Europe between Scylla and Charybdis

By: Beatrice E. Rangel - 28/10/2026

The violence unleashed in the streets of France and, to a lesser extent, in other European nations has diverted attention from a less visible but crucial threat to the continent's future: the possibility of being caught between two opposing fronts. This is the scenario that haunted Otto von Bismarck and which he sought to avoid throughout his public life. Just as the chancellor resorted to diplomacy, alliances, military force, and deception to prevent Prussia and, later, the German Empire from having to fight simultaneously on two fronts, Europe must mobilize its resources to prevent two converging pressures from jeopardizing its stability.

The first front is Russia and the states that support its expansionist policies. Russia's relationship with Europe has oscillated for centuries between rapprochement and antagonism. Its historical memory is marked by invasions and occupations from various directions. Mongol and Tatar domination, wars with Lithuania, and later, the Napoleonic and Nazi invasions contributed to forging a perception of vulnerability that continues to weigh on its worldview.

Vladimir Putin exploits this memory to portray Russia as a besieged fortress and consolidate an autocratic regime in which he rules like an absolute monarch. The search for buffer states and the fear of a NATO attack are part of this narrative. With it, he has sought to legitimize the invasion of Ukraine and discredit internal dissent. NATO expansion, driven by successive US administrations and championed by Madeleine Albright, provided the Kremlin with an argument to fuel this sense of encirclement. In my view, it was a strategic error, although this does not justify Russian aggression nor does it negate the right of European countries to decide their alliances.

Today, Russian pressure transcends the Ukrainian battlefield and reaches into the daily lives of Europeans. Espionage, disinformation operations, cyberattacks, and attempts to influence domestic politics are all part of a confrontation that also exploits discontent stemming from the deterioration of public services and strains on the welfare state. Hybrid warfare allows Moscow to weaken European cohesion without resorting to a direct military confrontation with NATO.

The second front is opening up on the other side of the Atlantic. The United States, a fundamental pillar of European security for decades, is undergoing a profound reassessment of its role in the world. An influential current within its policy calls for concentrating resources within its borders and conditioning international commitments on concrete benefits for the country. Under this logic, assistance must translate into diplomatic, political, or economic gains; Europe must assume a greater proportion of its own defense, and rapprochement with Russia is no longer an unthinkable option. For Europeans, the problem is the uncertainty surrounding the continuity and scope of US support.

Europe thus risks being caught between Russian hostility and an increasingly conditional transatlantic relationship. These are not equivalent threats, but their convergence could subject the continent to pressure for which its institutions are ill-prepared. If this pressure deepens political fragmentation and economic paralysis, it could strengthen nationalism and erode liberal democracy. European history offers ample warnings about the costs of this combination. Avoiding it requires restructuring the continent's economies, increasing their complementarity, and translating integration into prosperity that citizens can recognize in their daily lives.

Renewing the economic and political foundations of the welfare state requires building a new economy in cooperation with the United States. One starting point could be the Arctic. There, interests related to security, the supply of critical minerals, energy, and the development of maritime routes that could facilitate trade with Asia converge. The ambitions of China, Russia, Europe, and the United States also converge there. The Greenland agreement offers a foothold for expanding this cooperation, always with respect for its inhabitants and institutions. But turning this opportunity into a strategy requires European leadership to stop looking inward and turn its gaze toward the other side of the Atlantic with a concrete commitment to cooperation and integration.

«The opinions published herein are the sole responsibility of its author».