Brazil: the mirage of Latin American analysts

By: Beatrice E. Rangel - 06/10/2026

Before the vote count in Brazil was even complete, numerous analysts were already celebrating what they described as a victory for the right. A similar interpretation accompanied the triumphs of Nayib Bukele in El Salvador, Javier Milei in Argentina, Santiago Peña in Paraguay, Daniel Noboa in Ecuador, José Antonio Kast in Chile, and, more recently, Abelardo de la Espriella in Colombia. Flávio Bolsonaro's surge reinforces this interpretation, although the Brazilian presidency will still have to be decided in the second round on October 25.

The altarpiece evokes a not-so-distant past, when many Latin American governments were led by figures identified with the right. During the Cold War, anti-communist doctrines underpinned military regimes such as those in Brazil (1964–1985), Chile under Augusto Pinochet (1973–1990), Argentina (1976–1983), and Uruguay (1973–1985), as well as the long dictatorship of Alfredo Stroessner in Paraguay (1954–1989). Their end resulted from diverse processes: popular mobilizations, economic crises, military defeats, political negotiations, and even internal coups. Subsequent transitions paved the way for democratic governments of varying orientations. However, electoral alternation did not always translate into stronger institutions.

It is worth asking, therefore, whether we are witnessing the rise of a democratic right or a change of label that allows the perpetuation of the power structures that we call feudal here: inherited privileges, personal dependence and capture of the State by private interests.

The distinction is fundamental. The democratic right, in its liberal and constitutional form, shares with other democratic currents a legacy of the Enlightenment: limits on power, equality before the law, and respect for institutions. To this it usually adds the defense of private enterprise, competition, and fiscal discipline. Latin America was influenced by Enlightenment ideas, but their incorporation into institutional life was uneven and incomplete. Hence the persistence of a contradiction: modern trappings over structures of privilege that resist change.

These principles don't always guide the movements that today claim the right-wing label. Economic freedom is easily invoked, but it becomes uncomfortable when it demands dismantling protections, subsidies, or state interventions that guarantee incomes for powerful sectors. There are significant differences between their programs—Milei, for example, has made economic liberalization a central tenet—but the decisive test lies in determining whether the reforms expand competition and opportunities or simply redistribute privileges.

In the institutional sphere, the contradiction is equally evident. Constitutional reforms are used to facilitate reelection or alter electoral rules, while other decisions are justified by the urgency of security or the need to transform the economy. El Salvador's prison policy, the exceptional measures in Ecuador, and the restrictions implemented by Milei regarding citizenship and foreigners' access to certain public services raise questions about due process, proportionality, and individual rights. The effectiveness of a policy is not enough to confer democratic legitimacy upon it.

Judicial independence is another essential test. Pressures on judges and courts cut across the region's ideological landscape. Although there are substantial differences between countries and varying degrees of institutional resistance, no political force should be exempt from scrutiny. A democracy is not measured by the docility of its judges, but by their capacity to decide without submitting to the ruler of the day.

Viewed from this perspective, the forces that define themselves as democratic right-wing still have much to prove: respect for the separation of powers, equality before the law, and a commitment to economic freedom that is not reduced to the protection of vested interests. As long as these principles are not translated into governing practices, we will continue to see power structures with aristocratic roots attempting to manage modern democracies.

The movement led by Flávio Bolsonaro must be examined using the same criteria. His electoral advance expresses the desire for change among a considerable portion of the Brazilian electorate, but it does not, in itself, demonstrate democratic renewal. Nor does Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's trajectory exempt him from responding to the challenges of the 21st century. In my view, Fernando Henrique Cardoso remains a prominent figure for his attempt to combine economic modernization with institutional consolidation. The remaining challenge lies in transforming these objectives into sustained practice, transcending individual leaderships.

Insufficient economic freedom limits investment, productivity, and the creation of opportunities necessary to reduce poverty. Weak institutional checks and balances restrict the participation of civil society and facilitate state capture. In turn, the deterioration of public services widens the gap between the equality proclaimed by law and the inequality experienced by citizens.

Faced with this erosion of power, the population seeks to correct course by replacing its leaders. Thus, leaders who present themselves as representatives of the right or the left come to power, without their practices necessarily aligning with the principles they invoke. They satisfy the immediate demand to replace the ruler, but leave unfinished the more difficult task: transforming power and strengthening democracy. The analysts' illusion lies in confusing this replacement with an institutional transformation.

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