What can the Chilean transition teach the Venezuelan one?

By: Ricardo Israel - 15/03/2026

María Corina Machado (MCM) was in Santiago, invited by José Antonio Kast to his presidential inauguration. In Chile, with 700,000 Venezuelans out of a population of 20 million, they have become the largest minority group, so much so that they have become an electoral force, given that Chilean law allows them to vote after five years of residency. In a public event, receiving a large and enthusiastic reception, she met with 16,000 of them. On that occasion, she avoided giving a date for her return to Venezuela, stating that she would do so “within the context of a broad national agreement.”

Venezuela is in transition, and when these processes are taught, they are fundamentally grouped into three types: radical, negotiated (like Spain's), and institutionalized (like Brazil or Chile). They are more accurately represented by the image of a film or video rather than a photograph; that is, a process rather than a single event, in which there are advances and setbacks, as demonstrated by the case of Nicaragua, which, under the Ortega-Murillo duo, has ended up as a dictatorship just as bad, or even worse, than the Somozas.

In Spain, Sánchez and his partners want to dismantle the 1978 Pact that allowed them to transform into a successful liberal democracy for the first time in their history. Transitions are all different, so much so that, in the Venezuelan case, what is truly unique is not so much the role of the US as the existence of a figure like MCM, who would undoubtedly be elected in the first elections today, whenever they may be held. Today, yes, but what about tomorrow?

The fact that it is legally a kind of Washington protectorate today should not be a cause for skepticism, since other transitions such as the Chilean one coexisting with General Pinochet, first as commander-in-chief of the army for eight years and then as appointed senator, or the Brazilian one with the death of its leader Tancredo Neves in the middle of the transition process, or the role played by figures from Francoism in the Spanish one or those who came from Apartheid like South Africa also created many doubts in their beginnings, however, they managed to overcome those difficulties.

And MCM?

He will undoubtedly have to reaffirm his role, since the privileged relationship he established with Venezuelans may not last forever, requiring him to carefully analyze a changing landscape. This is where the need to understand different transition experiences comes in, both those that went well and those that failed. There have been processes where adaptation was necessary when circumstances changed, including, in the case of Chile, the difficult electoral campaign that led to the defeat of General Pinochet when he attempted to perpetuate his power through a plebiscite.

Venezuela is experiencing a transition, and while the dictator disappeared after his capture, the dictatorship remains. Transitions from authoritarianism to democracy are always the product of a multifaceted convergence that requires the participation of many wills; ultimately, a complex process of disintegration of the dictatorship, acceptance of pluralism, and eventual peaceful replacement. It is never an easy path, as it is a route where failure is more likely than success.

Many have an example at hand. Some think the Spanish case is useful. In this regard, Spain and Chile have differences as well as common elements. In both cases, the international context helped: integration into Europe in one, the post-communist world in the late 1980s and 1990s in the other. For the reasons I will discuss in this column, I prefer Chile. Ultimately, because I believe it fits better with what is happening in Caracas, and because of what happened in the south, it also offers clues for overcoming the obstacles that exist in Venezuela today.

The Venezuelan democrats' discourse hasn't focused heavily on detailed references to other transitions, instead emphasizing the unique nature of their own case. Perhaps the trip to Santiago provided an opportunity to speak with those who defeated Pinochet, as well as with those who lost the plebiscite—those who took the step toward convergence—and I believe this will also help in understanding the situation created by the US in Venezuela. The truth is that the path taken by Washington will allow Chavismo, under that name or another, not only to survive but also to transform itself into a democratic actor. I don't like it, but it's happening, and I only hope that the Venezuelan democrats manage to ensure that Chavismo remains a minority force, not a dominant one, as Peronism-Justicialistism was for so long in Argentina.

Venezuela needs a roadmap for its democratization, and if anyone can provide it, it's MCM. Understanding the details of successful transitions, as well as the self-criticism they engaged in to achieve those results, is helpful. For this purpose, the Chilean experience is a factor to consider, and not just because he is Chilean. It yielded interesting achievements, such as not only coexisting with Pinochet but also undermining his support, even among other members of the governing junta. Furthermore, they overcame the obstacle of a justice system linked to the dictator, enabling a transitional justice process that resulted in prison sentences for many human rights violators. It's also helpful to know how a relevant opposition was formed and how the amnesty decreed in the 1970s was overcome, ultimately leading to national reconciliation.

Chile's greatest success was its commitment to the Democracy of Agreements, that is, its pursuit of consensus as a governing strategy, coupled with its rejection of populist siren songs, its maintenance of the economic foundations established under Pinochet, and its refusal to modify them simply because their origins were dictatorial. In this regard, it forged an agreement to legitimize the fruits of economic growth through the reduction of extreme poverty from over 40% to just 8%, a level that was maintained even when power alternated between the center-right and center-left, as well as a public consensus on the prosecution of human rights violations in court.

The Chilean transition was based on a fundamental agreement regarding what to maintain and what to change, emphasizing the importance of justice as well as dialogue and reconciliation. In this regard, two commissions of great importance emerged. Shortly after President Aylwin assumed office, a high-level commission was formed, known as the Rettig Commission, named after the jurist who chaired it. This commission not only served as a model for a similar one in South Africa, but was also tasked with definitively establishing the facts surrounding human rights violations and their victims for the purposes of Truth and Reconciliation. Its report not only could not be refuted, but later, during President Lagos's administration, another commission was created: the Valech Commission, named after the Catholic bishop who headed it. This commission established reparations for all those who had been subjected to arbitrary imprisonment and/or torture. The presence of the Catholic Church, a staunch defender of human rights during the dictatorship, was particularly significant.

These were gestures of great solemnity and significance, which will undoubtedly be necessary in Venezuela. Moreover, just as the Venezuelan scenario changed abruptly due to external factors, primarily from the United States—a scenario in which MCM was not considered for the leading role it should have played—the question is: What happens if the scenario changes again, this time due to predominantly internal factors, such as elements or objectives more associated with stability than with change?

In fact, proposals that were once considered "unacceptable" when Capriles said them some years ago have already been heard again, or the surprise that the presence of Enrique Márquez as Trump's guest in the State of the Union speech he gave in February before the full Congress must have been for many.

The truth is that transitions are not a bed of roses and are fraught with pitfalls. What is truly important, for which MCM is irreplaceable, is that he maintains the hope and confidence of Venezuelans, and for both objectives, what he must never lose is relevance, something that has already happened, but that must not continue to happen.

By the way, I have no idea what he discussed privately with Rubio and Trump when he went to say goodbye to them, or whether he was advised not to return to Venezuela just yet. But with so many eyes on Iran and the upcoming November elections, my concern isn't so much that the White House will become more interested in Venezuela as that it will lose interest. To begin with, although temporary, the price of oil is a factor that can influence the elections, as can inflation, just as happened to Biden. Similarly, what happens in the Middle East could be decisive in whether the US reinforces its commitment to controlling Venezuelan oil, which could impact its commitment to democratization, perhaps even delaying it. In this regard, it is also important to keep in mind that negotiations with China on tariffs are underway, which could define the future rules for international trade, and where, undoubtedly, the issue of oil will come up, given its importance to China, especially in a scenario where Washington has gained the upper hand, both in Iran and in Venezuela.

And that's where unexpected scenarios can arise. For example, I'm concerned that Caracas might begin a process of privatizing public or expropriated companies and media outlets, where the new owners are handpicked because of their close ties to the regime. In this regard, I'm not only thinking of Russia or Ukraine with their well-known oligarchs, but also of a scheme that was implemented earlier in Pinochet's Chile in the late 1980s, where ownership generally remains in the hands of his supporters, unless the normal processes of buying and selling or foreign investment have taken place.

Chile also serves to understand how important the self-criticism was of those sectors that, from the left and socialism, revalued democracy, as well as how the Christian Democrats took a path in the opposite direction to disassociate themselves from the support they gave to the rupture of democracy in the coup d'état.

In the current situation in Venezuela, political dialogue with the regime is inevitable, but the government must treat them with respect—the bare minimum, a basic standard of dignity, given that they are the ones who won the July 28th election. The starting point is their participation in every important decision related to oil, something that must also be respected by the White House and the US Embassy in Caracas. Their participation is essential for decisions to be considered legitimate. In addition to the return of so many exiled politicians and the safety of MCM and Edmundo González, US pressure should also be evident in another area: the pursuit of consensus on important appointments, such as electoral authorities, Supreme Court justices, and the upcoming appointments for Attorney General and Ombudsman, which should be independent and prestigious candidates, and which must be agreed upon by consensus. In that sense, the Chilean experience is also useful, since there was a consensus for the first appointment made in the late 1980s for advisor of the autonomous Central Bank, an institution that was important to reduce the inflation that was then plaguing the country.

Incidentally, there is a danger: that past democracy will be overestimated and insufficient attention will be paid to future issues, such as the necessary renewal of those who will hold these positions. This is where MCM faces a great challenge: renewing and maintaining the privileged representation that Venezuelans granted him. This must be accompanied by another political challenge: doing so in such a way that neither the regime nor Washington can exclude him, as happened with the regime after his electoral victory and with Washington after Maduro's capture.

The third danger is that democratic forces may not fully grasp the new landscape, and ultimately, voters may reward the new stability, individualism, and consumerism over a commitment to democracy. In this regard, any analysis must begin with the humility to acknowledge that the relationship with Venezuelans is a privilege that must be earned every single day.

We must operate with the realism that today Washington's decisions are predominantly geopolitical, and now with Iran and the Strait of Hormuz it is better understood why they acted the way they did with Venezuelan oil, or why some countries in the region were invited to the Miami Summit and others were left out.

The important thing is not to be marginalized again, and whether or not it is true that the reason was that there was a trust issue, in the sense that the White House formed the idea that the Venezuelan opposition preferred the Democrats, whether or not it is true, it is something that must be taken into account, especially in months like the ones to come where much is at stake in the midterm elections in November.

This is a stage where MCM should also be campaigning, perhaps permanently, for presidential elections whose date we don't know, but which will undoubtedly take place. The only thing that could happen is that a date is chosen where the regime's candidate might be favored. In my opinion, being on the campaign trail will surely be a stage where, to differentiate himself, MCM will need to demonstrate independence from Washington, since Delcy and her brother will be there to ensure obedience.

In that sense, in defense of Venezuela, there may be disagreements regarding specific policies and decisions, which will need to be clearly explained so as not to suggest a return to nationalist approaches concerning the country's resources. It is also a time when there will surely be a need to clarify the definitive position on transitional justice, as well as to define the issues of amnesty and trials in cases of human rights violations.

Since Chile has a lot of experience on these issues, with both good and bad decisions, this is an additional reason why I believe the Chilean case is more useful for Venezuela than the Spanish one. This is for two reasons: Chile, unlike Spain, addressed the issue of human rights trials in a similar way to how Spain was transitioning to democracy for the first time, while both Chile and Venezuela had a prior history, a very respectable one.

The challenge to achieving democracy is for the opposition led by MCM to ensure that there is both continuity and change in a cumulative and chronologically successive manner, with the shared understanding that this is decided in Venezuela and not elsewhere. Therefore, it is most likely that the idea of a democratic rupture will transform into a negotiated democracy. If the examples of Chile and Brazil serve as a guide, it is to understand that from the moment the goal of democratization exists, there is a process already moving towards that objective. Consequently, decisions can be added incrementally, making it clear to everyone that democracy is the final destination.

@israelzipper

Master's and PhD in Political Science (University of Essex), Bachelor of Laws (University of Barcelona), Lawyer (University of Chile), former presidential candidate (Chile, 2013)

«The opinions published herein are the sole responsibility of its author».