Can constitutional legacies be salvaged?
By: Luis Beltrán Guerra G. - 15/12/2025
Share:
We don't know if the word "rescatable" is too vulgar to use in an essay about "the constitution," that is, "the fundamental law of a republic," which leads some linguists to capitalize it. In the US, a country known for honoring capital letters, it's called "capital letter." Perhaps the vulgarity can be minimized by using some of the synonyms for "rescatar," including recuperar, recuperar, and retomar.
But it is equally complex to consider whether constitutions are "inheritable," that is, whether their configuration and purpose can be transmitted from generation to generation according to hereditary patterns. Perhaps it is helpful to turn to the term "social inheritance," which is often analyzed, in pursuit of a more complete vision, within the framework of what is called "traditionalism." For some, this is "a direct revelation from God that it is up to humankind to develop through individual reflection, collective action, and trust." But it is also relevant to the doctrine that sees history as "a providential order or plan."
Let us assume, then, that “constitutional legacies can be salvaged,” since, as has been stated, one of the most cumbersome challenges of a nation's development has given rise to “a constitutional philosophy,” which we should assume constitutes “the backbone of the legacy.” It is to this, therefore, that “hereditary succession” must refer. To conceive of it as a lineage that outlasts ourselves does not seem to be a mistake.
The dilemma concerning Venezuela finds decisive explanations in José Gil Fortoul, a prominent Venezuelan intellectual, writer, historian, lawyer, and politician, who even served as its provisional president. The source is his excellent work, "Constitutional Philosophy," regarding which he states that it is not a synthesis of absolute principles on the political form of societies, which manifest themselves in diverse forms in each historical moment and in each ethnographic context. The original flaw of our constitutions stems from the fact that "the initiative of the rulers" has always predominated in them, instead of "social initiative." "The military leaders," the academic points out, often possessing no merits other than the personal prestige acquired in the frequent civil wars, and "the vociferous tribunes," who, making politics a profession, rose up against the ignorant classes and dazzled them with theories as hollow as their minds, establishing a de facto oligarchy over the republic, "an instinctive enemy of all democratic demands." These observations, at least for this writer, lead one to consider that the Venezuelan constitutional inheritance is best rejected, arguing, if we so wish and with apologies for the irony, that according to the general principles of inheritance law, “no one can be an heir against their will.” This is further reinforced by Gil Fortoul's assertion that our constitutional history reflects “an absolute lack of harmony between constitutional law and social laws.”
Constitutionalism, as we read, is associated with the political theories of the founders of the United States as a “republic,” according to which “the State must be legally limited in its powers,” leading to the conclusion that the “authority” it holds is bound by the observance of these limits. This idea raises the question of how the State can be limited if it is the one that creates the laws. It also asks whether the State can “limit itself.” The answer lies in considering that, if such limitations are invoked, they must be enshrined as written rules, logically, in the constitutional text. And they must be interpreted restrictively, that is, in light of their exceptional nature.
For some time now, Venezuela has been facing challenges. Currently, it confronts a critical situation, despite a long struggle for genuine democracy. That is to say, there is no guarantee of a positive outcome, and therefore, subsuming its situation under the alternative of "hereditary democratic constitutionality" inevitably raises the doubts that can be inferred from this essay. Please forgive us for invoking the capacity to face difficult events, which, with the help of "Divine Providence," may perhaps guide us to the best path.
It would seem, however, beneficial, if not indispensable, that if we deem the "rescue of constitutional legacies" laudable, a sound methodology for determining the best path forward might be a comparative analysis between the democratic Constitution of 1961, both in its text and in its implementation, and the current one, that is, the so-called Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of 1999. From this, if we proceed seriously, we will deduce what can be inherited in what would most likely be a new "Magna Carta." Which we hope will be truly democratic and applied in accordance with its nature.
Whether this approach is useful or not, much remains to be done, because Venezuela is currently viewed with concern from every corner of the world, even from heaven. But, it's also difficult to say, from hell itself.
God willing, we'll get out of this mess. We all need it.
God will provide.
«The opinions published herein are the sole responsibility of its author».