A Spanish-style transition for Cuba and Venezuela?

By: César Vidal - 27/02/2026

As you might expect, I'm following the political developments in Venezuela and Cuba with great interest. I've been doing so for decades—in the case of Cuba, literally since my childhood—and my interest has generally only grown. It was precisely for this reason that I was struck by Secretary of State Marco Rubio's assertion that change in Venezuela will follow a transitional process similar to that experienced by Spain in the second half of the 1970s. I don't know if Rubio's statement stems from a thorough analysis or simply reveals his very limited knowledge of history and geopolitics. Of course, it could be both, but allow me to outline the most obvious characteristics of the Spanish transition, and then let each of you decide whether that's the process you would consider advisable for Venezuela and Cuba.

1. There will be a total amnesty without criminal or political accountability: the Spanish transition took place after a tense Second Republic marked by violence on both sides, a civil war characterized by more deaths behind the lines than on the battlefield, and a dictatorship of almost forty years. The way out of this situation was the granting of a total and very generous amnesty for all crimes committed, including the very recent acts of terrorism and torture. No one, absolutely no one, was prosecuted for what happened during those decades, and those who were in prison were released.

2. There will be no purge in the security apparatus or the armed forces: in keeping with this general amnesty, no purge was carried out in the police or the army, even though they had performed repressive tasks and committed crimes. All retained their positions, ranks, decorations, and benefits, although those who had lost their rank for fighting on the losing side in the civil war were reinstated.

3. The process will be led by people from the previous dictatorial regime: the transition process was led by the dictatorship itself. It is true that, from a certain point, those people from the Franco regime—with the king and Adolfo Suárez at the forefront—began to engage in dialogue with the opposition political forces, but at no point did they relinquish control of the process.

4. Exile played only a symbolic role, not a relevant one, much less a decisive one: of course, the exiles were able to return to Spain—many had already done so since 1969—but they did not have a significant or decisive influence on the transition process. Some exiles symbolically became members of Congress, as was the case with communists like the historic La Pasionaria, the poet Rafael Alberti, and Santiago Carrillo himself, general secretary of the Communist Party, as well as some Catalan nationalists like Josep Tarradellas. But the transition was decided by the people who had remained in the country, not by the exiles or the children of the exiles.

5. There will be no restitution except for a few entities: no restitution was made to individuals for properties seized during the war or the dictatorship. The only restitutions affected political parties from the republican era and labor unions. However, no restitution was made to entities such as evangelical churches whose buildings and schools were expropriated and given to the Catholic Church. Nor was the property expropriated from Freemasonry returned. Likewise, no compensation was established for individuals, even if only symbolically.

6. The electoral process granted a fundamental role to the old regime: far from disappearing from the political arena, Francoism continued to exert a decisive influence on the nation's future. It wasn't simply that the head of state—King Juan Carlos—had been appointed by Franco, or that Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez came from the ranks of the National Movement, but that the right wing, with a few honorable exceptions, originated from the Francoist ranks, even though it fragmented into far-right groups like Fuerza Nueva, the Popular Alliance of former Francoist minister Manuel Fraga, or Suárez's Union of the Democratic Centre, which also incorporated right-wing democratic forces. In fact, the electoral law itself was designed to give a majority to right-wing voters, a majority that the right wing didn't always know how to exploit due to its internal struggles.

7. Foreign policy will not be sovereign but subservient: although this factor was not mentioned during its development, it is obvious that the Spanish transition process was fundamentally overseen by the United States from before Franco's death, with Henry Kissinger playing an initial and particular role. This circumstance meant that Spain would be integrated into NATO—formal entry occurred just a few years after Franco's death—and that its foreign policy would lack independence, being subordinated to that of the White House.

These were the characteristics of the Spanish transition. The reader can judge whether this is how they would wish for the transition to take place in Venezuela or Cuba, or whether, on the contrary, they consider such a possibility undesirable, regardless of what Marco Rubio might say.

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