The new Middle East that will emerge the day Iran accepts its defeat

By: Ricardo Israel - 10/05/2026

It was widely believed that the US and Israel would militarily defeat Iran after last year's 12-day war, which left it without air defenses and with its nuclear program in ruins. However, the problem is that this year, starting on February 28, efforts were made to eliminate the Islamic Republic (IR), which has not been achieved, and its mere survival is considered a triumph, along with the transformation of the Strait of Hormuz into an international economic crisis.

There, more than any military success of Iran, which today has neither an air force nor a navy, what has operated is the automatic mechanism of international maritime insurance that stopped the ships, since the threat and shots from some speedboat have been enough for the insurers to immediately paralyze navigation in those waters.

Washington's decision was to block all trade with Iranian ports, seeking a dual effect: the collapse of its economy and the depletion of its oil wells due to the inability to sell its oil. In other words, a devastating effect to be achieved without the need for troops on the ground, so that Tehran would be forced to negotiate. This has not yielded the expected result due to the internal division between regime politicians willing to negotiate and the Revolutionary Guard (RG), the de facto power today, who have rejected any agreement.

In the Middle East, where so many things change that they remain the same, it is difficult to use the term "historical change," but there is no doubt that this military defeat could bring about the most profound change since the very emergence of the Islamic Republic (IR) in 1979. Of course, a negotiation process still needs to lead to the regime, or whoever speaks on its behalf, acknowledging this fact.

If that day arrives, what changes should we witness? This is a region that has been geopolitically altered as a consequence of decisions made by the Persian regime itself, since the acquisition of the atomic bomb brought former enemies closer together. In the case of the Sunni Arab countries and Israel, they have supported each other militarily in recent years. Furthermore, attacks on countries that did not want to participate in this war, such as those in the Gulf, have only strengthened this relationship, especially between the Emirates and Israel.

This de facto alliance, which we will call the Semitic alliance, is the most important and probably the most lasting factor in this new situation. For it to acquire the character of a new geopolitical architecture, it lacks the adherence to the Abraham Accords of the most important Arab country, Saudi Arabia, which requires something that the current Israeli government does not want to grant today: the creation of a Palestinian state. They say that it would be rewarding Hamas and its invasion of October 7, 2023, a condition that Riyadh has set from the beginning because it aspires to continue leading the Muslim world.

I am convinced that this goes beyond a simple peace process, but that, together with the US, it will be the origin of a new NATO, in the form of a kind of Middle East Treaty Organization, replacing the NATO that is dying due to the growing distance between Washington and an increasingly irrelevant Europe. Just as the previous NATO—which perhaps should have disappeared with the end of the USSR—was born as an alliance between the US and its former enemies (Germany, Japan) to face the next historical stage, the new alliance will undoubtedly address the issue of control over oil and gas in that region. This organization will surely be concerned that what happened in the Strait of Hormuz is not repeated, and therefore, considering that 20% of the world's gas and oil trade passes through there, we will likely witness the construction of gas and oil pipelines that ensure global supply under all circumstances, and that will add to those existing in Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, but with greater ambition and as a definitive solution, so they should cross Saudi Arabia and Jordan to reach Israel, from whose ports they could go to the rest of the world.

Fancy?

No. Not at all, since the above comes on top of the recent rapprochement between Israel and Lebanon against Hezbollah, after having reached an agreement a couple of years ago, through US mediation, on maritime delimitation. This agreement aims to have Lebanon join, in the near future, the international consortium that extracts gas from the Mediterranean Sea, in which the UAE, Greece, Israel, Cyprus, and other nations already participate. Lebanon is poised to become one of the main gas suppliers to Europe, via a pipeline that would reach the European Union through Bulgaria, although Erdoğan's Turkey wants it to pass through its territory. As a sign of its potential, Egypt has already given its approval, prioritizing security of supply over other considerations, by signing a $35 billion contract with Israel as the supplier.

This is the new Middle East, more pragmatic than fundamentalist. Furthermore, despite the brutality and terrible death toll in Gaza, unlike in Europe, no Arab country witnessed the antisemitism seen in elite US universities or the massive demonstrations in the streets of New York, Toronto, Paris, London, or Sydney in support of Hamas. Nor did their leaders make such biased statements as those of Sánchez or Boric.

Should this materialize into a new organization, we would undoubtedly find ourselves in a new geopolitical context, especially if Trump's visit to Xi Jinping's China on May 14th and 15th culminates in a tariff agreement. Such an agreement, given its significance, would replace the multilateral structure that has been gradually disappearing as a consequence of the actions of the United States, its creator. If an agreement is reached, the combined size of both economies would compel every country to join, whether it likes it or not. This is certainly not the end of history, nor a clash or alliance of civilizations, but rather a profound shift, one of the most important in years.

However, if Marco Rubio has said that the US offensive against Iran “achieved all its objectives,” why does Iran continue to attack its Arab neighbors, and why does the US then want to reach an agreement with the remnants of the regime, accepting its survival?

The answer is that the drones and missiles that continue to emerge from Iran are all they have left, and it is also a consequence of the way they decided to face the war after the destruction suffered last year, where the regime opted to decentralize its missiles across its vast territory, giving decision-making power to mid-level commanders in charge of the launchers, anticipating what ultimately happened, that the high command would be eliminated from the air and there would be no reliable methods of internal communication. And this is what has been operating since February 28th, in a war that has been successful for the US in military terms compared to what happened in terms of duration and losses in the first (1991) and second Gulf Wars (2003), both with Iraq, and where the US has learned the lessons of previous failures such as Vietnam (not going to war if you are not prepared to win it) and Afghanistan (not getting bogged down, for which all available military resources are used), in addition to amassing an unassailable military superiority, as is happening now in the blockade of Iranian ports.

The problem is that the US has hoped for something that hasn't happened: that Iran will accept defeat, so it won't have to return in a couple of years, as soon as conditions change or there's a new government in Washington. Without an agreement, that might happen as soon as the planes, aircraft carriers, and military personnel are withdrawn.

Incidentally, if anyone needs a success with Iran and/or China, it's Trump, since his situation is complicated, given that much seems to be going awry, and, for his part, the economic impact of what Iran achieved in Hormuz could cause him to lose the November elections, for having taken the path of what the Democrats unfairly call an "election war," which he didn't actually start, but rather Iranian aggression has continued for 47 years since the takeover of the embassy.

What has the US achieved in its current offensive?

“For now,” a lot in a short time, if not the end, at least the long interruption of the Iranian atomic program, the end of the missile program, which, although they continue to be fired, is in reduced quantity, and the end of the proxies, except for Hezbollah which is fighting to survive, since the Lebanese government is against it and seeking peace with Israel.

This feeling that too much is only half-finished, not only in the transition to democracy in Venezuela or Cuba, but also in Gaza, where after having "achieved the impossible" with the ceasefire, everything seems to be at a standstill due to Hamas's refusal to hand over weapons, without which there will be no progress, just as Israel has not managed to disarm it, despite defeating it and now occupying half of the Strip.

Against Iran, the military aspect has worked well or very well, compared to other US incursions, but there is no doubt that what would happen in Hormuz was not measured, as well as, as on other occasions, there has been a lack of a plan for the day after the military, that is, it has resembled what happened to Netanyahu in Gaza.

It is from this feeling of incompleteness that the various initiatives arise, creating the impression that good results have not been achieved, which is inaccurate. This perception is fueled by a Democratic opposition that offers no alternatives and by media outlets that have failed to provide adequate coverage of what has actually transpired. Therefore, the timing is not favorable for Trump, who would like a ceremony similar to, or at least resembling, Japan's surrender, which will never be granted in the Middle East. Nor will there likely be anything comparable to the ceremony following the ceasefire in Gaza.

Hence the importance of what Washington hopes will happen, at least some indication that Iran has resolved its internal struggle between politicians and militants, to decide whether or not a new military offensive by the US and Israel will be necessary.

Trump has always been bothered by not receiving the recognition the Abraham Accords deserved as a major breakthrough for peace, and if he now succeeds in Gaza, Iran, Cuba, and Venezuela, these would be colossal achievements for a single president. But for the moment, the feeling is that he has tried too hard and is achieving too little, which is inaccurate, considering that Iran has been militarily defeated with few casualties and very few US planes and ships destroyed or disabled.

However, Iran has not lost its will to fight, just as Hamas did not in Gaza. Ultimately, if the Islamist architecture of the regime in Iran is not dismantled, even without nuclear weapons, a situation similar to North Korea could emerge in that part of the world. Despite this, something profound has already changed: first, the Iranian dictatorship remains a terrible punishment for its own people, but thanks to US intervention, it is now too weak to pose a permanent threat to its neighbors, nor is it in a position to support its proxies or export its revolution.

Secondly, given Iran's weakness, Israel undoubtedly became a regional power with air superiority even over Turkey, becoming a middle power internationally. But unlike nuclear powers such as France and the United Kingdom, it has the will to use its power. Furthermore, although it has been in continuous war since 2023, its economy grew, and it is one of the most important centers of scientific and technological development in the world, despite its size and population. To this must be added world-class intelligence that defeated and surpassed Iran before the confrontation began, both in 2024 and 2025. Therefore, it is difficult to understand how the country was surprised by Hamas on October 7th.

Moreover, and also to the benefit of the US, in Israel it found the ally that never appeared within NATO, except for the United Kingdom on some occasions in the past, certainly not today, considering the disappointments that have existed with the current government and with the anti-Semitism unleashed in the British streets.

Therefore, the question remains: if the maintenance of the Islamic Republic is accepted in a negotiation, is it still possible to break the Islamist architecture of the regime?

Islam is a religion, but Islamism is a political ideology, and the Iranian regime, whether in its ayatollah or military junta form, is Islamist in nature. Moreover, it is based not only on ideology or repression, but also on money, contracts, smugglers, family networks, foundations, terrorist proxies, and business collaborators. It is also an organized crime network that explains its role in drug trafficking and why it forged close ties with cartels, including the Venezuelan Cartel of the Suns, a network that extends beyond national borders.

When the US and Israeli attacks began, the talk was of missiles, the nuclear program, and proxies. Today, the Strait of Hormuz, global economic problems, and energy take center stage. This is not the result of diplomacy in Islamabad; it is a strategy imposed by Tehran. There has been a clash between the "Art of Negotiation" and the age-old logic of the bazaar, where money and resources have been moved through families, clans, and charities, with transfers ranging from bitcoins to gold. The unfinished task for the US is to map, expose, and close each of these channels, as no other country can do so.

Reopening the Strait of Hormuz is necessary, but not sufficient. After Iran's continued aggression against its neighbors, it's now possible to take advantage of the fact that places like the UAE and Bahrain know more about these mechanisms than the Department of Commerce in Washington, although Qatar remains untrustworthy due to its gas partnership with Iran.

What I've described may help dismantle the deeply rooted Islamist structure that continues to serve the regime, but I still don't believe it alone will force Iran to acknowledge its defeat. The ceasefire has only served to give the regime a respite, the same negotiating strategy it has been using since 1979. Therefore, whether it likes it or not, I believe the US will resume bombing, perhaps again dividing the work with Israel, just as they did in the early days. That is, from now on, the US will concentrate on oil, the blockade of ports, and air attacks until Khark Island is rendered unusable, while Israel's campaign will focus on the territory itself, using its entire air force, which is now larger than the US has on its aircraft carriers.

It would be the final offensive, the last one the US can afford, since time is running out, from the moment that the 60-day period stipulated by law to wage war without notifying Congress was fulfilled on May 2, and although neither Clinton nor Obama respected the deadline, Trump and Rubio already warned in writing that there were no major military activities left pending.

It's not the end of the story, but it is something different. In Iran and in the negotiations with China, the US is currently reshaping the post-World War II agreements and institutions, which are being dismantled by its own decision. Something geopolitically different is emerging, although its characteristics are not yet entirely clear; however, its first outlines are already beginning to take shape in the Middle East.

In conclusion, it is important to remember that history is the politics that was, and politics is history in the making, always within the context of the classic definition of war as the continuation of politics by other means, with the understanding that these only end when the will to fight of the combatants ends, which has not yet happened in the Middle East.

@israelzipper

Master's and PhD in Political Science (University of Essex), Bachelor of Laws (University of Barcelona), Lawyer (University of Chile), former presidential candidate (Chile, 2013)

«The opinions published herein are the sole responsibility of its author».