United States vs. Brazil: Is Lula the Victim?

By: Ricardo Israel - 31/08/2025

The truth is, no, since, since his electoral victory and his return as president of the Federative Republic, unlike the previous two, the third term of Luis Ignacio Lula da Silva put Brazil's foreign policy, for the rarest time in its history, on a collision course with the United States, at historic moments where the geopolitical primacy of the 21st century is being defined. In other words, these decisions preceded the return of Donald Trump, and, by their nature, their consequences may extend beyond the current terms of both.

What's happening is serious; it goes beyond the Bolsonaro case, and I believe it intersected with a little-understood issue in Brazil, but one that has to do with national security in the US, namely the health of the dollar. This has been said time and again by Trump, and not only by him, since it's worth remembering that Biden himself made a humiliating trip to Saudi Arabia to apologize to the current king, Prince Regent Mohamed Bin Salman, after accusing him of being a murderer for the death of a dissident journalist in his embassy in Turkey. He was forced to make a trip when the kingdom announced it would be considering receiving payments in yuan for oil sales, which ultimately fell through. Today, the dollar is a major power factor for Washington, as it is the world's savings and trading currency, above the country's current true level.

It's worth remembering that as soon as Lula assumed the presidency of the BRICs, he announced the replacement of the dollar as a goal of the utmost importance, and I believe Brazil didn't measure the impact of what they had undebated. And, lacking any capacity, saying so was, to say so, irresponsible. Undoubtedly, a different Lula, compared to what he previously displayed as a leader.

It is also a confrontation Brazil can hardly win, given that Lula's desire to become a global leader in this new scenario could also be damaged. There is no doubt that the Bolsonaro case has influenced and has a very strong emotional impact on Donald Trump, who sees in the former president not a repetition of the events of January 6 in Washington, but rather a tale of political persecution, which, real or not, resonates strongly with his supporters and has an emotional impact on both sides.

This is the purpose of this column, to debate what I believe is happening, which cannot be explained solely by the discourse of victimhood. Although it exists, as does the presence of Bolsonaro, in order to find a solution, we must appreciate that what makes everything difficult is the fact that we are witnessing political decisions that have distanced Brazil not only from its traditional position in foreign relations, but also from what Lula was applauded for in his two previous governments, starting with the inappropriate rhetoric at the wrong time, of irresponsibly calling for the replacement of the dollar.

This is what sets Lula apart from the past, since even the closeness to Cuba and the Chavismo of his previous governments are incomparable. In fact, on that occasion, there were no setbacks similar to the current ones, as Lula's alliance with Chávez had no consequences for his leadership in the region or for his relations with the US. This alliance achieved the survival of the Cuban dictatorship and the consolidation of the Sao Paulo Forum.

Lula was a constant presence in presidential elections, being defeated three times before achieving his first victory, taking office on January 1, 2003, and subsequently being reelected. He achieved this thanks to a consistent strategy of moving toward the political center in the runoff elections and moderating his government, not only abandoning old revolutionary slogans but also reviving traditional banners, present even during the military dictatorship, such as the idea of "Powerful Brazil." Furthermore, ideas of repudiating amnesty laws and promises to prosecute human rights violators were buried, unlike other democratizing processes in the region.

There is no doubt that everything changed profoundly after he spent 580 days in prison, convicted of corruption in the process known as "Lava Jato", a sentence annulled for technical reasons that had to do with the fact that according to the Supreme Court his rights were not respected in the process nor that the court headed by then judge Sergio Moro was the competent one, although no resolution established his innocence of the charges, therefore, the doubt of his guilt remains even today.

However, there is no doubt that the man who returned to the presidency after defeating Bolsonaro by just 1.8% in the second round, the smallest margin on record, was a different person, but one who had already made up his mind to settle scores, both with friends and adversaries. Thus, in domestic politics, instead of seeking to pacify the fray, imitating the strategy that failed the Democrats in the US, the path of judicialization and prosecution was taken. This was contributed to by controversial appointments, such as the appointment of one of Lula's lawyers to the Supreme Court, as well as the de facto alliance he established with someone who had made a career in the judiciary not as a judge but through politics, Alexandre de Moraes, whom we will discuss later.

The returning Lula is not following the same international guidelines established by his previous governments. Instead, in his search for international positioning, he is attempting to do so from what is known as the "global south." This ideology bears many similarities to the ideology thought to have vanished: that of the nations that called themselves "non-aligned" during the Cold War, but which, in general, shared the broad anti-colonialist theses of the former USSR. And some, or much of this, was evident in the decisions that would define this new Lula, such as a rapprochement with Iran, and, above all, with China, with a notable preference in its favor, in international organizations and in trade, compared to and in relation to his former closeness with the United States. This shift is understandable only in commercial terms, not unlike the rest of Latin America, but too risky when, behind these choices, nothing less than the scepter of the 21st-century superpower was at stake, and where China proclaimed its desire to displace Washington to anyone who would listen.

This was coupled with an international policy that, when it came to Ukraine, almost always sought to distance itself from that country in order to approach Putin approvingly. In regional politics, this led to an increasingly noticeable rapprochement with the Venezuelan dictatorship, which reached its greatest impact when, together with Colombia's Petro, they developed a set of strategies to support Maduro after he stole the July 28 election.

However, even if the Bolsonaro issue hadn't figured in, each and every one of these options undoubtedly carried with them the potential to put Brazil at odds with the United States, all of course exacerbated by Trump's personality, his impulsive decisions, and the way he has personalized the decision-making process.

In all of this, it's striking that the corrective influence that the vaunted professional management of Brazil's foreign relations always had in the past is absent, almost always even requiring the presence of a sort of ambassador in the Planalto Palace itself, Brazil's Government Palace and seat of executive power. However, none of this has happened with the decisions Lula has made regarding Brazil's foreign affairs, since that moderating influence, meant to ensure that presidential attitudes coincided with Brazil's permanent interests, has in fact been nowhere to be seen.

If anything, it's the exact opposite: the operation of a parallel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, run by someone as experienced and close to Lula as Celso Amorim. At 83, as head of the Special Advisory Office to the President of the Republic, and with a track record of having served as a minister on two occasions, he has done exactly the opposite: imposing Lula's views on the entire functioning of the government and the state.

And that is the most striking thing, how on the basis of such a small difference in votes, Lula has imposed his personal ideas on his entire past history and on a balance scheme that had been so successful in his previous governments, to the detriment of Brazil, since it seems there is a lot of whim, phobias and personal sympathies, and it is not clear what the gain could be for a country that has always wanted to be respected as a future power, a status that was already recognized by Henry Kissinger last century.

This lack of moderation has become very visible in another issue that could only generate distance with the US and that was not evident in previous administrations: the marked anti-Semitism that Lula has imbued Brazil's foreign policy, the way he has degraded the level of diplomatic relations with Israel at all levels, at all times, and under any pretext. Like all phobias, it is something personal, a very deep resentment, and the most notable thing is how he has dragged an entire country behind this personal attitude.

In a way, it is very similar to the type of decisions made by a person who deeply admires him, as is the case of Boric in Chile, with one difference: Lula and Brazil are important, while Boric is not, so having very similar decisions, opinions and attitudes in relation to Israel and the Jews, the Chilean has gone unnoticed in Washington, despite how frequent his criticisms of Trump are, a luxury that Lula does not have, who has received sanctions that have not taken place in Chile, probably because Trump or those close to him simply have not heard of what the Chilean president said.

All this has caused the Brazilian to lose influence abroad and popularity at home, and thus in a recent publication (June 30), The Economist, which usually applauds Lula, says that his “approval ratings are the lowest” of any time during his three terms” since “only 28%” say they are happy.

In this new Lula administration, it is striking that decisions detrimental to Brazil are piling up, with no apparent desire to rectify or amend. This is especially true for a country that claims to have a fundamental commitment to human rights, despite the sanctions it has received, and insists on continuing a program like "Mais Médicos" (More Doctors), based on the labor exploitation of 2,659 Cuban health professionals for the economic benefit of Havana, which withholds up to 80% of their salaries and holds family members virtually hostage. That is why, in this and other examples, it is necessary for someone to stop Lula, who has returned recharged, with a discourse of moral superiority, a line of distancing himself from the US, and wanting to do everything he could not do before.

Furthermore, it is clear that friendship with China, Russia, Cuba, and Venezuela has outlived its usefulness, harming Brazil today, not only in Foreign Affairs but also on the part of its own armed forces. Venezuela's threat to invade Guyana was not met with condemnation, which is incomprehensible, since, had it carried out its threat, that force would have had to have crossed Brazilian territory.

However, everything mentioned above, even the definition of Bolsonaro's guilt or innocence, pales in comparison to what surely lies at the root of this very difficult moment for the historic friendship between Brazil and the U.S., which is none other than the dollar. Today, the health of the dollar is a national security issue in the U.S.—not just any issue, but one that has been for a long time—and all the announcements made by Lula, I believe, took on a dispute that Brazil is not in a position to lead, and that can only harm it, without achieving anything in return.

This attitude of buying into problems that belong to another level and category, which surpasses what Brazil is today and will probably continue to be for some time, is something that has also been present in the role of Alexander de Moraes, who arrived at the Supreme Court without having had sufficient experience as a judge. This has been noted in his performance, in his successes and mistakes, and also in the ambition he has shown, starting with the way he has dragged his colleagues on the Supreme Court behind a personal crusade, where before being appointed a magistrate, political appointments predominated in his career.

Thus, after graduating as a lawyer, he worked as a prosecutor before holding public office in São Paulo, culminating in 2014 with his appointment as Secretary of Security for that state by then-governor Geraldo Alckmin, now Brazil's vice president. Both were members of the center-right Social Democracy Party at the time. Subsequently, Michel Temer, who succeeded Dilma Rousseff as president, appointed Moraes to the Supreme Court directly from his position as Minister of Justice and Public Security, without any transition.

And it is here that Moraes has come into conflict not only with Trump and Rubio over Bolsonaro, but also with US law, having been sanctioned by the Treasury Department under the Magnitsky Act, designed to impose sanctions, primarily economic, on foreigners deemed guilty of human rights abuses. The motive has not only been Bolsonaro, but also principles of great importance to the US, and by virtue of these, he has also come into conflict with European partners and allies. The first has to do with all the protection the US dedicates to its technology companies. Moraes has issued resolutions that have attacked companies as well as entrepreneurs like Elon Musk, in addition to affecting the neutrality of the internet guaranteed, as well as the extraterritoriality of its Californian servers, by Law 230, which dates back to the 1990s. To weigh the importance attributed to it, suffice it to note that Trump ignored the censorship he was subjected to by these companies to establish an alliance with their owners in this new era.

Furthermore, in this conflict between US and Brazilian law, the US has become virtually the only power to have made the banner of freedom of expression a foreign policy objective similar to what human rights were during the Jimmy Carter administration, establishing a framework where it is difficult to see how Alexander de Moraes can win such an established contest, so much so that long-time Undersecretary of State Christopher Landau has accused him of wanting to "destroy" the relationship between the two countries.

Is there a way out? It seems that sometimes the prevailing idea is that this is a war Brazil can't win, especially when one observes how quickly the European Union conceded on the tariff issue, following the same principle China has accepted from day one: that, unfair as it may seem, no country can afford to be excluded from the US market. But, on the other hand, the political necessity of confronting Trump quickly becomes apparent, given that in October 2026 there are general elections in which Lula will be a candidate. To that end, embracing the flag always wins votes in Latin America, especially since he's not showing well in the polls these days.

My impression is that there is a way out, and that it involves doing exactly what hasn't been done: understanding how narrow Lula's advantage was when he was elected, that he faces an uphill battle, and that the worst that could happen is leaving Bolsonaro out as secretary, imitating what failed in the US. At the same time, the way forward is to rescue the best that the democratic system has to offer, which is the search for consensus and the peaceful resolution of conflicts.

The Supreme Federal Court has already announced its decision to prosecute the former president for alleged attempted coup d'état after losing the elections. However, insufficient evidence has been provided to justify the five crimes he is accused of and the long prison sentences he could receive. Perhaps a political agreement incorporating elements of the amnesty currently being discussed in Congress could be considered.

Today, Brazil doesn't seem able to win, placed as it is in a difficult situation, a consequence of having taken a path of confrontation that has put it in a place it had never been before, and where the way out was shown by Confucius when he said that "if you hate a person, then you have been defeated by them" and "the problem with seeking revenge is that you need to dig not one, but two graves."

@israelzipper

Master's and PhD in Political Science (University of Essex), Bachelor of Laws (University of Barcelona), Lawyer (University of Chile), former presidential candidate (Chile, 2013)

«The opinions published herein are the sole responsibility of its author».