France and the crisis of the nation-state and the welfare state

Beatrice E. Rangel

By: Beatrice E. Rangel - 21/10/2026


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Images of violence in France are shocking the world. Angry mobs are roaming the streets of the land of Asterix, leaving behind burning vehicles, destroyed shops, and attacked public buildings. The fury seems to be advancing like a wave of lava. But beyond the material damage, these scenes raise a more profound question: what happens when the state ceases to be perceived as the instrument capable of channeling citizens' aspirations and resolving a society's conflicts?

Among the reasons cited to explain the discontent are the deterioration of schools, insufficient teacher pay, and the disconnect between education and employment opportunities. These are problems that deserve attention. However, salary comparisons between countries also require considering the cost of living, the tax burden, and social benefits. In France, for example, universal healthcare coverage is part of a safety net that has no universal equivalent in the United States.

Are educational deficiencies enough to explain such fury against the system? Hardly. Much less to justify destruction. Beneath these displays of anger lie accumulated frustrations that extend beyond the school environment and point to problems of integration, representation, and belonging.

One of these challenges is the difficulty of fully integrating sectors of the population of immigrant origin, including descendants of African and Middle Eastern families, into national life. Residential segregation, lack of opportunities, and cultural tensions can weaken the sense of belonging even among those born in France and holding French citizenship. In turn, this distance fuels rejection from other sectors of society. A divide is thus created between legal citizenship and the everyday experience of belonging to a national community.

Certain right-wing groups attribute this situation to what they describe as a Gramscian project of weakening the state, associated with the so-called woke culture. This explanation, however, overlooks a deeper transformation: the loss of effectiveness of the nation-state as an articulator of interests and mediator of disputes.

In the 21st century, institutions compete for public trust with the beliefs circulating on social media. There, unsubstantiated accusations and simplistic narratives can spread with enormous speed, eroding institutional legitimacy without offering viable alternatives or teaching how to build them. Criticism, essential for democracy, loses its transformative power when it becomes a constant challenge to all authority and any shared rule.

When trust in justice, organized participation, and the power of solidarity weakens, the temptation to impose one's own opinions by force gains ground. Collective bonds give way to an individualism that finds its expression in confrontation. The fabric of the nation-state then begins to unravel, and rigid loyalties reappear, eroding the Enlightenment ideal of a citizenry governed by common rights and norms.

Another source of discontent is the erosion of the welfare state. The European model promises to support people from birth to old age, but this safety net is struggling to meet the expectations it helped create. Forged largely in response to the excesses of industrialization and the major crises of the 20th century, it must now adapt to more diverse societies and profoundly transformed economies.

One of the tensions lies in the need to provide universal services through structures that tend toward standardization. In education, this tendency can hinder attention to diverse abilities and interests. Some students excel in mathematics; others, in critical thinking, literature, or technical trades. Universal schooling is an achievement, but it loses some of its promise when it doesn't offer sufficiently diverse pathways to develop these talents. Frustration increases when educational efforts also fail to lead to employment.

This is compounded by the pressure on public service financing. Globalization and the digital economy have widened the gap between the territories where economic activity is generated and those where profits are declared. Although capital mobility did not begin with technology platforms, the international organization of companies facilitates the transfer of profits to lower-tax jurisdictions.

This dynamic makes revenue collection difficult and complicates the fulfillment of social commitments. It is not the only cause of the problem: the aging population, the rising cost of healthcare, and management shortcomings also contribute. But the tension is evident. Citizens expect timely, high-quality services, while the state faces increasing obstacles in funding them. Waiting lists, overcrowded hospitals, and uncertainty about pensions transform this gap into a personal experience of vulnerability.

The combination of these pressures reduces the capacity of institutions to respond to citizens' aspirations, reconcile interests, and resolve conflicts. This creates a magma of discontent that can find an opportunity to erupt in a specific incident. France offers a particularly visible manifestation of this fracture, but it would be unwise to assume that its European neighbors are immune to similar tensions.

The United States faces comparable pressures, although its social safety net is different. The concentration of economic power, the political influence of finance and large technology companies, and the aftermath of financial crises have fueled insecurity among broad sectors of the middle class. One of the political expressions of this discontent is the MAGA movement, centered around Donald Trump and the promise of reclaiming a country that many of his supporters feel they have lost.

The French crisis, therefore, compels us to look beyond the immediate crisis. What is at stake is the capacity of the nation-state to sustain a community of citizens and the capacity of the welfare state to make its promise of protection credible. If both functions weaken simultaneously, discontent loses its institutional channels. Restoring these channels requires rebuilding trust through institutions capable of integration, providing opportunities, and being accountable for their results.


«The opinions published herein are the sole responsibility of its author».