Iran: Has Trump changed his mind, or is there just a shift in strategy and priorities?

By: Ricardo Israel - 27/04/2025

He told Time magazine he was willing to meet with the supreme leader or the president, but if there is no prior agreement, it will be a failure, perhaps repeating what happened with Kim Jong-un in 2019 in the demilitarized zone separating the two Koreas.

In the interview, Trump clarified that he had not intervened to prevent Israel from attacking the Islamic Republic's nuclear sites. He said, "I think a deal can be made without attacking. I may have to do it, because Iran should not have a nuclear weapon... but I told them I prefer a deal."

A laudable goal, but can Iran be trusted? And if Israel isn't being stopped, what's going on? My impression is that the US has undoubtedly entered a new round of negotiations with Iran, and there are meetings that are undeniable evidence of this, despite the failures to comply and the known intention to eliminate Israel, as well as its anti-Americanism and contempt for the very idea of the West, not to mention how different the invasion of Iraq would have been if Israel hadn't destroyed Saddam's atomic program in 1981.

Today, the facts show that the US and Iran held a third round of negotiations on April 26, this time in Oman, which has always acted as an intermediary, although the meetings themselves were "indirect." The previous week, they had held talks in Rome, and although they did not discuss the nuclear issue, both countries were satisfied, calling the meeting "a breakthrough."

Now, the issue of missiles wasn't even mentioned, and here I add the word "yet," since this capability not only allows them to reach Israel and Arab countries, but also Europe, even though the European Union remains in denial, and Tehran's hope is to continue progressing, meaning the final recipient is obviously the US itself.

However it is presented, there is no doubt that negotiations are underway, however incipient they may be. In this regard, Trump has not completely changed his mind. Contrary to his dark myth, throughout his personal history, and not only with Iraq, although he is not a pacifist, he has always maintained that military action should be the last option, and that the United States should not get involved in endless wars in distant lands. Reinforcing the negotiation thesis, it is striking that among the names mentioned today are officials whose careers, as well as their interventions at academic meetings, have emphasized positions opposed to confrontation with Iran.

Just like the Israel-Hamas negotiations, they are "indirect" meetings, but only in name, since they are in adjoining rooms, so there are immediate responses. And in Oman, the most notable thing, in my opinion, wasn't polite words, but the fact that for the first time there was a technical meeting where the US presented its ideas on how to limit Iran's atomic program.

The delegations were led by the Iranian Foreign Minister and the US Special Envoy for the Middle East, and it is interesting that the minister's "cautious optimism" is based on something as precise as "If the only US demand is that Iran not have nuclear weapons, that demand is achievable." It is also real progress that we can now agree on "the" problem to be resolved, given that despite this being a new negotiation, there have only been three meetings, two of which have been specific rounds, held one week after the other, one in Rome and the other in Muscat, the capital of Oman, and the assessment has always been "constructive."

In any case, in the latter case a difference arose, since while the White House spoke of progress being made, "but there was still much to do," the Iranian minister emphasized that "there are still differences," since "the positions have not yet come close enough for a pact," statements that in any case were made to state TV for internal consumption, so we must bear in mind what was said by the mediator, the Omani Foreign Minister, who confirmed that work is being done quickly, since next week there will be another meeting "to continue" seeking to resolve (the) differences."

There's no doubt that Trump has opted to give diplomacy a chance, and as with the tariff issue, we should avoid being confused by the harshness of the threats. It should be noted that throughout his public career, and long before arriving at the White House, Trump always proposed seeking deals on military interventions, not only in Iraq, but also in the pride with which he always emphasized that while he was president, the United States did not enter any new wars.

The change is noticeable in the following: he always criticized Obama's agreement with the ayatollahs, because it returned the money seized since the seizure of the Tehran embassy and also allowed Iran to acquire its bomb in 15 years. So Trump withdrew Washington from the agreement, later initiating the so-called "maximum pressure policy," which caused significant damage unlike President Biden's sanctions, since Trump hampered Iran's ability to do business and sell its oil. This would change for Tehran with the strategic agreement with Russia, with whom they had had differences in Syria, despite both supporting the same dictator. In addition, it solved many economic problems by negotiating a preferential oil agreement with China.

This new economic and political capacity of Iran was manifested in its ability to destabilize a good part of the Middle East with its proxy policy, that is, militias and terrorist groups close to and manipulated by Tehran, which had its maximum expression in the Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia's oil, in support of the Hamas invasion on October 7 and the so-called "Resistance Front" against Israel that consulted no less than 7 fronts, if Hamas were added to Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, Shiite militias in Syria and Iraq, the Islamic Jihad in Gaza and the West Bank, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard itself as a sponsor of terrorism worldwide and not just in the Middle East, as demonstrated in Buenos Aires, and the unprecedented direct confrontation with attacks by Iran itself against Israel.

The withdrawal from the agreement, in addition to agreeing with Israel's position, was justified by what that country discovered in a bold Mossad intelligence operation that was able to extract information about Iran's atomic program from a secret location. Israel's rapprochement with the Trump administration marked a change in both directions, after the difficult relationship that existed during the Obama administration, in some ways aggravated by Netanyahu's approach to the then-president's opposition in Congress. This, even though it related to differences over Iran, did not correspond to what is appropriate for allies, which should always be state-to-state.

The relationship with Israel, marked by the White House's undeniable desire that Netanyahu not continue as prime minister—also an attitude unbecoming of allies—was manifested in two ways in the Biden administration. On the one hand, it swiftly supported Israel militarily when what started the current war occurred, much as people would like to forget it: the Hamas invasion and the taking of Israeli, American, and other hostages. This support was mixed with pressure for Israel to halt its military advances, including embargoes on the delivery of certain types of weapons, as there was strong opposition to Israel within sectors of the Democratic Party during the campaign won by Trump. Trump always spoke of a military solution to Iran and support for an all-out offensive against Hamas, agreeing with Netanyahu on all counts.

Today, the official US position continues to refer to the military threat, but it has been added that it is not the White House's preference and would only occur if it were forced to act if Tehran went ahead with the production of a nuclear bomb, a possibility that is real, since the regime has significantly accelerated its capacity, so much so that it currently enriches uranium to 60%, above the 3.67% limit set by the Obama pact, which also had the support of London, Europe, and Russia.

This latest meeting in Oman lasted only a few hours and, like the one in Rome, was held on a Saturday, as Friday is a special day of prayer and rest in Iran and other Muslim countries. Undoubtedly, something has changed in Trump's public stance, compared to his criticism of the US's previous behavior, his 2016-2020 administration, and, above all, his recent campaign and the first days of his current administration.

To this, we can add the decisions taken in response to the terrible resurgence of anti-Semitism in the United States and the Western world, where a battery of actions is being taken to prevent it from happening again, including withdrawing public funds from places where it was tolerated, even if it means being taken to court by universities such as Harvard.

The big difference with the Biden administration hasn't been the rhetoric condemning Judeophobia, but rather the willingness to use anti-discrimination legislation against those who engaged in such behavior, including universities, in addition to using the sanctioning power of the Department of Justice and the FBI to hunt down the foreigners and Americans behind these anti-Semitic actions.

In the case of Iran, it's no secret that the regime is seeking the lifting of economic sanctions. For now, the first point of disagreement that has emerged is something else. Everything seems to indicate that, however different the comparison with Obama may be, the common thread is that, if there were an agreement on the nuclear program, Trump would surely accept the lifting of sanctions, which were also very effective during his previous administration.

From the known statements, the discrepancy that has emerged is that Tehran only seems to have accepted that the negotiation should be limited to nuclear capability, while the US points to Iran's missile program and Tehran's support for terrorist groups. For its part, the regime, including the Supreme Leader, has always denied seeking atomic weapons, which is refuted, as is its support for terrorism, by countless actions. So much so that what Marco Rubio said makes perfect sense. Rubio, who, in his capacity as Secretary of State, attended the meeting that kicked off this round of negotiations and stated that if Iran only wants a civilian nuclear program, "they can have one like so many other countries in the world, importing enriched material." The White House would probably accept the same thing as Obama's 2015 pact, that such material could also be supplied by Russia.

In any case, as the US is attempting a last negotiation with Iran, it is not out of place to reiterate, at every meeting, both privately and publicly, its opposition to the Islamic Republic enriching uranium on its territory, since the doubt is how trustworthy the fundamentalist regime can be, and I imagine that there must be similar doubts in the White House, in addition to the fact that Tehran has demonstrated an enormous talent for negotiation, finding "understanding" in various European foreign ministries, as well as support from US adversaries and always backing, in Latin America, in an arc that includes from the Castro-Chavista dictatorships to different presidents who have their anti-Semitism in common, such as Boric, Lula, Petro, and others.

In the case of the US, the regime has shown in the past that it is capable of using the language its interlocutor wants to hear, and in Obama's negotiations, in addition to the American leader's do-gooderism, there was successful manipulation, dragging him into a negotiation that involved delays as well as deception, in addition to a trap that was not always perceived, since there was no negotiation in good faith, since the only thing that interested the ayatollahs was the objective of preserving their power, that is, that instrument that is Iran. The fact that they do not want to endanger Iran was demonstrated last year, not only in the way they backed down in their confrontation with Israel, but also in the confrontation with missiles and drones that took place in January 2024 with another nuclear country such as Pakistan, whom they held responsible for attacks from its territory by groups that use that country as a base for terrorist attacks, since they claim Iranian territory in the name of something ancient, Baluchistan, one more of the many conflicts that despite being little known, there is always a wrong opinion, generally biased.

Regarding the current talks between Iran and the US, two things must be remembered, which Iranian negotiators are surely well aware of. First, the Russian invasion of Ukraine would simply not have been the same if Russia had kept the atomic bombs left behind by the collapse of the USSR on its territory, in exchange for a joint promise by the US and the United Kingdom to guarantee those borders. For the US, the second objective was to prevent all nuclear proliferation, an essential component of US foreign policy since 1945, and which, in the 1990s, was present not only with Ukraine but also with Belarus and other smaller programs in countries like South Africa.

Therefore, asking Iran to do something similar is nothing special, except that this objective was not included in the 2015 agreement. The privileged relationship that existed with Shah Reza Pahlavi suffered a complete breakdown with the Islamic revolution of Ayatollah Khomeini, where the Carter administration's misjudgment (shared by Israel and the entire West) led to the seizure of the US Embassy and the hostages.

The regime suffered greatly from the invasion of Iraq on September 22, 1980, but managed not only to survive, but to emerge stronger after its end on August 20, 1988, in what was not only the longest war of the 20th century, but also a further stage in the long Arab-Persian hostility, a key event to understand what is happening today with Saudi Arabia and other Sunni Arab countries that are in a growing process of rapprochement with Israel, due to the fear of the common enemy, a relationship that despite Gaza has continued to strengthen, in what is a conflict that dates back to the succession of the Prophet Muhammad in the 7th century AD, between the Sunni and Shiite branches of Islam.

The above is not only history, but a background to understand what the West in general seems not to fully understand, in relation to a region where, like no other, decisions are today determined by Iran's progress towards the bomb, and the question of whether it has it or not.

By the way, I don't know if this has happened, however, I don't believe it, being certain that 1) Israel cannot attack successfully without the US, since without its support it would have neither the bomb to destroy deep-sea facilities nor the attack aircraft to transport it. 2) Iran is close, since once knowledge enters a society it does not leave, although there is no indication that it has solved problems such as putting it inside a missile. 3) They are very intelligent negotiators, and if they cannot voluntarily agree to not continue with the bomb, an attack will have to be carried out to avoid a scenario like the one the US has with North Korea, where no one touches it, despite being a much poorer country. 4) Iran is racing to obtain the bomb, after the loss it suffered in Syria, after Israel also destroyed the military capabilities of its proxies in Gaza and Lebanon, and after Washington decided to confront the Houthis. If it ever has the bomb, there simply will be no attack. 5) They will hardly ever find Iran so weak again, especially after failing to cause any damage to Israel and having its response practically destroy its air defenses, leaving the site of its buried nuclear program bare of protection. 6) The regime's ideology corresponds to a completely exclusionary theocratic dictatorship. 7) If it obtains the bomb, it would spark an arms race in the region, since not only Saudi Arabia, but also Egypt and Turkey would seek to obtain it.

Will the US attack? I don't know, I'm not sure. I just think that if Israel does, it wouldn't prevent it, and would instead provide the necessary weapons and then provide diplomatic support in the face of the storm of criticism that will appear everywhere, with the probable exception of Sunni Arab countries that know the Iranian ayatollahs better and, being equally threatened, will rejoice in what Israel has done.

@israelzipper

Master's and PhD in Political Science (University of Essex), Bachelor of Law (University of Barcelona), Lawyer (University of Chile), former presidential candidate (Chile, 2013)

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