Quo Vadis, Venezuela?

By: Beatrice E. Rangel - 25/03/2026

Today, when Venezuela is mentioned, the reaction is almost always the same: raised eyebrows, awkward silence, or expressions of frustration. Depending on the perspective, the predominant emotions range from anger to resignation—occasionally, hope.

Even within U.S. political circles, there is a notable reluctance to engage in a comprehensive discussion about Venezuela: What are the objectives? What is the strategy? And what will the United States and the hemisphere ultimately gain from what increasingly resembles a modern-day protectorate?

To understand Venezuela's present, one must look to its history. In a single sentence, I would summarize that history as follows: Venezuela—and much of Latin America—resembles a kind of institutional "Jurassic Park," where old political and economic structures continue to shape modern realities.

When Pope Alexander VI divided the New World between Spain and Portugal, he did more than allocate territory: he exported feudalism. For more than five centuries, much of Latin America has operated under variations of medieval political economy. In these systems, order depends not on strong civic institutions, but on strong leaders. Wealth is derived not from creation, but from extraction. The state assumes ownership of natural resources and distributes concessions, generating rents rather than fostering productivity.

This legacy has profound consequences. Economies become mercantilist; politics, corporatist. Power is negotiated among elites—military, religious, business, and political—rather than emanating from organized civil society. These arrangements are inherently unstable, as shifting power balances continually disrupt the equilibrium. It is therefore not surprising that the region has struggled to consolidate lasting democratic institutions.

In most successful capitalist systems, natural resources become productive assets only when combined with private enterprise and wealth creation. Venezuela, in contrast, has remained overwhelmingly dependent on rent-seeking throughout its history.

This pattern began early. On his third voyage, Christopher Columbus reached the eastern coast of Venezuela and encountered rich pearl beds. The Spanish Crown moved quickly to exploit this wealth. The city of Nueva Cádiz, established in 1527, became the first European settlement in South America. However, in less than a decade, overexploitation depleted the resource.

The collapse of Nueva Cádiz set a precedent. Faced with economic decline, the local elites did not reform the institutions; instead, they resorted to strongmen. One such figure was Lope de Aguirre, whose brief and violent intervention epitomized a recurring pattern: economic crisis followed by the rise of authoritarian leadership, further destruction, and even greater instability.

The same dynamic reappeared during the rise and fall of the cacao economy in the 18th century. As independence movements gained momentum, landowning elites—fearful of losing their privileges—aligned themselves with brutal military leaders like José Tomás Boves. His campaigns devastated both the independence movement and the productive base of the economy, plunging the country into prolonged hardship.

Coffee later replaced cacao as Venezuela's main export, and for a time Venezuela prospered. However, internal conflict persisted, especially over land and social structure. Leaders like Ezequiel Zamora mobilized popular discontent, but they did so through violent confrontations rather than institutional reforms.

The discovery of oil in the early 20th century brought unprecedented wealth and a period of relative stability. Between 1959 and 1998, Venezuela was widely considered a functioning democracy. However, this stability masked deep structural weaknesses. Excessive economic dependence on oil, combined with protectionist policies, stifled diversification and growth. As oil prices stagnated, so did the economy, leading to widespread frustration among the middle class.

This environment paved the way for the rise of Hugo Chávez, a failed coup leader who capitalized on public disillusionment. Following political crises, Chávez increasingly aligned Venezuela with Cuba, effectively transforming the country into a client state. Over time, institutional erosion accelerated, culminating in the authoritarian system consolidated under Nicolás Maduro.

This historical trajectory reveals several enduring features:

• A persistent reliance on rent-seeking rather than wealth creation

• Weak civic institutions and limited social responsibility

• A recurring tendency to seek salvation in the leadership of strong men

Under these conditions, Venezuela's transformation into a state captured by criminal networks is less an anomaly and more a continuation of historical patterns. Over the past two decades, enormous national wealth has squandered, while state structures have been repurposed to facilitate illicit activities, including drug trafficking, illegal mining, and transnational crime.

Faced with this reality—and with limited trust in traditional elites—the United States has adopted an increasingly interventionist stance, which some characterize as the establishment of a modern protectorate.

This raises a critical question: how long will such an agreement last?

Although historical precedents are limited, certain dynamics warrant consideration. Criminal organizations tend to remain cohesive when the spoils are plentiful. However, in the case of Venezuela, economic decline and increased international scrutiny have significantly reduced these cohesive relationships. Illicit operations, which rely on secrecy, are now under sustained pressure.

As resources dwindle, internal fractures are likely to emerge. Rivalries intensify, loyalties weaken, and the system becomes vulnerable to what political science describes as "implosion."

However, the collapse of such a system is only the beginning. The far more difficult task is its reconstruction.

Rebuilding institutions requires more than removing a regime: it demands cultivating a political culture based on accountability, competition, and public service. This process is inherently long-term. Even under favorable conditions, restoring democratic governance and economic functionality could take a decade or more.

This may not be the outcome many are hoping for. However, given the depth of institutional decay and infrastructure collapse in Venezuela, there are no quick fixes. Dismantling entrenched criminal structures and rebuilding a viable state will require sustained commitment and, above all, time.

That is the reality that Venezuela faces today.

«The opinions published herein are the sole responsibility of its author».