Can there be lasting peace between Lebanon and Israel as long as Hezbollah does not disarm?

By: Ricardo Israel - 26/04/2026

These are optimistic days. With the US acting as facilitator, they have already met twice in just a few days at the level of envoys and ambassadors, in direct negotiations and in preparation for a meeting between Netanyahu and President Aoun in the near future. This Thursday, April 23, Donald Trump announced that the ceasefire would be extended for another three weeks, a cessation of hostilities that is not “100% effective,” as the Israeli ambassador to the UN was quick to clarify, which is true, considering that every missile, attack, or provocation by Hezbollah is met with an immediate, sometimes devastating, Israeli response.

Except for groups like this one, the two neighboring countries should have enjoyed better, even close, relations. However, foreign interference has had an excessive impact on Lebanon, with international factors playing a decisive role. These include, in chronological order, the Arab League, the Palestinian PLO, Syria, the origin and conclusion of the civil war, and Iran. The conflict began in 1948, the day after Israel's Declaration of Independence, when Lebanon was one of the five Arab countries invaded by Israeli armies. This should not have happened, given that Lebanon had been created by carving out territory from Greater Syria, where France replaced the Ottoman Empire. This was primarily intended to protect the Christian minority through a complex political-confessional arrangement: the president would be a Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim, and the speaker of parliament a Shia Muslim.

After the ceasefire, the shared border remained relatively peaceful for years compared to the rest of the neighboring countries, but everything changed when Palestinian militias were expelled from Jordan in 1970 after Black September, settling in southern Lebanon to attack Israel from that territory. The actions of the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization), the PLF (Palestine Liberation Front), and other smaller groups resulted in Israeli invasions in 1978 and 1982. The second invasion led to the expulsion of Arafat and his associates from Beirut to Tunisia, where he remained until the agreement reached in Norway with the PLO led to the creation of the Palestinian Authority. Arafat assumed the presidency in Ramallah, and from there he launched his call for the Second Intifada. Meanwhile, from 1975 onwards, the radicalization that the country was undergoing as a result of various internal and external circumstances, especially due to the interference of Syria, led to a civil war between Muslims and Christians, a conflict that ended Lebanon's status as "the Paris of the Middle East" and the experiment in multicultural tolerance that had taken place.

It was during this period, starting in the 1980s, that Iran created Hezbollah, the "Party of God," as an arm of the Islamic Revolution. Since then, it has conditioned all Lebanese sovereignty, ultimately replacing Syria as the most relevant external influence. This allowed the terrorist militia to become a more powerful military actor than the Lebanese armed forces themselves. So much so that when Israel withdrew from its occupation of the south of the country, this vacuum, instead of being filled by the State, was occupied until very recently by Hezbollah. They used this territory and the captive population as human hostages to systematically attack Israel, each time suffering the Israeli response, which took the form of a brief war in 2006.

The geopolitical situation had changed. Israel had withdrawn completely in 2000, hoping never to return, but Iran's occupation of the evacuated territory through Hezbollah was part of Tehran's strategy to create a "belt" around Israel while the Islamic Republic sought to acquire its atomic bomb. This was a period of such Iranian dominance that Hezbollah transformed into a militia at its service, also deploying to Syria to defend the al-Assad dictatorship in the civil war there, and to carry out terrorism in Buenos Aires.

When Hamas invaded Israel on October 7, 2023, the next day Hezbollah launched a relentless attack, and through it, Iran launched attacks from Lebanon, despite a ceasefire in place. The attacks were so constant that, in order to protect its border population, Israel had to evacuate tens of thousands of citizens for months, making daily life impossible, not only Jews, but also Israelis of Arab and Bedouin origin.

This situation repeated itself immediately after the joint US-Israeli attack on Iran beginning on February 28th. Of all the so-called "proxies"—that is, militias that answered to Iran in the region—only Hezbollah responded by attacking immediately, despite repeated pleas from Israel to the Lebanese authorities to prevent such a situation. Apparently, the Lebanese state was unable to persuade them, but it did publicly declare its position that the actions were unacceptable, as the terrorists were once again dragging the country into a war that was Iran's, a war they were destined to lose. Furthermore, for the first time in many years, the rest of the country was showing its displeasure with them, evidence that they had lost the internal support they had enjoyed in the past.

At the same time, the UN military forces once again demonstrated their characteristic inefficiency, failing to enforce UN resolutions prohibiting Hezbollah from operating south of the Litani River. This is the context in which the most recent Israeli invasion took place, with the stated aim of expelling the militants from the border towards the aforementioned river, effectively recreating the 1982 occupation. As in Gaza, this invasion acknowledges the failure of a unilateral withdrawal, which in Lebanon can only result from what is currently being attempted: a peace agreement. Hezbollah was and remains an instrument of Iran, its creator.

In other words, there is a high probability that a situation similar to the one currently existing with Hamas in Gaza will be repeated with Hezbollah. There, Israel has reoccupied a strip of land divided by the so-called Yellow Line, in the territory from which Israel had withdrawn in 2005, also hoping never to return. That is to say, after 26 years, Israel reoccupied southern Lebanon, and after 21 years, it reoccupied more than half of Gaza, as a consequence of decisions originating in Hezbollah and Hamas.

And here we come to a central theme of this column: beware of expectations. Israel is at war with Iran, and this entails definitively confronting the threat of Hezbollah as its armed wing, this time, perhaps for the first time, in conjunction with Lebanon, which is increasingly convinced that it has been another victim of the Islamic Revolution. But success will depend not only on Beirut but also on Israel being as realistic as possible regarding what to expect and what can be achieved.

The reality is that Hamas undoubtedly still enjoys strong support in Gaza; it simply hasn't disarmed, and between the Yellow Line and the sea, it still controls almost the entire population. Hezbollah, for its part, no longer enjoys the government's complicity, and today there is a rift with the Christian sector with which it negotiated, as well as a distancing from minorities like the Druze. However, it continues to have the support of the Shiites. Expectations should be tempered, because although both groups have been militarily defeated, as has Tehran, which has been so severely weakened that it is in no position to assist them, this doesn't mean the same thing as elsewhere. Victory and defeat have different meanings and are expressed differently in the Middle East than in the West.

Neither of the two militias is going to disappear since they are much more than terrorist groups, being movements whose fundamentalism has a religious substrate, in addition to having a social base, whose affiliation comes not only from identity or ethnicity, but even in the most unfavorable circumstances, they still fulfill social security functions for their people, as well as providing services as important as education and health.

Israel can, however, rest assured that for now, and for some time that may be long, they no longer represent a danger of invasion, not only from Gaza and southern Lebanon, but it is not seen how Iran could help them.

However, the novelty now is the support Israel has received from Sunni Arab countries, representing the most significant change the region has undergone in a long time, somewhat similar to what happened after World War II, when former enemies of the US became allies, as is the case with Germany and Japan. In that instance, the fear the USSR inspired during the Cold War played a significant role, a role that Russia now plays in the case of Germany and China in the case of Japan.

In the case of Israel and the Arab countries, this role was played by Iran, since the fear aroused by the possibility that the Islamic Revolution possessed an atomic bomb led to support, including military support, for Israel when it was attacked by Iran with a barrage of missiles in 2024, including from Arab countries that had previously gone to war. This support was also visible when Israel attacked alongside the US in the 2025 Twelve-Day War, where Israeli aircraft crossed Arab territory on their way to destroy Iranian air defenses and achieve total air superiority. I am so convinced of this relationship that, in a recent book I authored on Israel, published by the Inter-American Institute for Democracy in November 2025, the subheading on the cover reflects the main thesis: that “the future (brings with it) an alliance with former enemies, the Sunni Arab countries.” (*)

Moreover, I am also convinced that if the US manages to get Iran to accept the end of its nuclear program through negotiation, bombing, or economic extortion, the Middle East is headed toward a new reality. The Arab Gulf states were so concerned about Iranian aggression and how it affected their oil and gas exports that a new NATO will emerge in the region, replacing the one that perhaps should have disappeared along with the USSR. As a consequence of the estrangement from the US, NATO is currently disappearing in Europe, but it would now reappear in that part of the world as an entity uniting the US, the Sunni Arab states, and Israel to control the Strait of Hormuz, protect itself from Iran, and likely establish new oil and gas pipelines crossing from Saudi Arabia to Jordan and Israel. From there, fuel would be exported through Mediterranean ports to Europe, while others would reach the Red Sea and be shipped to Asia, including China, among other destinations. India and Japan, where Israel's recent recognition of the Republic of Somaliland gives them an effective future presence in Yemen, to control the Houthis from the Gulf of Aden.

This would be an opportunity for this new alliance to enable the emergence of the long-awaited Palestinian state, if its leadership this time takes advantage of the opportunity instead of calling for the elimination of Israel, as has happened on several occasions so far.

This could happen because, as a consequence of Iran's military defeat, a changed reality is emerging through a new alliance in the Middle East. This also confirms Europe's growing irrelevance, especially if the ongoing negotiations between China and the US culminate in an agreement during Trump's visit to Xi Jinping on May 13 and 14. The combined economic power of the US and China would be so immense that the rest of the world would have no alternative but to join in. In practice, this agreement would establish new rules that will replace those the US is currently dismantling by modifying its own post-1945 creation. However, if no agreement is reached, the current status quo will simply be maintained.

In the Middle East, the rapprochement with Arab countries could be so significant that this new scenario, or one similar to it, will emerge, even if Israel and the US part ways regarding Iran. This is because the interests of a major world power differ from those of a country with only regional reach, however effective their joint attack on the Islamic Revolution may have been. The US might be satisfied if Iran agrees to end its nuclear program, while Israel will continue bombing, as all indications are that the Islamic Republic has survived, albeit in a different form. In the current war, the Persian country appears to be led by a kind of military junta in place of the ayatollahs, given the uncertainty surrounding the current Supreme Leader's existence.

This appears to be the case, and in this context, Iran will continue attempting to destroy the "Zionist entity," since it never identifies it by name. Undoubtedly, Israel will continue acting against Hezbollah and Hamas, but I believe that, within this framework, the US will still continue providing the weapons and ammunition necessary to fight on three fronts. There won't be daily fighting, but this scenario is quite likely, given two circumstances that would provide Israel with a solid foundation to continue its efforts. First, the economy has not only withstood the crisis but has actually grown since October 7th. Second, the ongoing struggle against Iran, despite its length, continues to enjoy strong public support, with the majority convinced that they will not have a better opportunity again.

Added to this is the current dialogue with Lebanon, which is undoubtedly very welcome, although not entirely surprising, given that it is not the first time in recent years that Beirut has sought Washington's good offices. This mediation facilitated the announcement in October 2022 of what was called a "historic" agreement to demarcate the maritime borders between the rival countries, which undoubtedly contributed to the current dialogue. On that occasion, Lebanese interest was clear, as the waters in question contain hydrocarbons, primarily gas, and Beirut had been facing a severe economic crisis since 2020. International investment in those waters would not be possible until the dispute was resolved, investment that would also help address Lebanon's own energy crisis, which became very apparent after the port explosion.

If the current talks lead to resolving the outstanding issues, a peace agreement would put the path back on track after it was interrupted by the assassination of President-elect Bashir Gemayel, a member of a family traditionally linked to the defense of Maronite Christians. He was killed on September 14, 1982, before taking office, in an attack orchestrated by Syrian intelligence. This was determined in 2017 by a ruling from the Lebanese Judicial Council, the country's highest court on security matters, which convicted in absentia the perpetrators of this assassination and the murders of 32 other people.

The reason for the attack was that Bashir Gemayel had pledged to make peace with Israel. Syria was again behind an assassination when, on February 13, 2005, a car bomb killed then-Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and 21 other people, this time through Hezbollah, whose perpetrators were members, as determined by a UN-backed Special Tribunal.

Reality shows that the serious dialogue taking place in Washington between Lebanon and Israel would not be possible without the military destruction suffered by Iran, but peace cannot materialize if Hezbollah is not disarmed and Beirut fails to impose a monopoly on force throughout the territory. This has been compounded by another major development: perhaps for the first time since Lebanon's definitive independence on November 22, 1943, France has been excluded from a crucial decision. Paris has no involvement whatsoever in this rapprochement, not even for public display, by Israel's decision, but even more importantly, by Lebanon's own. This loss of influence is undoubtedly a punishment for Macron's foreign policy, but also a testament to the growing irrelevance of Europe, especially the colonial powers, which bear so much responsibility for the origins of this situation.

There is no doubt that Israel and the current Lebanese government, led by Joseph Aoun, former commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces, desire the disarmament of Hezbollah. However, no matter how much territory Israel occupies, this will not be fully realized without the Lebanese Army's willingness and commitment to disarm throughout the country. Such commitment has been entirely absent so far, as the army appears to lack both the military capacity and the will to do so, given its deep divisions and the infiltration at various levels by troops and officers committed to Hezbollah. This situation can only be resolved through an internal political agreement, which will be more effective than any Israeli victory or the current military advice and supplies from the United States.

It is, therefore, a moment of truth for the Lebanese Army, and it remains to be seen whether it can overcome its limitations. For now, high-level dialogue represents a significant shift in Lebanon, as previously there was no desire for any public relations, nothing direct. Now, this time, it was the government itself that requested direct, face-to-face talks, and there is no doubt that a ceasefire helps advance peace, even if it is intermittent and not total. It is true that ceasefires work best when they are between states, because when there are militias like Hezbollah and Hamas, reality and experience show that once established, that border can be violated. This has happened to Israel with both militias on several occasions, as these ceasefires, rather than being respected, are merely an opportunity for them to strengthen themselves.

The situation has been different with ceasefires with other states, including Lebanon, since in 1949, after the War of Independence, the border between Israel and the occupying countries was established along the so-called Green Line. Not only has this line survived, but strangely, it has become something it was not: instead of a simple ceasefire, it has transformed into an “official” border, even for the Palestinians and the Arab League, much like the border between the Koreas in Asia.

Will the agreements reached between Lebanon and Israel last?

Everything will depend on whether the terrorist group is disarmed. At least Iran's interference has been severely limited for now, so much so that the Lebanese government has perhaps for the first time asked them to leave the country alone and back off. But however defeated it may seem, Hezbollah is not going to disappear, reinforcing the problem created by armed militias that are militarily more powerful than the regular army. In fact, in Lebanon, Hezbollah's disarmament was approved last September, but nothing has happened since, and today, officially, they say that any agreement with Israel "neither concerns them nor obligates them to anything." For now, it seems that for some time in southern Lebanon the situation with the yellow line in Gaza will be replicated, and any peace, as well as a future Palestinian state, will be closely linked to what has not been possible to impose either in Lebanese territory or what the Palestinian Authority failed to achieve when Hamas staged a coup in Gaza with little resistance from the then legitimate authority; that is, both will have to do what they have not been able or willing to do: control militias that do not believe in the nation-state but in a universal religious utopia.

The Arab world is accustomed to periods that last only as long as the resources of their financiers. For many, the time comes to disappear. This happened with Nasserist Pan-Arabism, with communist movements, and with the Ba'athists of Saddam and Assad. If they are lucky, the time has come for Hezbollah and its Persian backers to disappear. In Lebanon, for generations, they were Shiites deeply proud of being Lebanese until an armed gang imposed itself upon them.

For now, these are hopeful times, not only for Lebanon, as a peace agreement could achieve what Hezbollah is preventing: the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the south and the return of displaced Lebanese citizens, as well as security for Israelis who had to leave their homes.

Among the existing models, if all goes well, the Peace of Isaac that Lebanon and Israel are seeking could resemble the significant progress made in the relationship with the Emirates under the Abraham Accords, moving beyond the coldness of a purely territorial peace, in which territories won in war were returned, as happened with Egypt. The status quo benefits no one, since Israel has not initiated any wars since 1948, yet it has won them all, and those who start them end up losing territories, which have only been recovered through negotiation.

However, none of this guarantees peace. Given the current government's stance, achieving peace hinges entirely on whether or not Hezbollah is disarmed.

(*) Ricardo Israel, In Defense of Israel, Amazon, 460pp., 2025

@israelzipper

Master's and PhD in Political Science (University of Essex), Bachelor of Laws (University of Barcelona), Lawyer (University of Chile), former presidential candidate (Chile, 2013)

«The opinions published herein are the sole responsibility of its author».