With Israel's recent response to Iran, will the relationship of mutual understanding that Israel and Russia have had change?

By: Ricardo Israel - 21/04/2024

Since the Hamas invasion on October 7 of last year and Israel's response to eliminate it as a military threat with accusations of genocide included, the Middle East has entered uncharted territory. So was the unprecedented attack on April 14 from Iranian territory with over 300 drones and missiles.

Considering the above and that Iran's support has been important for its invasion of Ukraine, in general Russia's attitude towards Israel has been cautious, and the question is whether it will change with the military action that just took place on the night of on April 18 and at dawn on the 19th, this time from Israel to Iranian territory. Apparently Israel did it to regain strategic credibility, since a limited action complied with the requests of the United States but allowed Israel to demonstrate that, unlike Iran, it was able to bomb deep into the adversary (and that in the future it would do so). could do with nuclear facilities), recovering the strategic credibility that had been lost, and which is vital for any peace agreement with Saudi Arabia, demonstrating that there is a will to confront the country that the Sunni Arab world perceives as a common existential enemy.

My impression is that if there is no escalation in the near future and Tehran's response is limited to the usual attacks by its proxies like Hezbollah, the mutual relationship of Russia and Israel will continue on the path of mutual understanding that was established at from the Syrian civil war.

The first thing to say is that Russia has not been abrupt, despite the importance that Iran acquired for the Kremlin's military objective in Ukraine, considering that, in addition, both the former USSR and the current Russia had a policy of support to the Palestinian cause and to criticize Israel, as well as in the UN, their positions were and are different from those of the US, with whom there are mutual vetoes. So is it any surprise that there has been Russia's understanding of Israel's successful defense of Iran's failed attack, and no increase in rhetoric or warnings to Jerusalem? Does it correspond to the current alliance between Iran and Russia that Putin has called the supreme leader of the Islamic Revolution, and the delivery of advanced air warning equipment has not been announced, but it has only emerged that Putin does not want an escalation?

The truth is that for regular followers and some of the best specialists, none of this caught the attention, since it is the continuation of a rather special relationship between Israel and Russia that was established in the years of the Syrian civil war. By the way, they were on opposite and very opposite sides, but they developed a rational understanding of the strategic needs of the other, and were able to reach agreements that were mutually advantageous, all expression of a world that is today complex, especially in The middle east.

To begin with, not only was there never a confrontation between both countries, but there was also a good personal relationship between Netanyahu and Putin, expressed in frequent trips by the Israeli to Moscow, including an invitation to none other than the Victory Parade, a very special date. of national celebration that comes from the Soviet triumph over the Nazis in 1945, in what is still the “great patriotic war” in Russia.

In those years, Russia did nothing against Israel's frequent military attacks on the Iranian presence in Syria and the transfer of weapons to groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, since then as now, Israel's national interest is to prevent the ayatollahs from establishing Syria a situation similar to what they have achieved with their proxies in Lebanon, of daily attack, just as it happens now.

An expression of that strategy was the bombing of that meeting in Damascus where an attack against Israel was being planned with these groups and others like them. The only thing new is that Tehran has responded directly, through its military and from its territory, and not through the groups that usually attack Israel on its behalf from Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq or Syria.

Those who personalize this relationship present it as Netanyahu's position, but that has not always been the case, so much so that there is a forgotten administration where another prime minister, Naftali Bennett, traveled to Moscow in 2022 and met for three hours with Vladimir Putin and then informed him of failure to Zelensky. This action had been requested by Ukraine on the second day of the invasion, not because its president was Jewish, but because of the relationship that existed between Israel and Russia.

In fact, this Syrian scenario is so important that Israel has had and continues to have a careful position on the war in Ukraine, different from that of the United States. This is how Israel has condemned the invasion, but has not joined the policy of commercial embargo as well as cancellation of Russian athletes or artists. Not only because of the number of Israelis who are of Soviet or Russian origin (there are also many Ukrainians), but because of the Russian military presence in Syria.

This is how of the policies promoted by the US to punish Russia for the invasion, the main or perhaps the only one followed by Israel is the arms embargo, and Israel has been careful not to send them to Russia, but neither to Ukraine, despite Zelensky's annoyance, who perhaps expected and has said so, anti-missile shields.

In this case, we have fallen into the usual mistake of personalizing relationships that are more in line with State decisions. In other words, strategic issues are normally state policies in Israel, and both Syria and Russia correspond to official policies, as does the protection of territory and inhabitants against missiles, the will to try to end Hamas and the response to the Iran attack.

Therefore, it is country to country and emerged as a mutual understanding of each other's position and needs, that is, more typical of the detente of the cold war, than the current total separation between the US and Russia. .

By the way, there is a gap that separates Israel from Russia, but here we have tried to see the glass half full and not half empty. Russia has undoubtedly acted with too many double standards when criticizing Israel in the UN, above all, for being the country that invaded Ukraine, bombed Chechnya, eliminating the jihadist threat without any regard, as well as its military intervention was decisive for the triumph of the dictatorship of the Assads in the Syrian civil war.

In parliament, the Knesset, there is at least one political group, Israel Beitenu whose leader is Avigdor Lieberman (born in Moldova), a secular and nationalist party that claims to represent Russian-speaking immigrants. Furthermore, considering the presence of a number that could reach 900,000 people (including those from the former USSR) in Israel and the continuation of a policy of strategic importance, it is not an exaggeration to affirm that what has happened is perhaps less surprising. that the support that Israel has found in Europe after the attack by Iran, although part of Europe has quickly distanced itself again, trying to tell Israel what it can and cannot do, without realizing that colonial times have passed, and that Its current status is quite minor in terms of relevance.

For Israel, the most important thing is to contain the aggressiveness of Iran, which has been attacking Israel for too long through the proxies it controls, since since 1979 it has defined the disappearance of the “Zionist entity”, that is, Israel, as a priority objective. of the Islamic Republic. To prevent Syria from being transformed into a new Lebanon, Israel has maintained, maintains and will continue to maintain a good relationship with Russia, which has included a personal relationship with Putin for the prime ministers, and which has the image disadvantage of not joining others additional embargoes to the arms embargo, despite Zelensky's understandable protests.

In the Russian position there are also issues of the current situation, since the war in Ukraine is going through a stage where everything indicates that today it is favorable to Moscow, which is why the Kremlin wants to concentrate on an upcoming offensive. An expression of this current reality is the recent “Crimean Platform” Summit that just took place in Bulgaria with Ukraine bringing together the countries bordering the Black Sea. In my opinion, the current moment of war is reflected in the fact that the call from the Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs asks for military collaboration, but mentions only defensive weapons, read ammunition and the like, very different from the previous one, which before the failed counteroffensive also asked for weapons. offensive like planes and tanks.

It is in this favorable context that an escalation between Iran and Israel is of little interest to Russia since it will inevitably have repercussions on the internal situation in Syria, so, for the same reason, it is in its own interest that that country not be used to attack Israel. What she wants is to consolidate the very important naval base she has there, the only one in hot waters and the only one outside of Russia, and in the Mediterranean no less.

In such a way it needs to concentrate on Ukraine, which did not bother to defend its former ally Armenia in the dispute it has had with Azerbaijan since the breakup of the USSR. In fact, Armenia has lost the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh and Russia did nothing to fulfill the role of guarantor to which it had committed itself. Furthermore, today the Armenians are moving closer to the West and Israel has supported Azerbaijan with arms sales, demonstrating, like the example of its relationship with Russia, that the world and history are more complicated than the never happy attempt to divide using only two groups, the good and the bad.

But beware, Iran was not just a military failure in an attack that was anything but “moderate” or “controlled,” intended as it was to cause harm. Even worse was its political defeat, considering the support received by Israel from Western countries that normally only criticize it, the reunion as allies with the US and, above all, the support of Arab countries such as Jordan or Saudi Arabia.

It also turned out better than expected in the case of Russia, which expressed support for Iran, but only in words, since in its actions it has rather shown an indifference that is not typical among allies, and even less so, with one that provides it with weapons. which includes drones that have been important to their invasion of Ukraine. What the Russian attitude seems to be demonstrating is that more than an alliance, there is a kind of marriage of convenience on its part, since we must not forget that Russia has an official policy of confrontation with jihadism, expressed in the way it eliminated the Chechen threat to form an Islamic caliphate, and how it helped Assad triumph against the Islamic State and Wahhabism promoted by groups backed by Saudi Arabia.

Once again, this is a more complex world than the Cold War, as the Middle East demonstrates daily, a reality that is not understood by those who do not understand how geopolitics influences globalization today and who prefer to give their opinion with little knowledge of that reality. , which includes not only social networks, but also analysts, journalists, and politicians throughout the world.

Putin has always argued that there is a pending negotiation since the disappearance of the former USSR and as successor, Russia should participate to definitively define the borders of the countries that emerged from the end of that empire. However, the invasion spoiled any possibility of dialogue in the near future for that purpose, since it violated international law in a way not unlike what Saddam did when he invaded Kuwait, claiming that it was the 27th province of Iraq. historical. Furthermore, Putin wants it to be exclusively his with the US.

There is no doubt that the world is more complex today with China vying for the position of the superpower of the 21st century, and in that sense, Russia has arrived as a junior partner of the eastern giant and has been welcomed, in an alliance that had never existed. in a history of rather competitive relations, until now.

It is this new scenario that has received German rearmament in Europe and Japanese rearmament in Asia as novel elements. It is in this context that an alliance between Russia and Iran seems a relationship of convenience, but not an element that is certain to be prolonged in the future, above all, due to the fact that Putin seems to have a style closer to the tsars than to Brezhnev, more to Great Russia than to the USSR, which he always criticizes as anti-communist. Theirs is a conservative revolution, due to its alliance with the Orthodox Church and Christian identity, the defense of traditional values, the opposition to gender ideology, and any agenda that wants to impose itself on national sovereignties, be it globalization or revolution. Islamic.

Therefore, at some point there will be a distancing from the universal jihad that Iran has preached since 1979, even though for Tehran it is a total fight against the West, which includes the United States as the “great Satan” and Israel as the “ little".

The world is becoming increasingly complex in relation to the easier location that allowed, for and against, the Cold War, and if the internal division of the United States continues, Western pressure may appear to force a negotiation with Russia. If so, there may be a rearrangement of alliances, as could occur in the post-Gaza Middle East, both with renewed pressure to create the Palestinian State and a common front between Israel and the Sunni Arab countries against Iran, their common enemy, all depending on how Israel emerges victorious or not from Gaza and its confrontation with the Islamic Republic, since with Tehran's attack on Israel, the first is mutating from being another war between Israel and the Palestinians, to a different conflict. , as the first confrontation between the jihad led by Iran and its adversaries, including those who still do not see it that way, as is the case of the West led by the US and Europe.

The third rearrangement would be the conflict between China and the US for geopolitical supremacy in the 21st century, the trigger of which could be the situation on the island of Taiwan.

In any case, what the future holds for us, including the alliances that are made and broken, can be presented, not from the surprises of the Middle East, but from whether or not the emergence of a scenario where Ukraine is put under pressure is true. to accept territorial loss.

And to this end, the current attitude of some Western countries towards Israel, both Hamas in Gaza and Iran, is illustrative of the type of pressures that Ukraine may face, in a context where it does not have military and arms production advantages, nor war autonomy. and policy that Israel seems to have gained for itself with its military performance.

@israelzipper

PhD in Political Science (Essex), Graduate in Law (Barcelona), Lawyer (U. de Chile), former president of the Armed Forces Commission. of the International Political Science Association

«The opinions published herein are the sole responsibility of its author».