What does Putin want to stop the war?

By: Ricardo Israel - 01/12/2025

On the one hand, why has a war that is essentially at a standstill dragged on? Why hasn't he more enthusiastically supported highly favorable offers? On the other hand, what is he waiting for? What does he want? In my opinion, even if an agreement is reached in the coming days, it will be temporary, since Putin's demands go far beyond a favorable ceasefire.

The reality on the battlefield is that Russia has suffered more casualties and is advancing slowly, more in meters than kilometers. However, it is winning and still has the capacity, alone or with allies, to replace its fallen. It is also true that Ukraine has been retreating for some time and simply does not currently have the capacity to replace its troops in sufficient numbers. Therefore, the history of wars demonstrates that those who are victorious are unwilling to relinquish what they have gained. Moreover, in the Russian case, this same reality shows us that this is not a war that began with the 2022 invasion, but rather, in the territories in question, it dates back to 2014, since Russia has considered Crimea and the Donetsk and Luhansk provinces its own for 11 years. In essence, we are talking about the same places that Ukraine is now being asked to relinquish.

In other words, Russia occupies roughly 20% of Ukraine, give or take 80% of the territory Moscow claims as part of historical Russia. And, if we're talking about realities, everything indicates that Russia is not in a position to start a new war, but neither is Europe, given its current state of growing irrelevance, and, moreover, despite what is being said, it is unlikely to want to or be able to shoulder the enormous cost of rebuilding Ukraine alone.

Moreover, two European trends make it a changing political reality: the growing Islamization of its societies and, at the same time, the strengthening of the populist right that rejects what is happening, a clash that signals that this part of the world will have to worry more about its internal realities than about the situation outside its borders, including addressing a bad economic situation, even for Germany.

In Ukraine, all of this is manifested in the fact that external support has never provided the country with the weapons necessary to win the war, only to weaken Russia, a country attempting to impose its will. And although Russia has not been able to win the war, all indications are that Ukraine is losing it. Therefore, for now, Trump is right in calling for a ceasefire, as people have been dying senselessly on both sides for some time. Furthermore, despite the criticism it receives in both Ukraine and the Middle East, the truth is that the only existing peace proposals, and therefore the only ones discussed or debated, are those put forward by the US.

So why doesn't Putin want to seize this favorable moment? Why did he say no to Trump in Alaska? Or why, even today, does the current and very favorable 28-point proposal, of which at least 10 are unfavorable to Ukraine, receive lukewarm support, as it would only be a good "basis" for negotiations?

And in seeking the answer to this question, I find myself at the heart of the problem, the reason why Putin wants something more, and what he wants is that which the US probably does not want to give up, perhaps cannot, since it would mean accepting the entire Russian version, Putin's version of the world, a version of reality where any pretense of covering up what was done by invading the neighbor does not hide that it was no different from what Saddam Hussein did in 1990, also arguing history, that in the past Kuwait had been a province of Iraq at some point.

Personally, I've been reading Putin for a quarter of a century, and in general, even though I disagree with what he says, I tend to believe him when he announces and anticipates that he will do what he says. And if there's one point he's always repeated, it's that the collapse of the USSR was a "geopolitical catastrophe" and that its fall was so rapid that there wasn't time to close that chapter of history in an orderly fashion—something that also appears in Gorbachev's memoirs. Gorbachev, being so different from Putin in every way, also asserted before his death—something probably true, but which today seems like science fiction—that the possibility of integrating the former USSR into Europe was also discussed.

Furthermore, Gorbachev insisted that, when the USSR dissolved with his resignation on December 25, 1991, he did so convinced that NATO would not expand eastward towards Russia's borders, a fact that was also present in Kissinger's argument that the US should not severely sanction Russia for its occupation of Crimea.

Since these promises have been repeatedly denied by those involved in the US negotiations, the question is: what does this have to do with Putin's reasons for invading Ukraine and the obstacles he has put in place for a simple ceasefire?

The truth is that much of it, and this goes beyond the proven fact that ceasefires, whether in Korea or the Middle East, tend to become definitive borders, which would require another war or wars for their modification, since what Putin is doing is repeating the same thing he has said since he came to power, after the resignation of Boris Yeltsin on December 31, 1999.

Putin says the end of the USSR was so sudden, so abrupt, that there was no time to agree on borders. This led to a situation where Russian and Russian-speaking minorities had their rights violated and were blamed in the newly formed countries for the USSR's repression. Furthermore, he argues, situations were created that would "force" Russia to intervene as a guarantor of the well-being and rights of these populations. This, he claims, is what underlies current conflicts like the one in Moldova, as well as the invasions of Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2022), and other conflicts that, while not originating in Russia, share the common factor of a lack of proper border demarcation, such as Nagorno-Karabakh, which has been the source of several wars between Armenia and Azerbaijan since the 1990s.

In historical terms, the fall of the USSR was the end of an empire, equivalent to what the end of the Spanish empire was with its administrative divisions of viceroyalties and captaincies general giving rise to new countries and border wars in the 19th century, something similar to what Putin sees in 15 new (and old) nations that emerged from the 15 republics that made up the USSR, a similarity that is also found in the conflicts in the Middle East that have their origin in the end of the Ottoman empire.

In other words, what Putin wants is for the US to negotiate the consequences of the USSR's collapse with him and only him, without considering the other republics on an equal footing. This has been a constant throughout his administration, which, despite the passage of time, has not faced any significant internal challenges. I believe his assertion that the end of the USSR was a "catastrophe" stems not from nostalgia for communism—so much so that what survives of the former Communist Party is his electoral rival in domestic politics.

Putin's case is different. I don't think he considers himself Brezhnev's successor, much less Gorbachev's, whom he despises. Like Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Putin sees himself as the heir of historical Russia, Mother Russia, more of the tsars than of any other historical period—a blend of Peter the Modernizer and Ivan the Terrible, both autocrats.

From another point of view, the disappearance of the USSR was not only a political change of historical importance, but also the end of an empire, since some Tsarist policies have so much continuity with Putin that it is impossible not to see the USSR as the political form that the empire adopted under communism; thus, Russian continuity in defense and territorial expansion, from the Tsars to today, is still present.

That, and nothing else, is what Putin wants to be recognized for, although there is no indication that the US is willing to grant it, since it would essentially be repeating what happened at the end of World War II in Yalta between Churchill, Stalin, and Roosevelt. However, the British Empire has already disappeared, and if the opportunity arises, Putin seems to think it's a good time to negotiate with Washington, since what Trump is doing is dismantling, both economically and politically, the kind of agreements that emerged after World War II, imposing a new scenario on allies in order to better face the inevitable conflict with a China that wants to replace it as the great world power of the 21st century.

The problem Putin fails to consider is that today's Russia lacks the power of the USSR that emerged from World War II, as demonstrated by its military performance in Ukraine, where it has not achieved the easy victory it expected. This is why I can believe reports of Russian intervention or influence in other countries while simultaneously disagreeing about their actual effects or significance, as demonstrated, for example, by the complete discrediting of the so-called "Russian collusion" narrative or the misconception that Putin orchestrated the 2016 election in favor of Trump—a mistaken view that, moreover, influenced many of Biden's decisions.

Putin is an autocrat, no example of democracy as his admirers seem to believe, just as it is also true that his support in Russia cannot be explained without the collapse and impoverishment of the majority that the collapse of the former USSR meant, which in turn helps to understand why in Russia there is not and has not been a liberal or democratic alternative, since the very name was tarnished in the years of Yeltsin.

Over the years, he has also learned that Putin must be believed when he announces anything, whether personally or through the few spokespeople authorized to speak on his behalf. Putin is consistent, and he also has an ideology, following certain philosophers whom he honors whenever possible. He also has favorite generals like Gerasimov, whose writings offer a better understanding of the successes and failures of both massive invasions and hybrid warfare, such as the annexation of Crimea by the so-called "men in green."

Could the US gain anything by negotiating with Putin on his terms? The truth is that Ukraine's military performance has been good, considering it has never actually been able to win or received the support to do so. If there has been any defeat, it has been NATO's, which, let's remember, has limited its support for Kyiv, both militarily and tactically, as it has been intimidated by the Russian threat to use nuclear weapons tactically, in a limited way, on the battlefield if it perceives it might lose. However, the truth is that we are not facing a Yalta-style negotiation, and contrary to what Putin might think, there is no possibility of a new negotiation like the Détente of the 1970s.

The truth is that the only thing that could be discussed is something that has never existed before and that was one of the worst consequences of this war for the US, the alliance of Russia with China, with the Kremlin as a junior partner, and which has acted systematically against the interests of Washington, and as a close relationship it is a novelty, since it did not exist even under communism.

However, this does not appear to be possible today, nor is it part of Washington's calculations, unless the US regains significant self-confidence by achieving a successful economic negotiation with China, and gains momentum as a power by establishing superiority in Artificial Intelligence and a dominance similar to that achieved in the 1990s in computing and the internet, when many were betting on the now weak Japan.

However, it shouldn't be entirely ruled out, even though some believe the conditions for such negotiations are not currently in place. The Trump administration frequently presents unexpected proposals, often using trusted advisors and friends to do so. This approach has its critics, but it has also yielded results in negotiations where international relations professionals have fared poorly. However, for the same reason, these negotiations have failed as often as they have succeeded.

Whether you call it peace, a ceasefire, or something else, the issue is stopping the senseless killings in this stalemate, a war where Russian attacks arrive daily, killing Ukrainian civilians for whom Kyiv has no real defense. It's true that there haven't always been expressions of gratitude from Ukraine, since Zelensky has generally felt pressured to offer thanks only when Trump publicly criticizes him. My impression is that the idea that the invasion might not have happened if the US and the UK hadn't forced Ukraine to surrender the nuclear weapons left on its territory after the collapse of the USSR is still popular in Ukraine.

What we are witnessing is a recurring theme: it is easier to impose an agreement on the losing side than on the winning side of a war. Although the current proposal is bad for Ukraine because it includes the cession of territories and a ban on joining NATO, all indications are that future proposals could be worse, despite claims that any agreement must have the consent of Kyiv. The possibility of a military collapse also exists, and acceptance is further complicated by two other internal factors: first, the existence of constitutional prohibitions that require at least a plebiscite.

Second, and equally or even more important, is the fact that Zelensky faces an election he would lose today against the same rival who, according to polls, would have won last year. Apparently, more powerful than the war itself in preventing it was this fact and the person involved: the current ambassador to the United Kingdom, former commander-in-chief of the armed forces, Valerii Zaluzhnyi. He still feels it was unfair that he was held responsible for the failure of the 2023 counteroffensive, which has kept them on the defensive ever since. Nevertheless, the general retains the prestige of having halted the Russian advance on Kyiv and was behind a military performance that exceeded everyone's expectations.

Now, Putin is accepting something he had always previously rejected, and it's worth noting that this acceptance is lukewarm and conditional. If one reads his exact words, it appears to be less of a definitive yes and more of a "basis" for initiating negotiations. What he seems to be saying, and what in my opinion confirms his desire for more substantive negotiations, albeit in the future, is that, according to the Russians, the Cuban Missile Crisis and Détente have made it clear that no nuclear power (and Russia considers itself one) will accept a war in its vicinity unless it initiates or provokes it, which is precisely what happened with the invasion.

This war should never have started; on that point, at least, Trump is right, although I don't think he could have prevented it unless what I believe is still Putin's motivation for a major negotiation had been accepted. Furthermore, it was expected that, as in 2014, Russia would encounter little resistance. What the US could have achieved is timely negotiations on the issue of the Russian minority in Ukraine, whose rights were indeed violated, or something only Washington could have imposed: respect for the Minsk Agreements. Both the first and second Minsk talks attempted to resolve the ongoing conflict in Donbas, but these opportunities were missed, as both sides failed to uphold their commitments.

Once the war started, only Turkey's mediation in Istanbul was able to stop it in April 2022, since Ukraine initially seemed to have accepted Crimea in 2014, and there was still fear of Russian military power, which these years have shown to be an exaggeration.

Today, there is no alternative to stop the war other than the US proposal, with some minor adjustments, and no other country seems to have the power and the will to make it binding on both sides, whether or not the Peace Council in charge of overseeing its implementation is maintained, chaired, as in the proposal for the Middle East, by Trump himself, perhaps because it is thought that it is the only country that could do it, although the truth is that so far not even the US itself has done so, that is, impose sanctions on those who violate it.

@israelzipper

-Master's and PhD in Political Science (University of Essex), Bachelor of Laws (University of Barcelona), Lawyer (University of Chile), Former presidential candidate (Chile, 2013)

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