The return of the bipolar order

By: Beatrice E. Rangel - 18/05/2026

The recent US-China summit will likely make history. For the first time since the George H.W. Bush administration, global stability was once again the central theme.

Just as Richard Nixon understood in the seventies that a strategic alliance between the Soviet Union and China would represent an enormous danger to the stability of Western liberal democracies, today Xi Jinping understands that, without détente with the United States, the Chinese dream of becoming the world's leading economic power could become a pipe dream.

For his part, Donald Trump also seems to have understood that China is not Europe, nor Venezuela, nor Cuba, nor Iran, but the only country capable of helping to rebalance the US economy, which is currently under pressure from inflation, debt, and a loss of industrial competitiveness.

The understandings between the two leaders stem from different motivations, but converge on a common aspiration: to successfully consolidate this new stage of specialization in the global economy. And, in this area, rarely in history have two powers been so complementary.

The United States remains the leading center of invention and technological innovation. China, on the other hand, has become the hub for streamlining and mass-producing these innovations within the global production system. China now possesses greater manufacturing capacity than the United States, Germany, and Japan combined, accounting for approximately 30% of global manufacturing output. This industrial power allows it to produce consumer goods at low costs, positively impacting the budgets of middle-class families worldwide.

China also dominates virtually the entire supply chain for rare earth minerals, which are essential for manufacturing advanced technologies. Without these minerals, the modern military industry would suffer a severe setback, as they allow for the reduction of the weight of strategic metals, making aircraft lighter, faster, and more efficient. They are also essential for the batteries of countless devices, from remote controls to electric vehicles. In other words, without them, the massive expansion of the contemporary technological revolution would not be possible.

The United States, however, remains the primary source of scientific discoveries and technological developments that the Chinese research apparatus has yet to fully match. Consequently, many Chinese companies involved in the expansion of artificial intelligence still rely on microprocessors designed with American technology.

This is compounded by a deep financial and agricultural interdependence. American farmers rely on China as one of their main markets for grain and soybean exports, essential for feeding a vast population transitioning to higher levels of consumption. China, in turn, remains one of the largest foreign holders of U.S. public debt. This creates mutual interests: the United States depends on global buyers to finance its deficits, while China relies on the stability and liquidity of the dollar to preserve the value of its international reserves.

In summary, the Chinese and American economies have developed levels of complementarity whose rupture would cause profound and possibly irreparable damage to both nations.

That is precisely what both Xi and Trump seem to have internalized, moving toward a kind of strategic détente. Interestingly, the United States resorted to détente during the Cold War when it concluded that a nuclear confrontation would have no winners, only multiple losers.

Does this mean that the agreements—not yet published or formalized—reached at the Xi-Trump summit will put an end to the rivalries between the two powers? Clearly not.

China will continue to expand its presence in emerging markets, particularly in Africa, to secure the supply of raw materials for its vast manufacturing sector. The United States, for its part, will hardly tolerate a significant Chinese presence in areas considered strategic to its national security, such as the Panama Canal.

However, both powers could agree on containing major threats to global stability, such as the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East.

Because what happened in China during the second week of May was much more than a simple diplomatic summit. It was, possibly, the moment when the 21st century definitively left behind the unipolar illusion and began to organize itself around two centers of power.

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