Protectorate vs. elections or elections vs. protectorate
By: Luis Beltrán Guerra G. - 19/04/2026
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It is not entirely inaccurate to suggest that Venezuela today could be considered the victim of a disagreement like that between a father and mother, where the father refuses to baptize his daughter, but she does. Both are convinced she is a beautiful child with great potential. Let us assume, in this possible metaphor, that the "protectorate" established following the events of January 3rd plays the role of the father, and the mother the leadership favored by the elections of July 28, 2024. Analyzing this issue is the purpose of this essay.
To begin, we believe that when considering whether Venezuela has fared well or poorly in recent decades, we should take into account the nature of societies affected by questionable leadership, coupled with uncertain civil discipline. In most cases, this leads to political power lacking ethical justification, consequently impacting both its exercise and the application of the law. To deny this observation, or to fail to address it, if we were to act honestly, is to perpetuate our self-deception.
It is a sincere reflection to acknowledge that in Venezuela, the democratic process was consolidated from 1958 to 1994, that is, for almost four decades under civilian leadership. Therefore, ethical justification and adherence to the law were present, fostering the political stability of the time. An admired Venezuela emerged amidst the scarcity of democracies in the region, joined by Colombia and Costa Rica, a trio of the only existing ones. "Betancurian democracy," as it should be called, in honor of Rómulo Betancourt, its leader, found conclusive support in the popular will, curtailing the possibility of coups d'état. But it also thwarted Fidel Castro's desire that the Caribbean nation ultimately be enveloped by his misnamed revolution.
For the sake of a credible assessment of our political history, we must also consider that Venezuela was the first South American colony to declare independence from Spain through a formal declaration on July 5, 1811. This declaration led to a long and costly war to become a sovereign republic, an endeavor we have been pursuing for quite some time. It must be pointed out that we have made a few missteps since that momentous date, driven more by personal than practical reasons, and intentionally disregarding the principle that constitutional assemblies alone do not change the political, social, and economic realities of countries. It is not an exaggeration to say that we have sought to constitutionalize ourselves, but the paradox is that we have cloaked ourselves in an "undesirable deconstitutionalization."
A penultimate chapter, "for now," in our recent history must be mentioned in the long process of our constitutional formalization, revealing that the latter seems to extend "ad infinitum." We are referring to the so-called "Bolivarian Revolution," presided over by Hugo Chávez from February 1999 to March 2013, whose position was filled by Nicolás Maduro (2013-2026). Its origin was a coup d'état, a mechanism we considered obsolete in the wake of a democracy praised in Latin America and a considerable part of the world (1961-1999), but also weary of the methodology that had been commonplace since 1908. Whether we have simply pulled it out of our heads remains a complex question. However, the answer seems to be no.
It is within this context that the United States established what we have previously termed a “protectorate, tutelage, and governmental co-responsibility.” The justification, as formally put forward by the United States, was to put an end to illegitimate activities by the then-government in Caracas, that is, the one presided over by Nicolás Maduro, currently facing charges in a New York court. This co-responsibility, established by mandate of the US Presidency, was structured as follows: 1. The President of the Republic, lawyer Delcy Rodríguez, who was then Vice President; 2. The continued existence, without alteration, in both its composition and functions, of the National Assembly, elected under the Presidency of the deposed President, exercising legislative power; and 3. The judicial power, vested in the Supreme Court of Justice, also without distinction. Let us assume, consequently, that this is the reality regarding the exercise of the three powers (executive, legislative, and judicial) established in the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, approved by referendum on December 15, 1999, popularly known as “Chavez’s constitution.” These are the characteristics, “for now,” of political power in Caracas, given the nature of the regime established by the White House, for a little over 3 months and 17 days since its establishment.
A popular movement spearheaded by Venezuelan María Corina Machado, recently awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, has been demanding an electoral process to re-legitimize public power in Venezuela through popular suffrage, an alternative not foreseen under the "protectorate regime," but which, it must be acknowledged, appears to have received the support of a significant number of essentially democratic countries. It would seem that the prominent political leader and her followers have become convinced of the slim chances of respecting the election of diplomat Edmundo González Urrutia as President in the 2024 elections, despite its recognition by more than 15 countries and international organizations. Evidence of this can be seen in the various meetings with important heads of state, parliamentarians, and even representatives from the United States, the holder of the protectorate, guardianship, or shared responsibility. The proposal from the "Vente Venezuela" movement, the political party founded by the Nobel laureate, would undoubtedly support its founder's motion, as is quite evident, particularly given the seemingly obvious unified, indivisible, and seamless leadership—a single bloc. The tutelary regime, as well as the powers established or recognized under it, will presumably be subjected, under its tutelage, to a level of accountability it has not previously faced. God willing, this will be for the sake of the Venezuela we continue to aspire to.
Despite the setbacks, it's hard to deny that Venezuelans, and indeed South Americans, dislike democracy; on the contrary, we desire it. We have much to learn to make it a reality, which requires us to learn once and for all that it is up to us to determine this through suffrage, to elect rulers, legislators, and judges, as well as to recall them. We are compelled to consider in our elections the difference between "commanding the subject" and "governing," meaning leading a country or a political community.
In the Encyclopedia of Politics, Rodrigo Borja notes that “under the assumption that in a politically organized society someone must govern, the question immediately arises of who should legitimately do so.” That is, whoever the people have legitimized for this demanding task. The former president of Ecuador gives us the impression of having accepted the existence of “politically organized societies” as a given; in our view, not all societies are, but rather, only a few. Likewise, the jurist emphasizes that in these societies “someone must govern,” a term that some fear, particularly in the numerous, questionable democratic regimes. For in these regimes, “one commands, one does not govern.”
God willing, we Venezuelans will be governed by others, because when we've been ruled by them, things haven't gone well for us. And may the Lord protect us from this, with or without a protectorate, tutelage, or shared governance—the scenario in which we unfortunately find ourselves.
Let us not lose hope that a combination of the two questions in the title will lead us to something truly constructive. And, of course, within the context of a democratic system.
The two questions embedded in the essay's title, leading us to benefits
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