Orban's defeat was resounding, but with Magyar, will continuity or change prevail in Hungary?

By: Ricardo Israel - 19/04/2026

In Plato's allegory of the cave, the shadows bring with them a lesson for politics, in all times and places, since what is shown does not always correspond to what is actually taking place and what we can expect in the near future, since many times, after an election, what prevails is enthusiasm and good intentions over objective facts.

This, in my opinion, is what could be happening today in Hungary with the resounding defeat of Viktor Orbán, which ended his 16 consecutive years in power as prime minister (2010-2026), twenty if we include a previous term (1998-2002). Perhaps even more so than in Budapest, there was also joy abroad at such an eloquent result, since he was not just any ruler but the embodiment of what was called "illiberal" democracy—an expression that, however much it was initiated and proudly used by Orbán himself, is quite an oxymoron, since it combines two words or concepts with opposite meanings. Democracy doesn't have qualifiers, and when it does, it simply isn't democracy, being something different, as were, for example, the "people's democracies," applicable today to the Cuban dictatorship, whose enthusiastic supporters, who almost always live outside the island, define it as a "different" democracy.

Moreover, it is difficult to find other instances where so many left-wingers, liberals, and even many progressive activists celebrated and applauded the triumph of someone from the right, such as Peter Magyar, with impeccable conservative credentials. Until quite recently, he was a collaborator of Orban in his government, and his career was also built within the same party, Fidasz, or Hungarian Civic Union. A personal matter, his divorce from the Minister of Justice, led him to distance himself, and with the information he possessed, he transformed himself into a champion of anti-corruption, a theme that allowed him a rapid and unstoppable political rise until his triumph.

The question that arises is what Magyar will do with this support and whether Orban's defeat is temporary or definitive, since in politics, there are many examples of those defeated, but who, like Lazarus, rise up and return to power, demonstrating "that the news of their demise was premature," as Mark Twain said.

The electoral process was impeccable, without question, so we did not witness any transition from dictatorship to democracy nor any "transition" to democracy, as was mistakenly presented by so much international press that made a real caricature of Orbán, who suffered from a terrible image, not always deserved.

What undoubtedly occurred was a drift toward the personalization of power and a loss of the checks and balances so necessary in any democracy. The result was such a concentration of power that, in practice, a regime that was initially parliamentary was transformed into a presidential one. Orbán himself contradicted this, since he was once presented as Magyar himself is today, having played a prominent role in the transition from communism to democracy, becoming a true face of that process, so much so that he was first elected prime minister back in 1998.

Despite his image, Orbán was never a Lukashenko, nor was Hungary Belarus in its relationship with either Russia or Putin. To begin with, every single time he was elected and re-elected during the 16 years he dedicated to accumulating personal power and leveraging majorities to enact constitutional reforms, there is no doubt that he won by democratic majorities. Moreover, regarding some of his well-known disagreements with European Union (EU) officials, during the election campaign, Hungary acknowledged that Orbán had been right on the issue of immigration, so much so that there would be no significant changes in that respect.

Therefore, the question is for Magyar, who must define how much continuity and how much change there will be in his government. The question is legitimate, given that in Europe there is a case similar to Orban's in terms of continuous time in power, but completely opposite in terms of the scrutiny he faced from the media and his relationship with powerful EU officials.

This is the case of Angela Merkel, who left office to mixed applause after serving as Chancellor of Germany from 2005 to 2021. Today, her administration faces considerable criticism, and little seems to remain of what was once her favored strategy: the agreement with Putin. Even before Putin, a strategy dating back to the Soviet era, involved securing gas and oil supplies, which were supposed to provide cheap and reliable fuel for industry and households in the Federal Republic. However, this optimism failed to consider geopolitical factors and ultimately proved ineffective against the invasion of Ukraine. Even the new Baltic gas pipelines suffered an attack in an unexplained incident, where the Biden administration may have been involved, either through omission or action.

Today, scrutiny is also focused on another of Merkel's distinctive policies: the openness to uncontrolled immigration, where, as on the US southern border, oversight was conspicuously absent for years. Incidentally, the two leaders are not comparable in style, and Merkel never sought to concentrate power. Furthermore, the attitude of the EU bureaucracy towards her was entirely different. What was once a show of closeness towards Merkel contrasted sharply with antipathy towards Orbán, a kind of distancing from the leader of a country that had not been seen from that bureaucracy since its attitude towards Mrs. Thatcher. The criticism of Hungary was similar to that of Hungary, particularly regarding the lack of democratic credentials, since the appointment of those in charge of each area and the presidency was the result of a top-level political agreement, given that elections were never held.

Furthermore, due to the type of coverage surrounding the Hungarian election, the analysis by international media has been dominated by emotion and rejection of Orban, so the media have reacted in a way similar to what is found on social networks.

My impression is that with Hungary there may be fewer changes than expected on issues such as the relationship with Russia and with Putin himself, given Hungary's dependence on energy, where geography and history also play a role, just as it is possible that the changes will be less than expected with regard to Ukraine and Zelensky.

Incidentally, with Hungary the style and language will change, as will Hungarian vetoes on community loans, and Budapest will cease to be a thorn in the side of that kind of politburo that is the European Commission headed as president by Ursula von der Leyen, and who derives much of her de facto power from taking advantage of the vacuum created by the existence of that absurd rule that requires unanimity in important decisions.

The point is that, beyond media posturing, Hungary's energy relationship with Russia and its existing dependence may eventually force the traditional raison d'état to prevail, regardless of the prime minister's wishes. This could last longer than Angela Merkel's strategy regarding Russian energy. Something similar could happen with Ukraine, since it shouldn't be forgotten that an unexplained incident was used by Orbán to justify vetoing the loan to Kyiv. He claimed that before lifting the veto, Hungary had to be financially compensated for the bombing of the gas pipeline, which he attributed to Ukraine's responsibility. Even after the war, the pipeline continued to serve economic purposes for both Russia and Ukraine, and this not only influenced Hungary's energy policy but also similarly affected Slovakia, damaging the image of its prime minister, Robert Fico, in the international press, much like Orbán's.

In other words, the damage to the Druzhba pipeline, which originates in Russia and whose route through several European countries makes it the longest in the world and, until now, exempt from EU sanctions, has interrupted the supply of oil to Hungary. This is behind the extension of the veto on the EU loan of almost one billion dollars to Ukraine, with Zelensky insisting that, in addition to the Russian attack, repairs were hampered by Russian bombing, a claim rejected by Budapest. Now, however, the pressure is on the new prime minister, as the EU expects him to lift the veto as soon as he takes office.

Beyond this specific issue, there is no doubt that there was and is a double standard and even hypocrisy in both the international press and the European Commission, demonstrated by their questioning of Hungary's democratic health and the validity of the rule of law. If this is true and has a basis, it would be unacceptable that a similar argument is not directed at Sánchez and Spain, despite the continuous attacks from the Moncloa Palace that weaken the 1978 Constitution and Spanish democracy.

How long will Magyar's honeymoon last?

Orban's defeat was so resounding that he was sidelined for some time, but will he return to power? It seems unlikely today, but by no means impossible. Even if he were to return, his exercise of power would undoubtedly have to be different, more similar to his first term than his last. After this recent election result, it will be extremely difficult for him to even attempt to regain the power he enjoyed in the past, given that the Hungarian system would have to shed the presidential characteristics Orban instilled and return to a clear parliamentary system. In any case, regarding a return to power, one need only look at what has happened to two leaders close to Orban, who for years have faced far greater criticism and even worse public opinion in the liberal press.

These are Trump and Netanyahu; the former, having overcome 93 legal accusations, managed to return fully recharged with his 2024 victory, and the Israeli could have been forced to resign for his responsibility as an authority in the Hamas invasion on October 7, 2023, and today, despite the reopening of the judicial process for corruption against him, the polls show him with a chance of winning in the next elections.

Much of the future scenario will be defined not by Orbán but by Magyar, in terms of the speed at which he transitions from candidate to ruler. Whether he becomes a new Biden—in the sense of adopting a similar attitude to Biden's toward Trump, or vice versa, wanting to undo everything his predecessor did—depends on him. In the US, this was done by decree, by executive order, and not by a change in the law. This was changed again when Trump did exactly the same thing: erase Biden's accomplishments, through the same means, with a simple signature.

Incidentally, Magyar might not act this way, given his shared conservative ideology and a political history that, until their falling out, coincided with Orbán's. However, Magyar's victory was so overwhelming that the temptation to repeat Orbán's actions could be decisive. Like his predecessor, he will have a two-thirds majority, giving him the opportunity to use this temporary majority to amend the constitution in his favor. He has already demanded the resignations of all those who collaborated with Orbán, not just as ministers, but also from nominally autonomous positions, such as the president himself as head of state. If they refuse, a constitutional amendment would be necessary to compel them. However, doing so would place him in the same unchecked position of power that led to Orbán's defeat.

The US example of Biden versus Trump is, of course, a bad one, as it has led to unbearable polarization and the impossibility of reaching any kind of agreement in Congress. In recent years, a more useful example has been Guatemala, where all indications are that President Bernardo Arévalo attempted to reach an agreement, but so far has not succeeded. This, ironically, opens the possibility of reaching future agreements regarding stability—precisely what does not seem possible in US politics today.

From the moment the left lost all representation in the Hungarian Parliament, the fact that Magyar shared a conservative ideology with Orbán was clearly decisive in his victory, so there was a dispute between two right-wing parties, also reflected in the careful ambiguity that the winner had on moral issues as important as abortion and euthanasia as well as on the Chinese influence, clearly growing in recent years.

This is why Russia and the issue of energy present a limitation, which may quickly constrain Magyar in power, since it is very difficult for him to change the dependence because, even if alternatives are found, after what happened with the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, what is found will undoubtedly be more expensive than what Russia charged by contract.

Hungary is one of the EU countries most dependent on Russian crude oil, which currently accounts for around 90% of Hungarian imports. This dependence has increased rather than decreased since the invasion of Ukraine. The truth is, it's unclear whether the energy situation will condition the relationship with Russia, and therefore with the EU, and whether, as a consequence, the new government's international policy will moderate, or on the contrary, become more radical, forcing it, like Germany, to break away from this link. However, it's doubtful that Hungary can do so in exactly the same way, since it is undoubtedly weaker.

During his campaign, Peter Magyar stated that Hungary needed the funds withheld by the EU, but he did not support granting Ukraine fast-track access, arguing that it should wait its turn in the queue, as other countries had submitted their applications earlier. Carefully, yet open to interpretation, he consistently maintained that Hungary was not in a position to participate in the loan due to its difficult economic situation, adding that while he would not veto it, he also did not want to participate—a stance similar to Spain's position regarding its financial commitments to NATO.

During the campaign, Magyar said something similar when asked about Israel, responding that Hungary would not continue blocking community decisions against that country, and "like any other decision, this one would be seriously examined on its merits," adding that he did not want to "predetermine a position on that matter," that is, a careful ambiguity, since it should not be forgotten that although he promised changes "brick by brick," what happened in Hungary was that one right-wing government succeeded another right-wing government, where at the same time the Orbán era came to an end.

The problem is that a different Hungary takes time, especially if the customized political system that was created needs to be modified. This could lead to disillusionment and frustration among those who expected rapid change. Therefore, the worst thing that can happen to the winner is for expectations to be too high, and for success or failure to be judged by something that, despite the rhetoric typical of any election campaign, they are unwilling or unable to do.

Perhaps Magyar's aim was simply to replace Orbán, not to dismantle his entire 16-year legacy. Perhaps, more than a desire for profound change, what existed was a weariness among Hungarians with the same faces, as well as a desire to overcome the authoritarian and corrupt traits that had emerged and were visible to all. However, there will undoubtedly be significant pressure from the European Union, given the challenge posed by Budapest. Hence Brussels' discourse on the need to "restore" liberal democracy and all the exaggerated media coverage and accusations of "ultranationalism," reflected in Magyar's calls for the resignation of all the authorities he called "puppets," such as the Chief Justice, the Attorney General, the President of the Constitutional Court, and others, even after Orbán conceded defeat.

It is true that the erosion of institutional checks and balances over the years and the concentration of power were real events that weakened the country's democratic health, but nothing is solved if the current majority were used for a similar erosion, only this time the degradation would be caused by the new government, and I don't think Magyar wants something like that.

Many of the situations for which Hungary was accused under Orbán are actually worse under the concentration of power and lack of democratic legitimacy of the European Commission and particularly under the presidency of von der Leyen, for example, in the way community funds are withheld and suspended from those governments whose defense of their national interests differs from the globalist ideology that today predominates in the EU bureaucracy, autonomy that has grown due to the vacuum created by the lack of adequate political direction, since the last time that existed was thanks to the alliance between France and Germany, and the leadership of Mitterrand in the 80s and 90s.

That level of leadership has disappeared, a void now filled by the European Commission, with the democratic deficit that entails. This clash was behind the withholding of €17 billion in EU funds that remain suspended for Hungary, funds which Hungary has vowed to secure their return, also assuring that “Hungary would once again be a strong ally of the EU and NATO.”

But will there be more to it than that? It's the end of the Orbán era, but not the end of Orbán as a politician. Personally, I believe changes are coming, but they will be more moderate than expected, with continuity coexisting with change. And compared to his predecessor, Hungary will differ more in style than in substance. Brussels can expect a different attitude from him than from Budapest's constant belligerence, and EU institutions will also need to better understand Hungary's energy dependence on Russia.

It was a timely defeat for Orbán, although he was never the monster Anne Applebaum made him out to be. As for the need to lower expectations regarding Hungary, Rubén Blades can help, and this is no exaggeration, since before becoming a famous singer he studied law and political science in Panama and at Harvard. Thus, in Pedro Navaja there's a line appropriate for someone who hasn't yet made the transition from candidate to ruler, and therefore remains an unknown in many respects: "Life gives you surprises, surprises life gives you," a phrase worthy of appearing among Machiavelli's advice to the Prince.

@israelzipper

Master's and PhD in Political Science (University of Essex), Bachelor of Laws (University of Barcelona), Lawyer (University of Chile), former presidential candidate (Chile, 2013)

«The opinions published herein are the sole responsibility of its author».