Trump, the Miami Summit, and the primacy of geopolitics over trade: The case of Chile.

By: Ricardo Israel - 08/03/2026

A dozen heads of state were invited to the Miami Summit by Donald Trump on March 7, in addition to the usual bilateral meetings. Originally, six were invited to this "Shield of the Americas" summit: the heads of state of Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, and Paraguay. Later, six more were added: Costa Rica, Guyana, Panama, the Dominican Republic, and Trinidad and Tobago. Chile, the newly elected president, formally assumes the presidency this Wednesday, March 11.

Earlier, on Thursday the 5th, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth had gathered representatives from 20 governments to hear about the need to combat narcoterrorism and the cartels.

Separated by 32 years, the same Florida city had served as the venue for the region to learn of the only two proposals the U.S. made during that time, each different from the other, both originating from the White House to establish preferential relations with the southern part of the continent. In 1994, when there was greater continuity between administrations and less polarization, an idea of George Bush Sr. was continued by his successor, Bill Clinton, who proposed a common market for Latin America and the Caribbean in economic terms, along with democracy in political terms, given that at the time there was only one dictatorship, that of Cuba. Unfortunately, the region was wrong and formally rejected the offer in Mar del Plata in 2005, when Hugo Chávez, Lula de Silva and Néstor Kirchner led the rejection of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), although some countries like Chile took advantage of the opportunity to have their own Free Trade Agreement (signed on June 6, 2003), in addition to that of neighbors Mexico and Canada (in force from January 1, 1994).

This time the proposal has different characteristics, given the very high degree of personalization and ideological affinity among those who received the invitation, since neither Brazil, Mexico, nor Colombia were present. Now the invitation has a clear geopolitical component, in that they are being called upon to "review foreign interference in the hemisphere," meaning China, since it coincides with the recent release in November of the crucial National Security Strategy 2025. This reflects a political alignment, as the U.S. is now seeking not partners, but allies. Behind this lies a transactional logic characteristic of President Trump, as revealed in the pages of his book, The Art of the Deal. The 12 heads of state and government signed a military coalition agreement against the drug cartels.

Under the banner of the Western Hemisphere, Latin America and the Caribbean are once again relevant to the White House after decades of mutual indifference. To this end, a term with a negative connotation in the region—the 19th-century Monroe Doctrine—is being revived, now supplemented by the so-called "Trump Corollary." Not only are specific leaders invited, but there is also a clear pursuit of greater political efficiency, where this prior alignment replaces the failures of previous multilateral ambiguity. This is a blow to the largely ineffective OAS, which joins the Peace Board convened by Washington to replace the UN in the search for peace in the Middle East. Undoubtedly, in both cases, the aim is to overcome the inefficiency of organizations that date back to the last century.

Will the US be more successful this time? Or, to put it another way, will Latin America be able to take advantage of this renewed interest, given that in the past it usually failed to do so? Moreover, the experience of integration organizations based on ideological alignment shows many failures, such as the Chavista ALBA or the Lima Group of the continental right. However, without a doubt, the offensive to end the dictatorships in Venezuela and Cuba marks an undeniable differentiating factor, even though it is still not clear that the final destination will be liberal democracy for both long-suffering peoples.

Undoubtedly, despite many comparisons to the Cold War, Beijing's economic power marks a clear difference, as the Chinese are the main trading partner of many countries in the region. In the case of Chile, this relationship has not only remained unchanged but has grown steadily for more than half a century, being one of the few state policies where Allende (who initiated it) and Pinochet (who consolidated it) were in complete agreement. Today, Beijing has a strong presence in basic services such as electricity and also in infrastructure.

This relationship also owes much to the patience and perseverance with which China undertook the task of developing its state capitalism. In this regard, I always recall how, back in the 1980s, during the height of the military dictatorship, the Institute of Political Science at the University of Chile was asked to host a delegation from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. We were quite surprised to learn at the meeting that the academics' interest was focused on a single topic: the still-existing system in Chile of personal capitalization, which allows individuals to finance their pensions in the private system through individual accounts. This was striking, given that China was still a collectivist society in the early stages of its impressive wealth creation.

My impression of the Shield of the Americas is that it is not yet compelling enough to subdue China in the region, as it lacks an infrastructure project equivalent to what the Silk Road represents worldwide, and which the US had in the past when it dethroned the UK as a superpower in the 20th century, for example, with the Pan-American Highway that connected the entire continent or its mining investments, such as copper, which are comparable to what China has built in rare earth elements. This explains why the Peruvian government partnered with Beijing to build the megaport that will primarily connect Asia with South America, or why two such different governments as Piñera and Boric in Chile considered Chinese companies for a communications cable between China and Latin America.

The truth is that, however much geopolitics may predominate today, or due to the region's rediscovered importance to Washington, what China represents today cannot be countered solely with arguments of fear or a Cold War 2.0, given its economic power. Moreover, it is a reality that President Trump himself has had to accept, since, after China's successful embargo on rare earth elements with sanctions reminiscent of those imposed by the US, they are now negotiating tariffs as equals. If they reach an agreement, it will become the new rules of the game for international trade, replacing the norms that are now disappearing, and all countries, large and small, will have to comply, whether they like it or not.

Chile is currently in the midst of a complicated situation, with sanctions against public officials who participated in the highly inadvisable express partnership project, including the Minister of Transport and Telecommunications, in what is known in Chile as the "cablegate," where Boric and his government acted in very bad faith, so much so that information was hidden from Kast in the transfer of power from the outgoing government to the incoming one, forcing the president-elect to withdraw from the talks, tarnishing a collaborative political tradition that until now had made Chileans proud.

With its attempt at deception, the Boric government broke with republican traditions, in addition to a series of contradictory statements, since it is not surprising that Chile would want a cable connection with its main trading partner. Moreover, as a country open to foreign investment, even more so than European countries like France, the nation possesses a system for facilitating such investments, which is internationally renowned.

No. What's truly surprising is the secrecy surrounding the final days of that administration. The U.S. easily uncovered what had happened, since, under transparency laws, the entire chain of meetings and trips to China was public. Furthermore, the entity involved was none other than China Mobile, the Chinese state-owned company with a billion users, which had managed to expedite its project in a mere 61 days—a suspicious timeframe. It was also noteworthy that, with the exception of the aforementioned minister, all the other individuals involved were members of the Chilean Communist Party, part of Boric's governing coalition. In fact, a final application was submitted to another party member in the Undersecretary of the Armed Forces just three days before the U.S. announced the sanctions.

In other words, a major blunder, the culmination of what was undoubtedly the worst government since the return to democracy, an amateurish one, aptly described as student-training, alluding to the fact that in just one decade they went from being student leaders protesting in the streets to governing the country, and that they managed to do something as difficult as making themselves look bad, at the same time, to both China and the US, in addition to creating a major and unexpected problem for their successor.

It was a government that failed to deliver on all its campaign promises, including its pledge to "instill instability" and "refound" the country. Its proposed constitutional reform even failed, as it was defeated by a wide margin in the referendum. Thus, there was no revolution, only a forgettable government. Reality forced Boric to change his mind on many points, except for one: the fact that he was the first president in Chilean history to proudly display his Judeophobia, expressed not only in his attacks on Israel but also in his refusal to have any contact with the Chilean Jewish community.

Moreover, the issue of the communications cable had a long history, as US pressure and the threat of withdrawing the visa waiver had already been exerted on the Piñera administration, which agreed to cancel the project, although no government officials were sanctioned. There were also incidents in the field of astronomy, as US pressure forced the cancellation of a project that the Chinese Academy of Sciences wanted to develop in conjunction with the Catholic University of the North, in the desert where Europeans have some of the most modern observatories in the world.

What lies behind all this should concern Chile, given the clear misunderstanding by two consecutive governments regarding the new global context and the failure to acknowledge the competition at all levels between China and the US in their decision-making. In this regard, Chile has demonstrated a lack of intelligence services that would allow it to understand what is happening, nor does it currently have a decision-making process that enables complete coherence in strategic matters. While the major powers clearly understand their strategic priorities, Chile seems to lack a proper grasp of its own long-term interests. Furthermore, it appears to lack a decision-making process that allows it to anticipate the cost of each decision. However reasonable it may seem to want a communications cable with the preferred destination for its exports, it is inappropriate for a country that relies on foreign trade to fail to understand the problem it is creating when competition between China and the US is the predominant factor that will define the struggle for the undisputed superpower of the 21st century.

Boric's government handed Kast's government a major and unexpected problem. For Kast, everything seemed to be going not only well, but very well, until the moment of nominating his cabinet revealed a serious misunderstanding of the world he will have to live in from 2026 onwards. This is not the time for the economy, as his nominations for ministers seem to demonstrate, but for the primacy of geopolitics, as the president-elect was reminded in Miami (see my column in Infobae, “Chile: Kast's mistake”, January 25, 2026).

Furthermore, both the US and Israel have stated their willingness to restore the close relationship they enjoyed for so long before Boric's arrival. Therefore, the question for Chile is how it can negotiate to maintain its current special ties with both the US, as its main investor, and China, as its main trading partner. It can be done; in fact, former President Ricardo Lagos achieved it in the 1990s. He announced to George W. Bush that Chile would vote against the invasion of Iraq in the UN Security Council, of which it was a member at the time, and yet, despite this, he managed to salvage the Free Trade Agreement that Chile was negotiating with Washington.

If the cablegate scandal demonstrates anything, it is the cost to Chile of not having digested the text of the all-important National Security Strategy 2025. This was no surprise in Boric's case, but more difficult to understand in a government that seemed to be enjoying success, like Kast's, since it discusses in detail the competition with China, as well as describing the importance attributed to Latin America and what is expected of it.

In fact, the new government, which takes office on Wednesday the 11th of this month, suddenly found itself facing sanctions, which were not directed against the outgoing government, but as a warning to the incoming government, since contrary to what this sanction indicates, people involved in the decision-making process have assured me that the White House wants to have the best possible relations with Chile, since, compared to other countries in the region, it is attracted by the collaboration of so many years, and the relative seriousness and predictability in decision-making.

The problem for Chile is that there's no guarantee the current importance of geopolitics is being understood, and the fact that swift action will be required. Everything indicates that a personal relationship between Kast and Trump, which doesn't exist today, will need to be established, given the personalized nature of diplomacy. This will require a rapid response, because with an administration focused on Iran, very soon, as soon as that situation is resolved, it will have to concentrate on what's truly vital for the government: winning the November midterm elections. And with the White House focused on an electoral process that could be lost, there will undoubtedly be little time and interest in Chile. Furthermore, many priorities will surely change, even for Cuba and Venezuela.

And for Chile to achieve its priority goal of good relations with both China and the US, today's meeting alone is insufficient. Therefore, I believe Chile's path forward lies in identifying an area of urgent interest, both within the White House and with Trump personally. In other words, as an example, Chile should do what no other country in the region has yet done: propose a partnership on rare earth elements, which the US currently lacks and has sought wherever it could find interested parties, as was the case with Australia and Ukraine. This proposal must certainly benefit Chile, perhaps even involving a review of the entire national territory, since, at least in the case of lithium, the delays by the Boric administration harmed Chile, as the international market moved more quickly.

Regarding the relationship with the U.S., a friend with whom I developed joint initiatives at the International Political Science Association when we were both at the university, and who now holds an important position in Washington, told me some time ago about Washington's interest in keeping the new Chilean government as close as possible. In this regard, he pointed out that even Boric was fortunate, as it is one of the few cases he knows of where there was no reaction from the White House to the constant offensive provocations coming from the Chilean presidency. They were deemed irrelevant, which was not detrimental to the country, and this is evident today in the warning issued to the new government before it takes office, so as not to harm future relations, as well as in the highly competent delegation that the U.S. is sending to the presidential inauguration next Wednesday.

Indeed, the delegation traveling to Santiago is very beneficial for Chile, as it brings together many of those who currently make decisions or set policies and strategies for the region, including individuals who shared years of experience with Marco Rubio when he was a senator. It is headed by Christopher Landau (son of the ambassador to Santiago, 1977-1982), now Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs and a frequent substitute for the Secretary, as well as one of the key figures for Venezuela; the Assistant Secretary for Economic, Energy, and Business Affairs (a former advisor to Rubio in the Senate); the Assistant Secretary of State for National Defense and Security Affairs for the Americas; the Senior Advisor for Western Hemisphere Affairs, also a longtime associate of Rubio; and the Chief of Staff in the Office of the Counselor at the State Department, currently one of the leading strategists for the region.

It is undoubtedly a team capable of placing great importance on a newly installed government, so everything indicates that the U.S. would like to have the best possible relations with Chile. Since the new government is just taking office, and given that there will be little time in Miami, it is not certain that the U.S. will have a counterpart in Santiago with that level of closeness to the new authorities. In any case, the question is different, given that the new Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense are highly experienced individuals, but without proven experience or knowledge in geopolitics. The doubt is whether Chile is understanding Washington's signals and intentions. Hopefully, Chile will organize itself well enough to explain to the U.S. the importance of its state policy toward China, since the incompetence exhibited by the Boric administration demonstrates once again the major shortcoming of Chilean democracy: the lack of a sufficiently robust intelligence institution to allow the country to achieve a consensus on international policy, as it did for so long during the successful transition.

In fact, if it wasn't understood in a timely manner that today's issue is geopolitics, hopefully the invitation to Miami will serve, not to lead Chile to make decisions contrary to its tradition, but to understand that the sanctions in the cablegate scandal are not a punishment for the new government, but rather the opposite: a warning to avoid penalties established in US law. If Chile neither wants nor benefits from choosing between China and the US, it must win this argument in the new context, and for that, the first step hasn't yet been taken. To have a successful strategy against a government that will dedicate itself wholeheartedly to its next election, Chile needs what it still lacks: total clarity about what is at stake. Miami hasn't resolved anything, but it makes what is happening visible, even though the appointment of Ms. Kristi Noem as an "advisor" after her dismissal as Secretary of Homeland Security is a discouraging sign of the true importance attributed to this initiative.

In conclusion, like any crisis, the Cablegate scandal presents an opportunity: to break free from the political niche the government has occupied and seek what was successful in the past but is currently lacking—a national agreement for a new era in the country. Achieving this in international relations is easier than achieving it in domestic politics.

As the Stoic philosopher Lucius Annaeus Seneca (c. 4 BC-65 AD) said, "If you concentrate on today, you will depend less on tomorrow."

@israelzipper

Master's and PhD in Political Science (University of Essex), Bachelor of Laws (University of Barcelona). Lawyer (University of Chile), former presidential candidate (Chile, 2013)

«The opinions published herein are the sole responsibility of its author».