The Venezuelan scenario: one or more than one?
By: Luis Beltrán Guerra G. - 01/03/2026
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The answer to the question referred to in the title of this essay should be obvious if we take into account some not so ancient events in our historical history.
A good starting point, without having to delve too far back into the pages of history, would be to consider some aspects of Juan Vicente Gómez, who ruled as an absolute dictator, extending his term in office and reforming the constitution several times. It is also recounted that he created the Military Academy and a National Army, putting an end to the system of personal armies commanded by caudillos. It is also said that during his long stay in power he amassed an immense fortune, of course illicit, which was confiscated by a decree of Congress and became entirely part of the national patrimony. The disaster, however, was so great that some do not hesitate to claim that Gómez should be credited with disciplining the country, which reveals the magnitude of the catastrophe.
We Venezuelans, therefore, have attempted not only good things, but great things, but unfortunately, with very few exceptions, we have remained just that: attempts. This is evidenced by several serious analyses. The underlying causes, it seems, have not been overcome, so it is not unreasonable to ask whether they remain the same or whether new ones, even contradictory ones, appear in each cycle.
The distinguished historian Inés Quintero asserts that the establishment of a national armed forces, the structuring of a nation-state, and the pacification of the country contributed to the disappearance of divisive tendencies as a factor fostering caudillo-led belligerence. She adds, therefore, that caudillos ceased to be the determining factor in the political system, which is now based on other foundations and forms of power characteristic of the 20th century. In our view, “caudilloism” persists, but in a new guise, as the serious difficulties Venezuela has faced in establishing itself as a “republic”—and a much more democratic one—seem to reveal. To deny, for example, that Hugo Chávez was a caudillo and that he inspired great enthusiasm is difficult to maintain. Indeed, the Mexican Enrique Krauze states that “modern caudillos” are populists who come to power through democratic means. But they do severe, sometimes definitive, damage to the customs, institutions, laws and freedoms of democracy, to which they owe their rise (The Return of the Caudillo, 2018).
The answer to the question posed in the essay's title is undoubtedly that Venezuelan history is imbued with a diversity of scenarios, yet seemingly subsumed under a single, ever-growing theme. Perhaps one of the most decisive was "the destruction of the democracy established in 1961," which had allowed for the democratic election of 10 presidents and solid periods of progress and well-being. Its fundamental provisions are more than precise: 1. The Republic of Venezuela is forever and irrevocably free and independent from all domination or protection of foreign powers; 2. It is a Federal State, in the terms established by this Constitution; 3. The government is and will always be democratic, representative, responsible, and subject to alternation; 4. Sovereignty resides in the people, who exercise it through suffrage and the organs of Public Power; 5. The national flag, with the colors yellow, blue, and red; The national anthem "Gloria al bravo pueblo" and the coat of arms of the Republic are the symbols of the homeland. The official language is Spanish. The immediate scenario, a consequence of a "coup d'état," which pleased a few (disguised as democrats), typical of anarchism, but with a negativity still present since December 6, 1998, that is, for almost four decades.
It is impossible to ignore the event that, ironically, could be described—in the language of today's governance—as "a minimal scenario," but which, in reality, is one of the most decisive in our historical development. This event, which took place between the last three months of 2025 and a few days of 2026, led to the regime of "co-responsibility, tutelage, or protectorate" established by the United States in relation to Caracas. It is so peculiar, and even somewhat unimaginable, that the head of state is now the dynamic vice president of the tutelary regime. This suggests that Venezuela is currently experiencing one of the most defining scenarios, at least in the context of its recent history. And the present, and in part the future, are in the hands of the tutelary.
One of the tasks undertaken to prevent democracy from becoming a source of "enviable wealth"—a tendency not entirely foreign to us—has begun with a tenuous control of political party finances, particularly regarding the financing of electoral campaigns. The use of political positions to amass wealth, in terms of the penalties for such conduct, leaves much to be desired, leading to the conclusion that a kind of well-distributed web has existed and continues to amass the fortunes of those who manage to infiltrate political activities. This practice does not exclude donors, who, in most cases, increase their wealth through what appears to be an investment. In Venezuela today, the sums allocated to high, mid, and even low-level officials are unprecedented in history. The author of these lines has found it difficult, and we continue to agree, not so much with the facts themselves, but certainly with the figures. The crucial point, for the sake of frankness, is that any political system embroiled in such a harmful practice would, sooner or later, implode. And this has indeed happened in a significant number of Latin American countries.
The IDEA group has spearheaded alternatives aimed at ensuring that politics is conducted with integrity. Evidence of this is the transcription of one of its arguments, which states that money is a necessary component of any democracy: it enables political participation and representation. However, if not effectively regulated, it can undermine the integrity of political processes and institutions and jeopardize the quality of democracy. Regulations related to the financing of political parties and electoral campaigns (commonly known as political financing) and lobbying are fundamental to promoting integrity, transparency, and accountability in any democracy. In short, for IDEA, our era demands a renewed focus on ethics in political action—a new convergence between ethics and politics.
It is worth recalling that at the Democratic Congress of 1958, Representative Jovito Villalba, a prominent politician and professor of constitutional law, proposed establishing an absolute prohibition on presidential reelection in the Constitution, a proposal that was not achieved. Instead, a 10-year disqualification was established, as Rafael Caldera's thesis suggests, which allowed Carlos Andrés Pérez to be elected President for a second time on December 4, 1988, before being replaced on May 21, 1993. The prominent political analyst Carlos Alberto Montaner wrote that reelection obstructs generational change, competition among leaders, and the circulation of elites; it reinforces caudillismo at the expense of institutions and fosters a harmful mercantilist relationship between economic and political power. Among other negative consequences for a democracy, it obstructs generational change, competition among leaders, and the circulation of elites, reinforcing strongman rule at the expense of institutions. Furthermore, when the term is prolonged, the strongman surrounds himself with courtiers who flatter and deceive him in pursuit of privileges, fostering a harmful mercantilist relationship between economic and political power. This system feeds on itself, facilitating corruption and fueling the so-called "Eistellung Effect," the stubborn tendency of the human brain to cling to solutions it has already experienced as good, preventing the perception of better ones. In my opinion, the academic concludes, the Mexican formula is the most appropriate: six years and goodbye.
This lengthy essay has sought to define some of the defining characteristics of the Venezuelan scenario, asking whether it has been a single one or more than one. The answer, logically, must lean not only toward the fact that there are more than one, but with the caveat that our analysis has only encompassed some of them. That is to say, there are many more, whose identification would require a treatise of several volumes.
«The opinions published herein are the sole responsibility of its author».