Is the United States going to invade Venezuela?

By: Ricardo Israel - 24/08/2025

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The goal is to prevent this from happening. The objective is the same, the goal not only of the Maduro government but of the Castro-Chavez regime, but it's being done in such a way that the objective is maximum pressure, but, as far as possible, to avoid a prolonged military action, and if it does occur, to ensure that it is both in and out.

Is this something new? An application of the "Trump Doctrine" on the use of military force? A decision unique to Venezuela that seeks to adapt it to existing legislation for these types of cases?

Let me explain.

The first step was the declaration that the government was illegitimate, no longer a political coalition, but an instrument controlled by transnational organized crime. The second was to define it as a drug cartel, Los Soles, led by Maduro, whose reward was doubled to $50 million for information leading to his capture, a strategy that had proven successful in cases like that of Saddam Hussein. The third step came when it was publicly revealed that the group in power was also a terrorist group waging a hybrid war against the US through various means, such as an alliance with Iran and Hezbollah, illegal mass immigration, being one of the main suppliers of cocaine, and using the Aragua Train as a criminal resource against the superpower.

The fourth step was of equal or even greater importance. President Trump, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Attorney General Pamela Bondi, Director of Homeland Security Kristi Noem—all those with a say in this matter—have publicly declared that Venezuela had no president. Rather, since July 28 of last year, Maduro, in addition to being a fugitive from justice, was a usurper after the election was stolen, thus fulfilling what was and is a legal requirement to be able to do what is being done. Why? Because since Reagan, there has been a presidential directive stating that the US cannot act against legitimately elected governments, a consequence of the recommendations of the Church Committee, which in 1975-76 reviewed Washington's interference in Chile's domestic politics in the Senate and also reviewed intelligence operations that included assassination attempts against foreign leaders, which was later reflected in various political decisions.

It is therefore a legal requirement for the intervention of the White House, which was joined by another statement of the utmost importance, Terry Cole, the director of the DEA (Drug Enforcement Administration) accused the dictatorship of collaborating with the ELN and the FARC to send drugs to the US, so the definition of Venezuela as a narco-state in alliance with the Colombian guerrillas is not something minor, but of the utmost relevance due to the amount of resolutions and money destined to combat guerrillas and drug trafficking via Plan Colombia, where between 2001 and 2016, over US $ 10 billion in aid was delivered, only surpassed by Israel in those years, in addition to the fact that Petro has done much to antagonize the White House, together with another important warning, the one made to US citizens and residents not to travel to Venezuela due to the risk of illegal detention or kidnapping, based on real records where US citizens have been imprisoned only to extract concessions from Washington.

Combating drugs using military resources is nothing new in the U.S., as there has been a "war" on drugs since at least the Nixon administration, one that has accumulated far more defeats than successes. Drug trafficking is undoubtedly the most important instrument of organized crime, and not only in Latin America. It has been very present in Afghanistan and the Syrian civil war, and is a major financing instrument for Hezbollah, just to cite one example. In the Middle East, and in the current relationship between the Venezuelan dictatorship and terrorist movements, from Colombian to Muslim, as well as with Mexican cartels, another U.S. concern.

What has changed is that the relationship between organized crime and drug trafficking has become perhaps the greatest danger to democracy in Latin America, with the emergence of narco-states under Castro-Chavismo, of which Venezuela and the Cartel of the Suns are paradigmatic examples. Without losing democracy, Colombians had already suffered from it in the 1980s, as well as Mexico in this century, especially with López Obrador's "embraces." The US was missing, which is why it is so relevant that the so-called Trump Doctrine has defined transnational organized crime as what it effectively is: a potent threat to national security.

In a way, what's happening with Maduro isn't new, as it was also attempted during Trump's first administration, at least twice. In 2018, Washington maintained contacts with three groups of dissident military personnel, but ultimately nothing came of it, primarily due to a lack of confidence in the possibility of success because the interlocutors didn't seem serious enough. The second attempt took place in 2019, when it was apparently believed that General Padrino López would move against Maduro on February 23. In that sense, Presidents Duque of Colombia and Piñera of Chile arrived in the border city of Cúcuta, in what would prove to be a major mistake for both, as they ignored the fact that Bolsonaro, Macri, and other more cautious individuals had withdrawn from the trip. The US interlocutor with the Venezuelans was Trump's representative for that country, Ambassador Elliot Abrams. The failure appears to have been due to Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino's repentance, both on behalf of himself and his group, as there was no guarantee that a promise of amnesty or pardon for human rights violations could be honored in a democracy, an issue present in other transitions and still pending in Venezuela.

Today, as can be deduced from the steps taken by the Trump administration, everything indicates better preparation, that is, a more detailed approach to bringing about Maduro's downfall. The issue is no longer whether the dictatorship will fall, but when and how it will happen, not if it will happen. It's a profound change.

The truth is that, for too long, the US ignored the fact that losing not just any ally, but one that possessed the world's largest oil reserves, was not only a severe geopolitical defeat, but also that from Caracas, Chavismo posed a permanent threat to the US and other allied countries in the region. Without a doubt, a military mobilization that calls for assault ships, three destroyers, more than 4,000 elite troops, reconnaissance aircraft, and a submarine just to search for drugs is no longer organized. When Washington incurs that cost and assembles this force, it is only on one of three occasions: first, military exercises with friendly and/or allied countries (e.g., NATO, Operation Unitas); second, a warning to deter an adversary or enemy (e.g., Houthis, North Korea); and third, a military attack (e.g., Iraq). It's not any of these three, but it's not a warning to China or Russia not to intervene, either, since there's no indication they will. Although they'll likely have to discuss a national security issue with China, such as oil supplies, as soon as they finish negotiations with China over tariffs.

What the U.S. has mobilized can cause significant damage, but it's insufficient to occupy a country like Venezuela. It's also worth remembering that after Saddam Hussein was easily defeated in 2003, there was chaos the following day due to the insufficient number of troops to provide security. Furthermore, considering that the invasion of Panama was resolved militarily in minutes, despite this, and adding the various support actions, it required the mobilization of more than 30,000 troops.

In any case, the military force that has been mobilized on this occasion allows for a range of possibilities for acting against Caracas, so if we add to this the declaration that the US has moved to have total control over the Caribbean, it can be seen that all the necessary steps have been followed for the most important thing for any president: to be able to say that all the requirements of US law that allow the use of military force have been met, which is precisely what they do not want to do, unless it is an entry and exit, so maximum pressure is being exerted so that the regime feels that it is surrounded, as well as to stimulate an internal coup.

For the rest, everything indicates that in this strategy, there are at least two decisions already made, first, that the force to be used has its location and dependence on the Southern Command and that it has already moved from Title 10 to Title 50, the difference being that the first is a use of military force in normal terms while in the second, from the operational and legal point of view, it depends almost exclusively on the orders of the President, as occurred in two examples, the elimination in Iraq of the Iranian General Soleimani in 2020, and more recently, the B-2 Spirit that attacked in June to try to eliminate the atomic program of the ayatollahs.

What is happening is in no way a repeat of Panama 1989, since it must not be forgotten that, although there were airborne commandos there, there were US troops in that country due to the Canal, so the overthrow of Noriega was not exactly the same, since the Panamanian army was more of a police force, so much so that it was disbanded.

In any case, international isolation is already evident, not only in the face of China and Russia, but also in the reactions of allies like Petro and Lula, given that two lies have already emerged from those countries: the Colombian government is saying that there has "never" been a border agreement with Venezuela, comparable to what emerged from Brasilia, in the sense that Maduro would "never" have been recognized as president.

Above all, it coincides with the beginning of a political cycle moving to the right in Latin America, with the electoral result in Bolivia and a similar one that could occur in the Chilean elections in November, as a preview of other elections. The question is whether it will be indicative of a change at the regional level, which I have doubts about, since at least recently the OAS became outdated, by electing by majority vote for the secretary general who represents the closest and most conciliatory position with the Maduro regime. Furthermore, not even in the US is it clear whether this is a single operation or the beginning of a new policy toward the region.

In any case, there is a reason why the US is a superpower, both globally and apparently returning to that capacity for the region as well, since the change in geopolitical attitude is having consequences not only for Venezuela, but it is also clear that it could also reach South America, since the concern both with the South Atlantic and with Chinese penetration opens a window of opportunity for Argentina and Milei to discuss the Malvinas issue with the United Kingdom, this time with the possibility of the White House participating, which, rarely, is not on autopilot with London today.

On the other hand, returning to Venezuela, we must also consider how important it is to the mother dictatorship, the Cuban one, which, for all practical purposes, controls important decisions from Havana. However, the Venezuelan reality is not easily transferable to the island, since Cuba is not the same, since it is unlike any other Latin American dictatorship. With its total lack of freedoms, it is closer to North Korea. Therefore, rather than a process, it will likely experience a collapse.

It is unknown whether or not this US strategy is intended to prevent future subversion or destabilization, as sponsored in the region by the Sao Paulo or Puebla Forums. It is also unknown whether there will be a political proposal from Washington, which has been absent for some time, first due to the region's request to Obama to let it solve its own problems, and instead, dictatorships increased rather than decreased. Furthermore, there has not been a bipartisan proposal since the one made by Bush Sr. and Clinton, which materialized at the first Summit of the Americas in Miami in 1994, for a common market, which the region ultimately rejected in Mar del Plata.

Will Marco Rubio be able to generate a bipartisan proposal for the region in the near future? Difficult, given that the US currently lacks one, not even for Ukraine or Israel. For too long, there were confusing messages from Washington about whether oil or democracy was the most important factor, exacerbated by the return of front man Alex Saab and his narco-nephews. But now, the novelty appears: after many years, the US once again considers Latin America a sensitive area for its national security. The truth is that, for now, what is happening in Venezuela has two premises that must be accepted to better understand what is happening: on the one hand, the US does not want to invade, nor does it want a long-term commitment that would be costly. To achieve this, and secondly, it is demonstrating the capabilities at its disposal, previously demonstrated in the successful extraction of Venezuelan refugees from the Argentine embassy in Caracas, which the regime only learned about when they were already out of the country.

For now, fear is rife within the regime, and purges are also emerging within it, in addition to absurd responses such as the announcement of the mobilization of 4 million militiamen (not even China has that many) or the current ban on airborne drones, as if military drones didn't attack from far above. More important is whether Venezuelans will take to the streets, a key question given the nature of this US intervention, which inevitably leads to questions about what's happening with the opposition. Is its rhetoric penetrating the armed forces? Is it penetrating the civilian support that Chavismo still maintains? What kind of transition is it proposing? Without a doubt, in this escalation, in this step-by-step script that it is disciplinedly following, the US is demonstrating the lessons it learned from the failures of 2018 and 2019. But has the Venezuelan democratic opposition learned its own lessons from several previous failures? This is because the strategy followed by the US off the Venezuelan coast leaves ample room for political action, that is, to take advantage of what has already happened, the loss of fear, which is always the starting point of a process of transition to democracy, where one must know how to combine "the fear of those leaving with the impatience of those entering," in the words of former Uruguayan President Julio María Sanguinetti.

The U.S. operation has psychological aspects of hybrid warfare, and the current situation is different from other years, but for that very reason, it must not fail. On July 28, the Venezuelan people complied, shook off fear and disillusionment, and went to vote.

Today, Venezuela doesn't need an armed opposition, but rather a presence that conveys Maduro's complete orphanhood, which is achieved both with full streets and completely empty ones. No transition is a bed of roses; difficult decisions lie ahead, starting with issues such as whether there will be trials, including those related to human rights, the handover of the country to the Cuban dictatorship, various illicit enrichment issues, and the debt to China and Russia. All of this is necessary, but the question is one that requires a political response: to what extent? To what level? The US will probably limit itself to Maduro, Cabello, Rodríguez, Padrino, and a few others, but the question is for the democratic opposition, so it now becomes important to know what decision many in the armed forces will make these days.

Master's and PhD in Political Science (Essex University), Bachelor of Laws (University of Barcelona), Lawyer (University of Chile), former presidential candidate (Chile, 2013) // @israelzipper

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