Iran-Contra War: Hormuz Changed Everything

By: Ricardo Israel - 29/03/2026

Until a few days ago, the US and Israeli bombing had a two main component around which everything seemed to revolve, since, on the one hand, the US and Israel were militarily destroying Iran, while, on the other hand, despite the above, the Islamic Republic survived without an alternative government emerging.

However, Iran's success in blocking oil and gas flows through the Strait of Hormuz changed the way the war unfolded and how it was perceived. A spokesperson for the International Energy Agency described it as "the greatest threat in its history to the planet's energy security," however exaggerated the fear may seem—an assessment shared by many, given that in just a few weeks, the situation has surpassed the scale of the oil shocks of 1973 (the Yom Kippur War) and 1979 (the rise of the Islamic Republic).

In addition to the above, what is happening reaffirms once again an ancient truth, known at least since the Chinese philosopher and general Sun Tzu (544 BC-496 BC) published The Art of War, in the sense that wars only end when the will to fight of the opponents ends, also demonstrated in the cases of Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza, a trio that despite their diminished military situation shows that in the Middle East, the concepts of triumph and defeat do not mean the same as in the West.

Therefore, in all three cases, attempts at mediation and negotiation did not end in surrender, so it is likely that with the latest announcements by President Trump the same thing will happen as with Russia-Ukraine in the European war, that is, that the positions of both, the US and Iran, will ultimately be so opposed that not even a ceasefire will be possible.

Moreover, Hormuz is much more than a battle, as it represents nothing less than a long-standing principle, still enshrined in international law as freedom of navigation. It was this very principle that led the fledgling American republic in 1801 to its first military intervention abroad, in what is now Arab territory in North Africa.

Given this long-standing importance to the US, the question is whether its relevance will survive if Iran succeeds in tying up what is still the world's leading superpower, for which this principle remains so relevant that in the recent National Security Strategy 2025, the geopolitical bible of the Trump Administration, it was noted this November that the US must "preserve freedom of navigation on all critical sea lanes."

Incidentally, it is not the only place, but if Iran succeeds in the Strait of Hormuz, it endangers the most important of all, the Strait of Malacca in Southeast Asia, as well as the Danish Straits, that is, the three sea channels that connect the Baltic Sea with the North Sea, to which we can add the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, just to mention a few, such as the Panama Canal, given its importance to the US Navy, in a country for which geopolitical considerations, abandoned in practice since the disappearance of the USSR, have been restored in all their glory.

What has transpired in Hormuz should not have surprised the US, the White House, or the Pentagon planners, given that the importance of maritime chokepoints has been known since antiquity. If anything, its reappearance in Hormuz only demonstrates that in the age of missiles and satellites, geography remains as important as ever.

The importance of Hormuz is explained by the decisive fact that 20% of the world's oil and gas consumption passes through there, and without that money, Iran simply could not have developed the destabilization it has carried out throughout the Middle East, in addition to having become the main state agent in the organization and financing of terrorism worldwide, with an arm so long that it reached Buenos Aires.

And if its importance lies in fuels, be very careful with Taiwan, whose significance comes not only from the People's Republic of China but also from the fact that more than 80% of the most advanced semiconductors on earth are produced on that island, so even without invasion, a prolonged blockade would produce a global economic crisis whose impact could surpass the current crisis.

Capturing Hormuz is a complex war scenario with an uncertain outcome, raising more questions than answers. The various scenarios share the common characteristic of requiring not just any troops, but a specialized deployment of paratroopers and rapid reaction forces. This opens up alternatives ranging from stabilization to a major escalation—a turning point in the current situation. In such a scenario, the troops employed will almost certainly be American, as it is difficult to imagine NATO participating. Furthermore, Macron has already indicated that French troops would only be available for combat scenarios once Iran has been completely defeated, an opinion that surely reflects the majority of the European Union, which repeatedly states that this “is not their war.”

Furthermore, Israel should not do so this time either, since if we are talking about this country, we must not forget that it will be occupied with Hezbollah, given that Iran succeeded in dragging Lebanon into another war, despite Israel's warnings not to do so, and that for once it was the Lebanese government itself that did what it had not done before, that is, warn the terrorists to refrain, in addition to expelling the Iranian ambassador.

Hezbollah ignored the warning and became the first of the Iranian proxies to do so, even before the Houthis, despite being battered and weakened. Israel has warned that this time it will re-establish a security zone extending to the Litani River, some 30 km from the border, thus regaining control of a zone within Lebanese territory, after its complete withdrawal in 2000. Hezbollah had remained for years in support of the country's Christian minority, but despite this, the Lebanese state failed to fulfill its obligation to occupy the evacuated territory, and in its inaction, Iran and Hezbollah took action. The aim of this occupation is to defend the Israeli population living near the border, since, in the last war, Hezbollah came to the aid of Hamas, forcing Israel to evacuate tens of thousands of its citizens from their homes. Now, hundreds of thousands of Lebanese are refugees, given the ongoing fighting. Everything points to an Israeli victory, so their presence will surely remain until the Lebanese state wants or is able to address the pending issue of securing a monopoly on weapons for its army, which implies the undesirable scenario of confronting Iran and Hezbollah.

Since only US troops would be fighting in Hormuz, President Trump faces a major political problem, as it would betray the promise he has repeatedly made to his most loyal base, MAGA, a promise reiterated in both presidential campaigns, that he would never put "boots on the ground," meaning he would never involve troops in a major war. Therefore, the arrival of these special forces could undermine one of the main sources of pride of his first term: that he withdrew the country from old wars and did not commit it to any new ones.

From another perspective, regarding the atomic program, any US military attempt to extract the uranium that Iran has managed to enrich would require the participation of even more specialized elite units, such as Delta Force, Ranger Regiments, or Green Berets. Their success would require extremely precise intelligence on their location, as well as logistical expertise for their deployment—all elements that place this task squarely on Washington, since, as far as is known, Israel does not possess such units. In the case of Saddam Hussein's atomic program, its destruction was carried out in 1981 from the air, without ground troops. In any case, the US has possessed nuclear defusal teams since the Cold War.

Publicly available information since last year's bombings shows that Iran should have uranium at least in underground facilities in Fordow and Isfahan, either in sectors totally destroyed since June 2025 or still protected by steel walls, but to be sure would require what Iran has not allowed, on-site visits.

In the event that the facilities in question were destroyed, I had the opportunity to read a report from a specialized center in Jerusalem, published by the Israeli press, which convinced me that, of all the alternatives, the least dangerous would be to leave the uranium untouched, buried under immense quantities of rock and dust at the bottom of the mountain. The report is very convincing in that, for now, the best course of action would be to leave it buried, since after the bombing, its most likely state is gaseous.

Returning to the Strait of Hormuz, the economic bombshell unleashed by Iran with its hybrid response to the bombing it received, which has erased it as a military threat, has caused not only a major economic crisis in oil and gas, but has also given rise to a global shortage of fertilizers and a major threat to food prices due to the scarcity of agricultural inputs. This complicates food stability, creating insecurity. It is worth recalling that something similar occurred after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, given the importance of both countries in that market as well as in the fertilizer market. In other words, the economic crisis does not only affect fuel prices.

For that reason, the situation in Hormuz is worse today than the situation created by Saudi Arabia and OPEC of the exporting countries in the 1970s, since for the current crisis there was no oil embargo, so that, until the attack on the plants of the Gulf monarchies, there had been no shortage of either gas or oil, and for the crisis to be unleashed, a simple verbal threat was enough, given the geographical narrowness of the place.

Iran achieved a great deal with its threats, in addition to crossing a red line that the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, never crossed. He, incidentally, encouraged the kidnapping of diplomats in 1979, but never wanted to subject the whole world to this blackmail, as he understood that it was a cause of war.

We know that, during the Iran-Iraq War, both countries attempted to disrupt maritime navigation in the strait, which is a free passage under international law, with attacks limited to contact mines. They also unsuccessfully tried to deny the adversary access to the strait. Finally, sometime in the 1980s, the U.S. protected oil tankers that had been threatened.

Moreover, after the end of the USSR, there have been meetings between Soviet and American officials from that era to review the Cold War, where information has emerged that distorts the main narrative, but which is nonetheless interesting, such as the testimony of a relevant advisor to the Politburo of those years, who witnessed how the sending of more troops to the USSR's border with Iran was discussed but not approved, alarmed by the US inaction in the face of Tehran's radicalism, since the successful Islamist reaction to the communist coup in Kabul and the Soviet invasion was a surprise to Moscow.

Ultimately, the idea of preemptive action failed to gain traction in the USSR once they realized that the events in Afghanistan and Iran were independent phenomena. Nevertheless, it remains interesting that, according to a White House official at the time, a nuclear scenario was briefly considered. Meanwhile, according to Politburo documents, Soviet communism was completely surprised by Khomeini's rise to power, as they never imagined the Shah would be abandoned in favor of a Shiite fundamentalist. However, under Cold War conditions, the cleric was seen as a healthy counterweight to communism in some sectors of the diverse American political landscape.

It is interesting to note that decades later, despite the relevance acquired since then by alternative technologies and by the ideology of climate change as a civilizational danger, what has not changed is the centrality of oil and gas in a place that the Iranians call the Persian Gulf and the Arabs, the Arabian Gulf.

Similarly, it is striking that Europe is completely absent from the resolution of the problem, even though the demonstrated irrelevance is another nail in the coffin of what were once powerful empires, just as the European attitude is another nail in the coffin of NATO, especially if one adds the attitude of the US in relation to Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

Perhaps it would have been better if that military alliance had disappeared along with the end of the USSR, because today it doesn't appear to have any significant role in what will define this century geopolitically, namely the confrontation for global supremacy between China and the US. Adding to this, Europe continues to deny the significance of an Iranian missile nearly hitting Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, demonstrating that the 4,000 km traveled was a sufficient distance to reach European capital cities. Yet, they have refused to engage with the Iranian challenge, despite the fact that the Islamic Republic has been waging a jihad since 1979, not only against the US and Israel but also against the very idea of the West.

In Iran today, it's unclear with whom negotiations could take place and who truly holds power in Tehran, except for the evident dominance of the Revolutionary Guard in the decision-making process. However, the Strait of Hormuz crisis has garnered so much attention in Washington that there's no doubt that as soon as the military issue or the question of who is in charge in Iran is resolved, the US will seek to control Iranian production in a way that will likely surpass what was done with Venezuelan oil. Moreover, if the Strait of Hormuz has demonstrated anything, it's that after what has transpired, permanent solutions will surely emerge. In this sense, an attack on the Sunni Arab monarchies of the Gulf could achieve the same result as Iran's nuclear program: that the power acquired through Israel's current air superiority could combine with the nascent alliance between the interests of those countries and Israel, potentially leading to a new oil pipeline and a gas pipeline involving Arab countries and Israel. It could also include Hormuz, since not only is there the main island in Iranian hands, but there are also, at an even narrower point, three other small islands close to the shore, which have been claimed for many years by the United Arab Emirates as part of its territory.

The case of the Emirates is striking for its clear understanding that, as stated in an official declaration, “Tehran is a threat to global security.” Furthermore, compared to other Arab monarchies, they have been successful in halting the barrage of attacks from Iran—more missiles and drones than against any other country in the region. Similarly, they have lobbied for an international strategy to restore safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz and to protect energy supplies.

However, the reality today is that there are two straits that are very easy to block, as has been demonstrated to the detriment of the Arabs: the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab Al-Mandeb Strait in the Red Sea, when, for example, a pro-Iranian proxy like the Houthis of Yemen not only disrupted maritime transport, but also attacked Saudi Arabia's oil depots on its own territory.

In this regard, the Gulf Arab monarchies and the US have sufficient resources to finance both an oil pipeline and a gas pipeline crossing Saudi Arabia and Jordan so that Gulf fuels could reach Israel via Aqaba and Eilat in one case, and Haifa and the Mediterranean Sea in another, after passing near the Allenby Pass, from where they could be safely shipped to the rest of the world. Such a strategy could complement the existing alliance between Israel, Greece, Cyprus, and other countries that is extracting gas from the sea to transport it to the European Union, perhaps via Bulgaria. It would not be surprising if Turkey also joined this effort, especially if Erdoğan loses the upcoming presidential elections, and Egypt has already signed a contract to purchase significant quantities of Israeli gas.

All of the above could be amplified if, ultimately, as a consequence of Iranian aggression, the Arab monarchies of the Gulf join the war at some point, including those with a Shiite majority or those that in the past had a close relationship with Iran, such as Qatar, especially if both are important gas producers, which both the US and Israel would welcome given their economic power, since this war has demonstrated the great cost of the bombings carried out on Iran and its infrastructure.

Iran has been severely punished, it has lost the military aspect of this war, but it could be dictating the terms of how it ends, to which contributes the notorious fact that the US went to fight without a clear political plan for what comes next, since, if the regime continues to govern, that will be its victory no matter how hard the destruction it has endured.

The unfavorable war scenario for Iran was established after last year's crushing defeat, but the alternative remains the same: collapse or negotiation, with several intermediate scenarios depending on their probability. To negotiate with the US, Iran only needs to accept that it cannot possess a nuclear weapon, although Israel is now demanding more—clearly the end of a regime committed to its own destruction. In any case, Iran is currently fighting for its survival, and this is not just about a country, but about what the Islamic Revolution represented starting in 1979.

All of the above is complicated by the fact that the Revolutionary Guard currently holds sway in Iran, along with hardline leaders who now control the declining military response, given their control of the now decentralized missiles. They are generally the ones who reject any hint of negotiation, implementing a scorched-earth policy that includes threats against the Arab Gulf states. This makes it difficult to determine who is truly in charge in Iran after the death of the Supreme Leader, which in practice translates into militarization, where the clergy have been replaced by a kind of military dictatorship, determined to crush all popular mobilization.

From a military standpoint, the war is going much better than the mainstream American press is willing to admit, still more focused on rejecting everything Trump represents than on dispassionate analysis. Indeed, the results are far better than the first Gulf War, which, in 1991, despite Saddam remaining in power, received widespread praise for the expulsion of his army from Kuwait. Today, the statistics are better in terms of response time and duration, number of casualties, oil prices, economic recession, downed aircraft—virtually every indicator shows.

It is regrettable, in any case, how many people in the US itself would prefer that the removal of the ayatollahs fail rather than criticize them for the crime committed against at least thirty-something thousand protesters who were only seeking greater freedoms.

What Washington has failed to do is develop a plan for the aftermath, just as Israel failed to develop one for Hamas in Gaza, which resulted in a situation similar to the Islamists' continued presence in the Iranian government. This lack of planning has also contributed to the continued prominence of the Strait of Hormuz, given the number of aircraft, ships, and soldiers that experts believe would be needed to reopen it—all, unfortunately, with uncertain outcomes, as Ehud Barak, the former prime minister, has made clear. While not a very successful politician, he was one of the most decorated soldiers in Israeli history.

@israelzipper

Master's and PhD in Political Science (University of Essex), Bachelor of Laws (University of Barcelona), Lawyer (University of Chile), former presidential candidate in Chile (2013)

«The opinions published herein are the sole responsibility of its author».