularly for the Supreme Court, whose rulings are often described as pivotal in the history of the so-called "giant of the North." As they say: "Since the day the Supreme Court of the United States first met in 1790, it has issued thousands of opinions on all subjects, from the powers of government to civil rights and freedom of the press. Although many of these decisions are little known and of little interest to the general public, several of them stand out for the impact they have had on the history of the country."
May God enlighten Venezuela.
«The opinions published herein are the sole responsibility of its author».