Venezuela: After Maduro, what?

By: Ricardo Israel - 04/01/2026

Maduro and his wife, Celia Flores, Chávez's former lawyer, were captured. In a press conference, Trump announced that the U.S. was assuming control of Venezuela, appointing personnel and overseeing the reconstruction of Venezuela's oil infrastructure. Washington is managing the transition, as there is still no date set for those elected last year to be sworn in or for new elections. The attack was strategic and precise, executed with excellent intelligence, more CIA-driven than military, and Cuba was also defeated, as they had been responsible for protecting Maduro. It is curious that so many people doubted this outcome, including some Latin radio broadcasters in Miami, given that the U.S. possesses the world's largest military capacity. Perhaps Maduro regrets not accepting the numerous offers made to him to resign.

For now, the Venezuelan constitution is being followed, and Vice President Delcy Rodríguez remains in power. She reportedly assured Rubio of her cooperation in a phone conversation from Russia, where she was caught off guard by the US attack. Chavismo also continues to survive under her leadership, although as of Saturday morning, the whereabouts of two men with bounties on their heads, Diosdado Cabello and Padrino López, were unknown. The big question is what the fine print of the agreement reached between the Chavistas still in power and the US administration is.

In Caracas, the dictator Nicolas Maduro was arrested in compliance with an order issued by US courts for his evident role as a drug trafficker and leader of the Cartel of the Suns. In Venezuela, more than a dictatorship protecting criminals, what existed was organized crime itself that directly governed the country, a regime so violent that almost eight million people were forced into exile, stifling all forms of democracy. And despite being a prosperous country with the largest oil reserves in the world, impoverishment became widespread.

We still need to know what will happen to those Chavistas who survived in a reality that, like all transitions, is multifaceted, and therefore, we still don't know for sure what kind of transition Venezuela will have. In theory, at least three types are distinguished: institutionalized, when it is carried out by the outgoing regime itself; negotiated, when there is an agreement with the democratic opposition; and rupture-based, when the regime in power simply collapses. The question is which of these will be Venezuela's transition to democracy, or its return to the democracy that existed before Chávez.

The truth is that, within these three types, there are variations, so one doesn't always resemble another, neither among the Latin American transitions that followed military coups nor in post-communist Europe. Therefore, we are likely to witness a Venezuelan-style transition. Until now, we only considered the existence of a duo: María Corina Machado (MCM), the undisputed leader, and Edmundo González (EG), the president-elect. But now the US and those Chavistas who claim to be surviving through collaboration have been added to the mix. Are they credible or trustworthy? Certainly not, but to the extent that the US maintains a presence, it already appears superior to what existed before.

The most important event has already taken place. The transition has begun, and with it, the loss of fear. Maduro was not a president; he was an illegitimate occupant of power, having staged a coup after being defeated by a wide margin in the July 2025 elections. We assumed the US would swiftly swear in the legitimate rulers, elected last year. We are already seeing that this will not be the case, and in the meantime, the Chavista vice president is acting as president, though it is unclear for how long.

Meanwhile, there was an arrest warrant for Maduro issued by a New York court for his proven involvement in drug trafficking. That is the reality: compliance with a court order, rather than an “imperialist action” to seize Venezuelan oil, as proclaimed by friends of Chavismo and some Democratic senators.

This US action has also been a defeat for the Cuban regime, which, for all practical purposes, was effectively occupying Venezuela in terms of security, controlling the most important decisions and overseeing the security of dictator Maduro. Will the Cubans and Nicaraguans be next? We don't know if the domino theory will apply—that if one falls, other similar dictatorships will follow—but we do know that this weakness has never been greater, not only because of the US but also because of the shift in regional orientation after the electoral victories of conservative political forces. Only Mexico, Brazil, and Colombia remain as democratic countries with governments that protect dictatorships, the latter two holding elections this year.

What also makes it difficult to answer the question of what to expect in Venezuela is that, unlike other transitions, there is still no detailed information about the type of transition being proposed. And if there are new elections, what will be the level of participation of Chavistas, and will the winner join the conservative governments that are gaining ground in the region, or will they follow the tradition of most governments before Chávez, which tended to be more centrist, either in the social-democratic or social-Christian version? Or will someone with a history far removed from democracy unexpectedly win?

During these years of dictatorship, Venezuela was practically occupied by Cuba, a strange situation, since generally the richer country dominates the poorer one, not the other way around, as happened with Havana and Caracas. In this regard, will there be full declassification, or will some information be protected as a state secret? Furthermore, the situation of Cuban domination was only possible due to the outright betrayal of Venezuelan government officials and military personnel. Will these individuals be prosecuted? And if so, to what extent? For that, we will probably have to wait for a new government, since it is difficult to imagine that this could happen under a government led by Delcy Rodríguez.

There are other questions to consider regarding the type of democracy that is emerging: will it be similar to the one that existed until Chávez's election, or will it be more refined? We must not forget that the man who would destroy the country's democracy was elected and legitimately won some elections before the falsification of results began. Therefore, will there be anything similar to the Truth and Reconciliation Commissions of Chile and/or South Africa? Will the fate of the immense sums of money spent to ensure the survival of the mother dictatorship, the Cuban one, be revealed? Will archives be opened to uncover the extent of intervention in so many other countries? Will we learn the names of those political activists who were generously paid from Caracas? And considering that successful institutions in the U.S. have failed when transferred to other contexts, will this temptation exist in a transition where the U.S. appears to be acting as guarantor?

Will anything ever be revealed about the amounts of money received in Europe by the Spanish Podemos party or by individuals serving the regime, such as Rodríguez Zapatero or former judge Baltasar Garzón? Anything about the financing of the São Paulo Forum? What will become of the statements by Chavista leaders who also paid US politicians? Finally, what will be done with the evidence that Chilean prosecutors claim to have that Diosdado Cabello himself paid the Tren de Aragua gang to assassinate Lieutenant Ojeda? Or will we have to wait for a government, once fully democratic, to address all of this?

For international relations, it is crucial to know what will happen with Chavista allies like Cuba, which has suffered a severe strategic defeat, and Iran, which is in such a precarious situation that it could be expelled without consequences for Caracas. But above all, the cases of Russia and China are of paramount importance. My impression is that neither will confront the US, given that there is no national security threat to them in Venezuela. In Russia's case, the issue is primarily one of how to repay its enormous debt. In China's case, there is also the issue of a massive debt, but Beijing also has a huge need for oil and a desire for Venezuela to continue supplying it. World history shows that debts are always eventually repaid, so the sooner negotiations begin, the better for the transition. However, in return, China must demand the acceptance of the illegitimacy of Chavista decisions that run counter to the national interest, such as the transfer of vast tracts of land and Venezuelan companies, sometimes practically free of charge. Under other circumstances, one might say that to address this issue one could wait for a government elected in full democracy, but if we are talking about rebuilding Venezuela's oil capacity, it is crucial to resolve this problem now, or else these countries could win in international courts.

Of equal or greater importance for understanding what comes next is what will happen to “Chavismo,” to that immense machine of destruction and human rights violations. What will happen to its collaborators, to those who claimed they were only “following orders”? What will the United States, which apparently retains power and responsibility, say about this Bolivarian bourgeoisie that enriched itself unjustly? Will justice ever be served to prosecute those who committed crimes and offenses? Will there perhaps be a scenario similar to the European one of merciful amnesia, as occurred in the transitions from communism to democracy, or earlier in Spain and Portugal, after long periods of authoritarian rule?

What will happen to the armed forces, police, and security forces? The experience of other transitions shows that even with amnesty laws, the mere signing of international human rights treaties is enough to classify these crimes as crimes against humanity, making them imprescriptible and always prosecutable before a judge. How will the new government act in the face of the International Criminal Court and the deplorable situation where its biased orientation has been demonstrated time and again by its refusal to prosecute the crimes of Maduro and others responsible?

In this regard, there are many different decisions made by various transitions, some that did nothing, like Brazil; others that did very little, like Uruguay; those that, like Argentina, prosecuted those who ordered the military coup; and cases like Chile, where General Pinochet was tried but died without being convicted. However, in contrast, dozens of trials have brought charges against and convicted all those whose crimes could be proven, with some defendants receiving sentences exceeding a thousand years.

Furthermore, what will the government do in the face of the expected lawsuits in Venezuelan and international courts from the many people whose property was expropriated by Chávez and his successors, both Venezuelan and foreign? These pressures will surely reach the White House itself, given the true US involvement in this almost unprecedented and unexpected transition process. Let us remember that this situation is not uniform, but rather varied, depending on the will and arbitrariness of the ruler in power, beginning with Chávez himself and his infamous orders to shout "Expropriate!" at public events—let us not forget—while receiving applause from the attendees. Under the Chavista dictatorship, there are also different types of expropriation: those that were fully or partially compensated, those where nothing was paid at all, and even some foreign expropriations where the expropriated companies received more money than the market value warranted. And this is all without even considering the long chain of corruption.

In Latin American cases, we find that different transitions made different decisions, from compensating for arbitrariness, to returning what was expropriated in exchange for withdrawing demands, or in the case of Chile, where shortly before retiring from power, Pinochet anticipated Putin and the oligarchs, since property that was state-owned was handed over through different means to businessmen close to the regime.

What does the new government intend to do about this, or about the even more pressing issue of the terrible and widespread corruption? It's acceptable to consider that the case of properties acquired through this means by the leaders of the Cartel of the Suns might be easy to address, as Maduro did against Chavista rivals, but what can be done when corruption has existed at every level?

The questions, however, don't stop there. What about the alliance established with Iran, Hezbollah, and perhaps Hamas as well? What will be done about those who provided more than a thousand Venezuelan passports to operatives of these terrorist groups and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, allowing them to travel the world without arousing suspicion? Furthermore, has Venezuela been involved in the violence unleashed in various Latin American countries to bring about change, as has been alleged in Chile, Ecuador, and Colombia? Personally, I haven't found any evidence, but this was supposed to be an opportunity to determine if there was any basis for these allegations. But is there any possibility of a transition if Delcy Rodríguez leads the government? On the other hand, should the path taken by the U.S. be given a chance, given that in other transitions, those who came from the regime have yielded positive results, as in Brazil?

And the US?

Washington has followed each and every step required by U.S. law to ensure this action would not be challenged in the Senate or, especially, where Trump's most effective opposition now resides: the courts. The first step was the declaration that the government was illegitimate, no longer a political coalition, but an instrument of transnational organized crime. The second was defining it as a drug cartel, and the reward for information leading to Maduro's capture was doubled. The third step was labeling the ruling group a terrorist organization waging hybrid warfare against the U.S. A fourth step was taken by Terry Cole, director of the DEA, who certified that Venezuela was a narco-state sending drugs to U.S. territory.

Perhaps the most important step was the fifth, when President Trump, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Attorney General Pamela Bondi, Director of Homeland Security Kirsti Noem, and all those who had a say in the matter, publicly declared that Venezuela had no president, but rather that since July 28, 2025, Maduro, in addition to being a fugitive from justice, was a usurper who stole the election. This was absolutely true, even though other statements, such as those about terrorism, were exaggerated, though not unlike those of other presidents in the past. This declaration is a legal requirement, since a presidential directive has existed since Reagan stating that the U.S. cannot act against legitimately elected governments. This directive stemmed from the recommendations of the Church Committee, which in 1975-76 reviewed in the Senate Washington's interference in Chile's internal politics, as well as its involvement in operations that included assassination attempts against foreign leaders.

This capture of Maduro coincides with the recent publication of the National Security Strategy 2025, which puts a geopolitical framework on what the US has done, including the fight against drugs and the return of the Monroe Doctrine, this time with the addition of the so-called Trump Corollary.

I understand the US caution in not getting involved in a commitment that would be difficult to extricate itself from, especially if, as this agreement with a sector of Chavismo seems to indicate, they had doubts about the capacity of democratic forces to manage a worrying internal security scenario. The transition will require a firm hand and as little leniency as possible, given the alarming possibility of a violent, criminal outbreak, considering the enormous quantity of weapons distributed among the collectives fostered by Chavismo, as well as by Maduro and his relationship with Petro. This has been evident in the de facto alliance on the Colombian border with former guerrillas turned drug traffickers, as well as in illegal gold mining.

Furthermore, we simply don't know how the organized crime cartels will act once they are forced out of their control of the country, in terms of how they will react, given that in the past, after Uribe's security policy made life difficult for them in Colombia, these cartels simply moved to Mexico, with consequences that are well known to everyone.

It is in this sense that the US may not be able to disengage from Venezuela as quickly as they have declared, and this security problem could tie them down for longer than anticipated. Therefore, the US commitment could be greater than Rubio expected, and in this regard, they preferred to grant Chavismo a future rather than add it to the list of those who wish to sabotage the return to democracy.

All that remains is to feel joy for Venezuela and prepare for the difficult decisions inherent in any transition to democracy. In the case of the US, it's somewhat depressing that this may not do much to defeat the cartels as long as the insatiable thirst for drugs among its citizens persists. For everyone, a militarily successful outcome, but with surprises, since reality, like life, always has them.

Undoubtedly, there will be greater freedoms in Venezuela, but the decision to return remains difficult for so many Venezuelans scattered around the world.

@israelzipper

Master's and PhD in Political Science (University of Essex), Bachelor of Laws (University of Barcelona), Lawyer (University of Chile), former presidential candidate (Chile, 2013)

«The opinions published herein are the sole responsibility of its author».