By: Hugo Marcelo Balderrama - 24/06/2025
Guest columnist."In vain, some in the United States are planning that the right will win, that it will return. Let's see if that right, if it wins, can hold on. Here, the people are united to defend their homeland," warned Evo Morales on Wednesday, June 18, in a meeting with the leaders of the Six Federations of the Tropics. We could take Morales's words as one of his now-typical verbal incontinence; however, in recent days, videos were made public of a group of hooded individuals carrying automatic weapons and threatening to fire on any military and police personnel who enter the area dominated by Evo.
"Forewarned is forearmed" is an old adage that tells us that if something bad is going to happen, it's easier to take precautions or deterrent measures. But, despite the antiquated nature of the saying, the Arce Catacora administration doesn't seem to feel threatened by the criminal groups that follow the coca grower's orders. The hypothesis is that he doesn't want any trouble in his last 60 days in office.
A couple of days ago, I had the honor of speaking at a forum on State Security and Economic Development. The conclusion of all the speakers, including forensic experts, police officers, and military personnel, was that Evo Morales has become—in reality, he always was—a threat to the country's security, and therefore a danger to the lives, property, and freedom of good Bolivians.
The solution lies in applying a strategy similar to that used by Alberto Fujimori in Peru or Belisario Antonio Betancur in Colombia, specifically with Pablo Escobar and his associates. That is, Evo becomes a military target for the national government. It's a harsh but necessary measure, especially after the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) officially added Bolivia to its gray list, given that the country failed to comply with the observations required to draft a law to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.
However, along with restoring internal security, a realignment of the geopolitical outlook is equally necessary, since the military agreements with Iran were the worst blunders of the governments of Evo Morales and, later, of Arce Catacora.
Note the contradiction: while Bolivian entrepreneurs dedicated to foreign trade needed to strengthen trade agreements with the United States, the regime applied "revolutionary solidarity" toward the most furious anti-American dictatorships. Apparently, in the current escalation of violence between Iran and Israel, where the Iranian ayatollahs have the most to lose, Arce Catacora and his government have opted for the path of silence, the only good thing achieved so far. Regarding this, Emilio Martínez, in his article "Lejos de los ayatolas," states:
We don't expect a complete reversal of ties, which will only be possible in a different political context, when it's feasible to resume the flow of Israeli tourists to Bolivia's northern Amazon, or to explore technological cooperation with a powerhouse in this field like Israel, the only democracy in its region. In the meantime, keeping the country away from the ayatollahs seems like a sound national strategy.
All in all, given the latest poll results, the next government will apparently be decided between Jorge Quiroga and Samuel Doria Medina, both of whom are highly criticized for their long history of being functional opponents and negotiators with Morales, including the 2007 Constituent Assembly and the coca grower's escape in 2019. Therefore, will either of the two who occupy the presidential chair be up to the historic challenges facing Bolivia, or do they simply want to be remembered in the books as former presidents? That is something history will judge.
«The opinions published herein are the sole responsibility of its author».