While the US is worried about Iran, what is China doing?

By: Ricardo Israel - 05/04/2026

And what about China? Let's not allow urgent issues like Iran to distract us from the most important conflict, the one that will define the 21st century: the struggle for geopolitical supremacy, China versus the U.S.

The fact that what's happening isn't making headlines or breaking news doesn't mean nothing is happening, and it's even good news that there haven't been any harsh statements, as it indicates that negotiations are being conducted seriously and with the intention of reaching an agreement on tariffs. This is important because if the negotiations, which are quietly underway, are successful, the economic power of both sides is such that they will establish new rules to replace those in place since the end of World War II, which the US itself decided to abolish. The other countries, whether they like it or not, will have no alternative and will have to join in.

In fact, this weekend was one of the dates considered for Trump's visit to Xi Jinping, but the closure of the Strait of Hormuz made it impossible, and since the end of March it has been known that May 13 and 14 have been set as the definitive dates for both leaders to not only discuss tariffs, but since their last meeting, Taiwan and Iran have been added to the agenda, and in the latter case, its importance to China is such that this country is behind Pakistan's initiative for an indirect negotiation, already accepted by Washington and Tehran.

In any case, China has long prepared for a scenario of reduced access to oil, and has been conserving its consumption, as well as emulating what the US did in the 1970s after the Arab oil embargo: establishing strategic reserves. Furthermore, Beijing has been negotiating with the Iranians for the passage of its ships through the Strait of Hormuz, and given the possibility that control of Iranian oil could fall into US hands, as happened with Venezuelan oil, it always has a plan B: increasing Chinese consumption of Russian oil and gas for the benefit of both countries. In fact, there are plans for Chinese financing of oil and gas pipelines from Russian territory.

Above all, China has been concerned with strengthening its negotiating position with the US. Therefore, it has taken seriously the gains it achieved after its successful boycott of Washington regarding essential rare earth elements. Thanks to its virtual monopoly, China became the only country negotiating tariffs on an equal footing, one-to-one, with what is still the world's largest economy. This was considered a victory by Beijing, which has always rejected the containment measures the US has tried to impose, similar to those imposed on the USSR during the Cold War.

Although there are objective limits to what China and the US can agree on given the existing competition, clearly outlined in the Trump administration's geopolitical bible, the National Security Strategy 2025, if everything continues to go well for Xi Jinping and Trump to shake hands in May, the same mechanism used when they agreed to negotiate would be repeated; that is, after the specialists reach technical agreements, the ministers in charge of trade and finance negotiations will meet with their Chinese counterparts to do what Secretaries of State or those in charge of International Relations do in political negotiations: give the go-ahead for the leaders to sign.

It appears that both Xi and Trump have a clear interest in claiming credit for an achievement on the issue of market access to the other. Trump needs this, as his toughest test yet, the one that will likely define his legacy and the continuation of the profound changes he has attempted, is the difficult midterm election he faces in November, an election that has traditionally been won by the opposition to the incumbent.

In the case of Xi Jinping, it has been full of activity that has had little impact on Western media, but has dominated the media in his country. These events have in common the strengthening of his personal dictatorship over an institutional framework that used to be collective, and his position had a maximum duration of two terms, according to the guidelines left by Deng Xiaoping.

This is how the Chinese leader has been preoccupied with reinforcing his control over the Communist Party, the country's only true source of power. We know this because a new purge is underway, which has already targeted a member of the Politburo, although this time it has focused primarily on high-ranking military officers. The pretext has been the same as before: the "anti-corruption" campaign, which, based on some undeniable facts, has paved the way for his absolute power by being used to defeat rival factions. This is because politics does indeed take place in China, only it occurs within the single party, as there are no competing democratic alternatives.

All of this is with the ultimate and definitive source of legitimacy of power in mind: the 21st Congress of the Communist Party, which will take place at the end of next year. Many positions will be up for renewal, and Xi Jinping wants to ensure they are filled with loyalists. Many important positions are at stake, perhaps all but one: his own. Therefore, Xi Jinping will easily renew his positions as General Secretary of the Party and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Furthermore, in March 2028, during the sessions of the Chinese Parliament, he will again occupy a less important, albeit largely ceremonial, position: the presidency of the country.

The process being followed is flawed, with many supposedly voting, but without any real possibility of choice. In other words, in towns and city neighborhoods, since last year, millions of people have been forced to participate in fraudulent elections because they have no alternative, as the local party leaders are always the ones elected.

This process produces not only mayors, governors, and mid-level ministers, but Xi Jinping also intervenes when appropriate to ensure what is truly important: the loyalty of the top decision-makers, most often in secret, namely the Politburo, now composed of 23 members.

In March, the leader also paid attention to a political event, as the National People's Congress convened starting on Thursday the 5th. This meeting was particularly important given the decisions made regarding the country's future amidst an economic slowdown and a geopolitically tense international situation. Its significance lies not only in the gathering of delegates from across the country, but also in the opportunity it provided for the Communist Party to reveal to the Chinese people and the rest of the world what it had secretly decided to do.

That is its importance and the entire party elite collaborates for its dissemination, since it coincides with a new planning cycle, as the XV Five-Year Plan (2026-2030) is launched, to which all economic actors, public and private, must adapt to the fulfillment of the goals, including that of growth, as well as the priorities, not only economic but also of diplomatic positioning.

Furthermore, and of great importance, China took a step to exercise its superpower status and, in defense of its interests, decided to leverage its power and participate in negotiations to open the Strait of Hormuz, since, as the main buyer of Iranian oil, its closure directly affected it.

Through an ally like Pakistan, China has shrewdly become involved in the search for a ceasefire and the opening of indirect negotiations between the US and Iran, whose primary objective is the opening or return of the Strait of Hormuz to freedom of navigation.

Ultimately, China seeks to repeat its 2023 success in getting both Saudi Arabia and Iran to commit to improving relations, a move that surprised the West. However, this agreement proved short-lived after Tehran backed Hamas's invasion of Israel and activated all its proxies against the country, opening a conflict on seven fronts. This is the origin of the conflict that has culminated in the current bombings, primarily due to Tehran's refusal to end its nuclear program.

China was able to take this step because of its close relationship with Pakistan, which consistently received support in its conflict with India—a position it shared with the US during the Cold War. As a result, China enjoys Washington's trust, despite occasional disagreements. Similarly, China has a privileged relationship with Tehran, not only as a trading partner but also as a diplomatic supporter at the United Nations and other international organizations, in addition to providing technology and intelligence, even during the current conflict.

Pakistan succeeded in opening indirect negotiations between the US and Iran without Israel being invited. Washington presented a proposed solution (the so-called "15 points") which was met with an Iranian response, although the two proposals were very different. Trump's statements have been widely denied by Iran, primarily due to internal divisions. With the elimination of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, a single authority no longer exists, leading to a power struggle between professional politicians who favor negotiation and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which appears to be gaining ground, opposed to any agreement, along with the Basij paramilitary organization.

Initially, for several days, the US and Israeli bombing campaign revolved around a dual aspect: on the one hand, Iran appeared to have been militarily devastated, while on the other, the Islamic Republic was surviving despite everything, with no indication that an alternative government might emerge. Then came Iran's success in blocking oil and gas flows through the Strait of Hormuz, transforming it into a veritable economic time bomb, causing disruptions in the price of fuels and their derivatives. This demonstrated the age-old truth that wars are the continuation of politics by other means and that they only end when the will to fight of the combatants is exhausted, which has not happened this time.

In any case, yesterday, Saturday, April 4th, Trump reminded the Iranian regime that it had 48 hours to reach an agreement, that “time was running out… before all hell broke loose” (against them). Another threat that won't materialize since the ultimatum was rejected?

In any case, China's intervention as a shadow negotiator behind Pakistan is undoubtedly a novel development, and it only confirms that in the world to come, China will be a relevant player in the search for solutions, since in economic terms it is the equivalent of what the former USSR was in the political sphere after the Second World War, so we are going to have to get used to an increasingly active role.

Furthermore, if in a new scenario, whether through Iran's defeat or through negotiation, everyone accepts the importance of keeping the Strait of Hormuz open, it is doubtful that Europe will want to play an active role. It is more likely that if the US were to step aside, or if an international agreement were to be reached, China would acquire a much more important role than it has had until now, especially if there is an economic agreement with the US in May, and if an international reorganization occurs, Europe will be among the losers.

If China plays a significant role in opening the Strait of Hormuz, it will constitute a crucial test for its fourth modernization—the military modernization of its armed forces, the last in the list established by Deng Xiaoping in the last century. This will be inevitable, given that Hormuz requires assurances of a strong military presence due to the potential for conflict in that geographical location, as 20% of the world's oil and gas consumption passes through it.

This is something that must be observed very closely, and not only because of the challenge that Taiwan represents, since there is an aspect of China's military modernization where this country still needs to prove that it has learned to deploy its power, since at the moment everything indicates that it still has a long way to go to have the capacity and perhaps the will to do something similar to what the US has done in Venezuela and Iran.

Moreover, given the complete irrelevance of the UN, the declining prominence of Europe and NATO, the activation of Chinese military power appears to be an increasingly prominent factor, filling the vacuum created by Europe's loss of power, India's unabashed rise, and Russia's lackluster performance in Ukraine. Trump himself seems to acknowledge this when he points out that China, Europe, and India must take a more active role in opening the Strait of Hormuz to free navigation, since they depend on that supply, while the US is not only the world's leading producer but, unlike in the 1970s, no longer needs that oil and buys little from it.

It is not certain that Washington will take that step, since what Trump said seems to be only a threat, but if it did, it is undoubtedly most likely that China and Europe would negotiate with Iran, which would strengthen the possibility of the Islamic Republic's survival, even in the current situation, where there seems to be a kind of military junta, an expression of the Revolutionary Guard rather than the theocracy.

Perhaps the US will consider its objectives met if Tehran ultimately abandons its nuclear program and, due to its evident military defeat and the destruction of its infrastructure, focuses on reconstruction, thus ceasing to be a threat to its Arab neighbors and being unable to continue supporting proxies. Perhaps the US will also achieve another objective: actively collaborating in a new phase by participating in the control and/or ownership of Iranian oil, now free of sanctions.

However, the problem of its ongoing aggression against Israel and the questioning of its existence would remain unresolved, so Tel Aviv would continue attacking, and taking advantage of its air superiority would strengthen its relationship with the Sunni Arab countries, also wary of Iran, until Tehran's expansionist attitude is modified.

It is unknown whether something like this will actually happen, or if, in practice, there will be a kind of ceasefire similar to what has occurred in Gaza, without a definitive solution. It is also likely that Trump will try to end his involvement in Iran and, claiming a military victory, will focus all his attention on the difficult midterm elections, the polls for which will open in November.

In any case, in this scenario, however urgent the Iranian issue may seem, for the US and its national security, what is truly relevant is the type of relationship that will be established in the future with China; that is, whether this confrontation remains contained and limited to economic and technological competition (outer space, Artificial Intelligence) or whether it enters a terrain of conflict with no return.

In other words, whether China and the US will be able to avoid what Graham Allison has called the Thucydides Trap, an expression that describes the emergence of a new power (like China) that threatens to displace a dominant power, as happened to Great Britain with the US in the last century. The name Thucydides Trap comes from a book in which, drawing on the experience of ancient Greece, this scholar studies 16 cases where the aforementioned rivalry ended in an unwanted conflict.

Can this confrontation between China and the US be avoided, or is it inevitable that it will end in an unwanted conflict? Will Taiwan be the trigger?

In my opinion, there's a readily available example that isn't always analyzed in its positive aspects, as it has been demonized despite its recent history. It's the Cold War, which, for me, is a rare case, one of those exceptions where there was a confrontation between two antagonistic powers, separated by everything, and yet it didn't end in direct armed conflict, which would inevitably have been nuclear. There were many proxy wars, at the local or regional level, instigated by them, but they never actually fired on each other, as they always knew how to negotiate.

And if China and the US want to learn, there are several things from that era that would be good to salvage.

First, it is necessary to respect what is non-negotiable for each side; this is what the idea of red lines encompasses—that is, what they would be willing to go to war over. This prevents the temptation to cross those lines that must not be violated. The West knows that China has said that for them, it is Taiwan, but the Chinese do not know what the equivalent would be for the US.

Secondly, in the Cold War there was a concept that was very useful, which was respect for what emerged from that meeting in Yalta, where there was something accepted by all, it is what is captured in what was called the Spheres of Influence, which have reappeared (for example, in Trump's corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in the National Security Strategy 2025), you may like it or not, but the objective is to avoid frictions that escalate into confrontations.

Third, internalizing the fact that each country will lead a sector of the world and will integrate other nations into its strategy helps clarify the situation for countries that wish to maintain good relations with both powers, as is the case with Chile. Its new government doesn't know how to approach the Trump administration, with which it feels ideologically close, but as a country, China is its main trading partner, and the cost of distancing itself would represent a significant blow to its well-being. Thus, the concept of the Non-Aligned Movement had little power during the Cold War, although it was nonetheless a legitimate and universally accepted position.

Fourth, the great lesson learned from the mistake made by the USSR in threatening the US from Cuba allowed for the subsequent step of détente, relaxation, or reduction of tensions, which ultimately succeeded in replacing permanent confrontation with a process of negotiations that achieved predictability in decisions and arms limitation treaties, ultimately leading to peaceful coexistence to avoid any possibility of nuclear conflict, as expressed in the fact that both Washington and Moscow collaborated to prevent nuclear proliferation.

Exactly what the Islamic Republic of Iran never understood, given its desire to eradicate Israel from the map, a danger that for now seems to have been avoided, even if it was through bombing.

@israelzipper

Master's and PhD in Political Science (University of Essex), Bachelor of Laws (University of Barcelona), Lawyer (University of Chile), former presidential candidate (Chile, 2013)

«The opinions published herein are the sole responsibility of its author».