Is this the end of the Islamic Republic? Or not, at least not yet?

By: Ricardo Israel - 22/03/2026

The answer is that it certainly could happen, but so far everything indicates that it won't be now. However, as history in the region and the world has shown, that end will come. It didn't happen last year, nor in the 22 days since this latest US and Israeli bombing campaign. So, what would have to happen for the Islamic Republic to fall? What hasn't happened so far—a coup or a successful popular uprising—leaves room only for collapse, meaning that Iran would be so weakened and destroyed that this type of religious tyranny, which has ruled the country since 1979, would no longer be possible. But that remains difficult when the damage is being inflicted solely from the air.

As the US in Iraq and Israel with Hamas have learned separately, military victory and defeat do not mean the same thing in the Middle East as they do in the West. Furthermore, the alliance between the superpower and a country whose interests are limited to this region, however much they may be united by the elimination of Iran's nuclear program, in no way implies a complete agreement for the future, since for Israel it is essential to also eliminate the power structure that, from Tehran, has sought the disappearance of the Jewish state.

From the Israeli perspective, this includes the physical elimination of those responsible for a regime of hatred, including supreme ayatollahs, political leaders, those in charge of internal repression, and those behind the nuclear program—a complete existential threat to the survival of the country and its inhabitants. Incidentally, however much the US has turned Venezuela into a protectorate, it is almost impossible for that model to be replicated in Iran, not only because Chavismo is very different from Shiism and because there is no Delcy Rodríguez, but also because, fundamentally, however much Venezuela has been controlled by organized crime, it is nonetheless part of the West, which Iran is not; rather, it has been waging jihad against everything that represents the legacy of the Enlightenment.

Iran has been defeated in terms of military resources, and it doesn't appear they can continue their nuclear program, as Trump and Netanyahu have stated. Furthermore, the network of proxy countries and militias was destroyed by Israel, and it doesn't seem likely the ayatollahs can regain that support, as evidenced by the fact that, this time, with the exception of Hezbollah in Lebanon, no one is fighting in their favor. Ultimately, it has been demonstrated that the "Iranian Superpower" narrative was always a lie, believed only by fundamentalists in the Middle East and by Western progressives.

Moreover, Israel knew this from their involvement in Syria during that civil war, as every direct confrontation always ended in its victory. If any doubt remained, the Iranian missile attack caused only minor damage in 2024, and the Israeli response in 2025 was a resounding defeat, with 200 aircraft entering and withdrawing without a single one being shot down or intercepted, thus far achieving total air superiority. This superiority was further reinforced by the subsequent US intervention to attack nuclear weapons production sites, after which the US withdrew without even being detected. Now, in 2026, in their repression, the Revolutionary Guard and the Basij paramilitary (and volunteer) forces, who are now the true power, are recalling the Revolutionary Guard's role in the survival of Saddam Hussein's regime in 1991, after Iraq was forced to withdraw from Kuwait.

It has also been a confrontation where, in terms of warfare, the number of Israeli and American deaths has been extremely low, and where it remains striking that, unlike the Western press, the return of the Pahlavi dynasty does not appear to be a viable alternative in Iran, which also contributes to the maintenance of the Islamic Republic. Indeed, however preferable it may seem to clerical fanaticism, the Shah's regime was also a dictatorship, and its fall was not only aided by the ayatollahs and the Carter administration, but also by anti-monarchist liberals and communists, who would in turn be crushed by Shiism in the internal conflict following the Shah's overthrow.

In their fantasy of destroying Israel, the Islamic Republic was also sunk by its anti-Semitism and the hatred that led them to dedicate immense resources to lying to their own people, telling them of a great victory when they wiped Zionism off the map, which was believed by that gigantic mass of haters, who even today, despite the available evidence, falsely spread on social networks that Tel Aviv has been destroyed and that Netanyahu has been eliminated.

Does this mean that Iran has learned nothing from past defeats? No. On the contrary. It has learned a great deal, so much so that the successes achieved in the regime's survival are mainly explained by the lessons learned and by the type of asymmetric warfare and hybrid resistance it has employed against the current joint attack. To understand this, it's important to remember that the current war didn't begin on February 28th, but rather its origins can be traced back to 1979 with the takeover of the embassy and the kidnapping of its diplomats in one case, and, in the case of Israel, to a more recent date, to the invasion carried out by Hamas with Tehran's support on October 7, 2013, which led to a seven-front war that culminated in an Israeli victory.

In 2023, it was Israel that was isolated; now it is the Iranians, who have lost not only their proxies but also Syria, where today the Houthis and Hamas are conspicuously inactive and have not come to its defense. Added to this is the impressive intelligence success of both aggressors' agencies in 2025 and, above all, in 2026, with their infiltration at every level and the preemptive elimination of scientists and military personnel, as well as symbols like Ayatollah Khamenei and Ali Larijani, the regime's most important politician.

Today, the 22nd, airspace control is total, and Tehran is left without a Navy and Air Force, facing adversaries who have also made innovative use of AI, outer space, and satellites. However, not only does the Islamic Republic survive, with the Revolutionary Guard remaining its mainstay, but despite all the blows it has suffered, there is still a quantity of enriched uranium buried since 2025 or in the regime's hands—something that neither the US nor Israel possesses.

Not only that, but in its response, Iran has created a serious problem, especially for the US and Trump, as its most visible face, in the context of a future where he must face an uphill battle in November, the midterm elections of his administration.

First, as a consequence of last year's bombing, and being a vast country of 92 million inhabitants, Iran decentralized its military response. Having lost virtually its air defenses, its missile arsenal was deployed to the provinces, distributing it among the civilian population, including in Gaza, even in small towns. From these locations, Iran has launched missiles against Israel and US bases in Arab countries, which have continued to fall despite the heavy firepower, creating an image of resistance. This is happening, but the number of missiles is decreasing daily, thanks to intelligence capable of locating the sites and mobile launchers from which they are fired.

In addition to this decentralization, the most successful aspect of the response has been its attacks on the Sunni Arab Gulf states, even though, unlike the previous year, these states had refused to cooperate with the attackers. The Iranian response has created a veritable economic bombshell, the explosion of which has affected not only the West, but also China and India, given that the problem posed by the Strait of Hormuz is almost impossible to resolve solely through military means. In any case, what has transpired was foreseeable not only for governments but also for oil companies.

In any case, this is how Iran was able to create economic hardship, especially regarding oil and gas, whose prices have not only risen but have also had consequences for raw materials and the market for byproducts such as fertilizers and the agricultural sector. It's not the same as the Arab oil embargo of the 1970s after the Yom Kippur War, but it has had such an impact that in Europe it recalls the crisis caused by fuel shortages, fertilizer shortages, and inflation following the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

This is different from the past, in that until the attacks on Arab countries, supplies were normal. Furthermore, the mere threat from Iran has been enough to cause this effect, not only in the countries themselves and the disappearance of tankers from the area that handles 20% of the world's supply, but also in the market and among insurers. As a result, China has been even more affected than the US, the world's leading producer, while Asia depends on the Gulf. Certainly, Europe should have been better prepared, but so should the US, given that this possibility in the Strait of Hormuz has been discussed for half a century. Its use was threatened more than once when sanctions were announced over the Iranian nuclear program, and also during the war in the 1980s when both Iran and Iraq attacked tankers and other vessels in and around the strait, using naval mines to disrupt traffic. Moreover, in support of Hamas, an Iranian proxy like the Houthis has repeatedly attacked Western ships in the Red Sea in recent years.

For its part, using hybrid and asymmetric warfare strategies, Iran has now managed to create an economic crisis, despite having no shortage of gas or oil. Incidentally, the price increase will correct itself as soon as the war is resolved in the not-too-distant future—weeks, not months—but in the meantime, internal pressure on US politics is very strong as the November election approaches. It is striking how Iran seems unconcerned about deepening its isolation by attacking Arab countries, in a manner akin to the scorched-earth policy employed by the Soviets when attacked by Nazi Germany, emulating the actions of the Tsars against the Napoleonic invasion. Iran has been successful because, although the Sunni Gulf states have purchased advanced weapons from the US, their military inexperience has been evident, as their use of this expensive weaponry has failed to defend the oil fields on which they depend.

Changes are surely coming, in the sense that this experience will further strengthen its closeness to an Israel that has proven capable of defending itself and attacking, and if the US presence returns to what it was before Obama, Trump will surely demand an increase in its financial contribution, similar to what has happened in Europe with those who make up NATO. What has happened in Hormuz also reinforces several geopolitical points, beginning with the growing irrelevance of Europe, which continues its march toward diminished importance. This trend is further reinforced by consequences that, for NATO, could be even more serious than those in Ukraine, given the displeasure felt in the US over what they consider a betrayal. Several countries, such as Spain, denied the use of US bases, while Macron acted as usual, declaring his willingness to participate, but only when "the situation calms down." Others, like the UK, were criticized for not "forgetting" what happened, given the supposed "special relationship" between them. Furthermore, on two occasions in the last century, during the two world wars, the US came to their aid when they seemed headed for certain defeat, especially in the second. Moreover, Europe is once again indebted to its Jewish citizens, whose protection is becoming increasingly difficult in the face of the aggression of antisemitism.

The US claims to have secured the commitment of 20 countries to unblock the Strait of Hormuz, and its pressure has led to several European nations joining the effort, but the damage to the transatlantic relationship has already been done. One consequence is that, alongside Europe's decline, India's rise is becoming increasingly prominent, poised to challenge Japan and Europe for third place in the 21st century's economic landscape.

On the other hand, the Hormuz case brought to mind the chaos that ensued when nations began competing at the start of the pandemic to buy up scarce vaccines. Now, the difference lies in the fact that at least eight countries individually managed to negotiate with Tehran, perhaps by bribing the Revolutionary Guard, ensuring the passage of ships carrying gas and/or oil, which Iran was keen to facilitate. Not only China, but also two other nuclear-armed nations, India and Pakistan, achieved this. Moreover, in the latter case, despite having exchanged missiles with Iran in 2024 after being accused of harboring terrorist groups operating from its territory to attack the Islamic Republic—groups seeking the reemergence of Balochistan, a former Persian Empire territory—this is one of those conflicts that, unlike the current one, rarely captures the attention of the mainstream press.

What's striking is that countries like Pakistan and India managed to position ships near the Strait of Hormuz in support of their demand for freedom of navigation, while Europe was conspicuously absent, despite its total dependence on fuel. Above all, personally, I continue to be struck by the defeatism of the mainstream American press, whose rejection of everything related to Donald Trump has clouded not only its understanding but also the quality of the coverage that once made it the best in the world. It has obscured the military success that has defeated Iran, even though after the Iranian aggression against Qatar, even Al Jazeera acknowledged that the attack "was working," despite the fact that, to date, the second objective, which was not present in 2025—the end of the Islamic Republic—remains to be achieved.

However, from the US perspective, perhaps for the first time since World War II, it has found in Israel a true ally—in its willingness to fight, its efficiency on the battlefield, and its technological and intelligence contributions—something it had never before found in NATO, except perhaps on rare occasions in the United Kingdom. This confirms the distancing from Europe (to which the US still belongs, despite Brexit), as outlined in the 2025 National Security Strategy. Moreover, as a superpower, the US has once again demonstrated its unparalleled ability to project power, no matter how far from its continental territory.

The US should have reacted better to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, because the truth is that this war has unfolded exactly as expected, including anticipating that Iran's predictable response would be to weaponize gas and oil, creating a supply crisis by attacking its Arab neighbors. Indeed, this has been the case, as the US has decided to lift sanctions on two major producers, Russia and Iran itself, to increase supply. The joint military success has even exceeded expectations, given the speed with which Iran's arsenal has been destroyed, especially considering that the conflict is only now entering its fourth week.

In any case, the surprises may not be over, since after the disruption of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, despite it being a place of free transit and navigation according to international law, it is undeniable that Iran will ultimately lose control, and its oil will be as restricted as Venezuela's, regardless of whether the Marines intervene or not. But be warned: if the internal struggle between the political sector and the Revolutionary Guard ends up favoring the former, before the inevitable acceptance of the US-Israeli military victory and before a ceasefire is imposed, they could surprise everyone by asking the Chinese to fulfill their role as guarantors. I haven't forgotten that in June 2023, as mediators, they managed to negotiate a rapprochement agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which was a true surprise at the time.

Since a popular uprising or coup is not currently in sight, the most likely alternative remains either collapse or negotiation. To achieve this with the US, Iran only needs to accept that it cannot possess an atomic bomb, in addition to agreeing to the consistently rejected offer of a peaceful program, where uranium would be provided free of charge, provided it is produced outside the country. The US, under both Obama and Trump, has offered that uranium could be Russian, an offer consistently rejected on the grounds that it "offends Iran's dignity." However, I do not foresee Israel accepting such an agreement if the Islamic Republic survives under the fanaticism of the ayatollahs in power. Therefore, Israel will surely continue bombing the threat posed by the long-range missile program and any attempt to return to nuclear weapons. Due to sanctions, industrial components and scientific knowledge in Iran are now considered domestically produced, since once knowledge is incorporated into a society, it does not disappear but rather remains there. Today, after 7-X, only regime change satisfies Israel, which will end its disappearance as Tehran's official policy, as well as the network of proxies created to attack it.

But what can Israel do about it? Probably continue what it's doing, since, with a population of no more than 10 million, occupying Iran is impossible. Israel can only continue this pursuit, targeting the entire regime's leadership—political, military, and nuclear program scientists—one by one. This includes dismantling the entire state apparatus responsible for repression, restricting its operations, and forcing the replacements of those eliminated to focus more on their safety than their actions. This also serves to punish those who attack peaceful protesters and foster the possibility of an uprising against the regime, perhaps after a ceasefire. And, if necessary, even if the US only provides weapons, Israel can continue its attacks, even though such a regime cannot be destroyed solely from the air.

A second element that helps explain the regime's survival has been revealed and denounced during this war. It is the secret system known as the Bayt, which also explains why Mojtaba, the son of the assassinated Ayatollah Khamenei, was installed by the Revolutionary Guard as the new supreme leader, despite lacking any religious background at the highest level.

The Bayt is the secret system that controls everything that happens in the Islamic Republic. It was created three decades ago by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei himself and has thousands of representatives distributed throughout the state apparatus, controlling decisions and, with Mojtaba, personally making those of great importance regarding the investment of funds. It controls everything from religious seminaries to the economy, since a significant portion of the GDP passes through the Bayt's hands, from "abandoned" or expropriated properties to subsidiaries of airlines, banks, media outlets, and energy companies, to name just a few sectors, making it a veritable state within a state.

In conclusion, in an ancient society like Persia, there is a proverb predating the Islamic invasion that says, “The candle that presents itself as the sun is the first to go out,” which is exactly what happened to a revolution that aspired to be nothing less than “global.” However, for that very reason, it is almost impossible for them to relinquish control of Iran, and it is the reason why their mere survival is considered a triumph, thus sustaining the narrative. The truth is that, without that territory, they have nothing else to cling to today, as it is their only support.

As allies, the US and Israel achieved a convincing military victory but have not yet managed to bring down the regime, so the advice of the Greek philosopher Epicurus (341-271 BC) is useful to them, who asked "not to ruin what you have by desiring what you do not have," at least not yet, since its end could be near, because however much the mainstream press does not highlight it, the regime has been mortally wounded, for the first time in Iran.

@israelzipper

Master's and PhD in Political Science (University of Essex), Bachelor of Laws (University of Barcelona), Lawyer (University of Chile), former presidential candidate (Chile, 2013)

«The opinions published herein are the sole responsibility of its author».