The chess game of crime in Bolivia

By: Hugo Marcelo Balderrama - 22/06/2026

Guest columnist.
Share:     

Max Manwaring (RIP) explained that the criminal phenomenon evolved through three generations of gangs:

First-generation gangs are generally linked to the control of small territories and petty crime. For example, these are the groups that, in the 1990s, dominated certain neighborhoods in our cities and fought over territory with similar gangs. Their criminal activity is a nuisance, but it's not something that local police forces can't control.

In contrast, second-generation gangs are organizations that control several cities, even entire countries. They often function as bodyguards and security chiefs for the cartels or are directly involved in drug trafficking. Furthermore, their criminal capacity poses a threat to the countries where they operate. Indeed, groups like Tren de Aragua and Los Reyes Latinos have influence in several countries in the region and have openly defied the state. For example, in the tri-border area between Peru, Chile, and Bolivia, Tren de Aragua has established a base of operations from which it interferes with the foreign trade of the three nations. Additionally, Vanessa Kaiser, a Chilean member of parliament, denounced the existence of a vast human trafficking network.

Finally, third-generation gangs are transnational organizations, but unlike their predecessors, they have a declared political objective. The most obvious example is the São Paulo Forum, an organization born from the mind of Fidel Castro. Its criminal methodology is a mixture of populist narratives; infiltration of the media; destruction of the image of security forces; and the creation of proxy political parties.

The São Paulo Forum, under the leadership of Hugo Chávez, seized power in Venezuela in 1999. The country's oil revenues were used to expand its criminal enterprise throughout the region. Ecuador, Argentina, and Bolivia were the first countries where transnational organized crime succeeded in overthrowing governments. But let's focus on Bolivia.

From the beginning of the 21st century, destabilizing processes began: the Water War between February and April 2000, the Battle for Coca in January 2002, Black February in 2003, and finally, the Gas War of October 2003 were the skirmishes that undermined the country's democratic institutions. Of course, we must also highlight the complicity of Tuto Quiroga and Carlos Mesa. The former, during his short presidency, was unable to execute the arrest warrants against Evo Morales. For his part, Carlos Mesa betrayed Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada and negotiated the October Agenda with the subversives who had attacked Bolivia. The 2005 elections, essentially, were the triumphant entry of the Cuban dictatorship into La Paz.

Evo Morales' fourteen years in power were guided by the plans of Castro-Chavismo. The constitution was amended; the Armed Forces and the National Police were dismantled; subservience replaced meritocracy in the Judiciary; judges and prosecutors became mercenaries of the dictatorship; and civil society was subjugated through state terrorism, which included tax persecution as a mechanism to generate fear.

The internal conflict between Luis Arce and Evo Morales was the main reason the Movement for Socialism (MAS) lost the 2025 elections in Bolivia. This paved the way for Rodrigo Paz to come to power. The new government, which was seen as the hope for restoring democracy in Bolivia, has already faced more than 90 days of blockades and protests in its first seven months in office. This demonstrates something: that although the proponents of 21st-century socialism lost power, they have a great capacity for managing violence. To do this, they use unions, social movements, peasant federations, and media operatives. They also have the support of their transnational accomplices, including Gustavo Petro in Colombia and Juan Marino in Argentina; in fact, Marino attempted to enter the country with a group of agitators.

President Rodrigo Paz insists on dialogue as a mechanism to quell the bloodlust of the blockading groups, but this is nothing more than a sign of his disconnect from the country's reality. These are not citizens exercising their right to protest, but rather armed narco-terrorist groups, who in many cases are holding hundreds of truckers stranded at the blockades hostage. In this regard, Carlos Sánchez Berzain, in his article "Fear of Governing with Respect for the Law is a Stigma of 21st-Century Socialism in Democratic Governments of Latin America," explains:

We have seen and continue to see presidents and governments in Latin America stigmatized by the fear of governing by upholding and enforcing the law, because they do not change the dictatorial system, because they adopt the strategy of gradualism which is their own slow death, because they do not form strong governments of national unity with the clear objective of restoring the elements of democracy and separating crime from politics in order to recover the economy of the people, because they believe that everything can be negotiated, including the human rights of citizens—whom they are obligated to protect—who are victims of crimes.

In conclusion, the government should not engage in dialogue with organized crime. While acknowledging the differences, what Bolivia needs is to emulate what Peru and Colombia did in the 1990s. That is, to declare the actions of Evo Morales and his cronies, which include the COB (Bolivian Workers' Center) and various peasant groups, as a threat to national security, because, in terms of danger, there is no difference between the coca grower of Chapare and the Cali Cartel or Shining Path.

«The opinions published herein are the sole responsibility of its author».