How can China and the United States avoid the Thucydides Trap?

By: Ricardo Israel - 17/05/2026

The expression was used by Xi Jinping himself when he expressed his hope that both countries would "transcend the Thucydides Trap to forge a new model of relations between great powers." In other words, the challenge would be to generate cooperation, not confrontation.

This particular trap corresponds to an expression popularized by political scientist Graham T. Allison, who quotes the classical Greek historian and military leader Thucydides. Thucydides reflects on what happens when the rise of Athens and the fear this instilled in Sparta made war inevitable. Allison studies 16 historical cases where an emerging power challenges an established power and concludes that 12 of them ended in war. The question is whether China and the US can avoid this fate.

The recent meeting was undoubtedly a summit, a true one, since the word has lost its meaning when applied to any meeting between heads of state, be they presidents or prime ministers. This one was a summit because of the topics discussed, even though no treaty or agreement was signed. In a way, it evoked memories in the collective imagination of those meetings between the leaders of the US and the USSR during the Cold War, although the range of topics surpassed those of that era, since economic issues were not discussed then. Unlike China, Soviet communism was a relatively isolated actor in the global market, and globalization had not yet taken hold in those years.

What was achieved? Was anything accomplished, or was the Summit itself the most important thing?

The following day, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce announced an agreement on tariff reductions for certain products “of concern,” without specifying which ones. Is that enough for this Summit? In any case, although there was no final declaration, the topics discussed did come to light, and what stands out most clearly is the fact that, given the importance Washington attaches to Beijing's participation in a solution to the Strait of Hormuz, China should not be absent from any geopolitical analysis, which is a further step in its recognition as the other superpower.

What we witnessed in Beijing is the result of China earning its place as the only country negotiating tariffs on equal terms, and it achieved this after responding to US sanctions with its own, which denied the sale to the US of essential rare earth elements, where China enjoys a kind of global monopoly, also a result of a long geopolitical slumber that the US took from Obama onwards, or perhaps even before.

Last October, they agreed to a truce that is clearly still in place, and although nothing was signed, all indications are that serious negotiations have been taking place in the numerous meetings held. Furthermore, the backstabbing and mutual accusations have decreased considerably. In general, the lack of expectations helped; the press was right to anticipate the topics discussed and the lack of newsworthy results. It also helped that Trump was accompanied on this trip by some of the most important business leaders in high technology and Wall Street, always welcome in the state capitalism that is China. "Fabulous" was the word Trump used, an exaggeration for the deals made.

This positive atmosphere was reflected in the attitudes of Xi and Trump, with the former giving a warm welcome to the latter, who seemed pleased by the effort made to show respect, exactly what was absent from China during Biden's years in office, when he even had difficulty speaking to Xi Jinping by phone on more than one occasion, just as Beijing created similar obstacles for the Secretaries of State and Defense to interact with their counterparts.

Trump is a man who finds it difficult to keep his opinions and moods to himself, and in Beijing he appeared pleased, with a constant smile, even reading from prepared texts, without deviating from the script established in previous meetings by the negotiators. The resulting atmosphere demonstrates that, as a leader for whom personal relationships are as important as, or perhaps even more important than, those of state, it is best to approach Trump with respect rather than confrontation.

At the banquet, Xi Jinping told him that China's "great rejuvenation" was compatible with the spirit of MAGA, "Make America Great Again," and in response, Trump invited him and his wife to visit him at the White House on September 24. However, expectations should be higher on that occasion, and more than mutual courtesies should be obtained, since at the very least, answers should be expected to so many issues that are now left unanswered.

For example, Taiwan. Trump said there was “no compromise,” however, perhaps that is precisely the problem, since the issue is so important to China that it is perhaps what Xi Jinping is hoping for. Just as the issue of Iran dominated Trump's agenda, China's insistence on Taiwan is a clear indication that, on the road to the next Communist Party Congress, a concession or recognition of Beijing's rights over that island is what Xi surely wants to present there as a victory.

In this regard, it's important to remember that Nancy Pilosi's ill-advised trip to Taiwan in 2022, during preparations for the previous party congress, allowed Xi Jinping to achieve a personal victory by ordering the blockade of the island. This precipitated a deterioration in relations between the two powers that continues to this day, with Washington demonstrating its inability to adequately protect its ally. This shift altered the ambiguous policy that had prevailed since Nixon's visit in 1972 and the subsequent diplomatic recognition. Furthermore, it's crucial to remember that China is now a nationalist dictatorship, making the Taiwan issue the primary, and perhaps only, arena where war would almost automatically erupt. Therefore, I am convinced that Xi Jinping will continue to exert pressure, and may even link issues such as arms sales to the signing of a tariff agreement, especially since the September 24th visit is a date when the chances of Trump making concessions increase significantly. An agreement would have an immediate economic impact and would perhaps be the last major international opportunity before the difficult November elections. In fact, during the visit, Trump appeared hesitant about the arms sale.

In any case, the US side spoke extensively about Iran, even if it seemed somewhat forced, and Trump, on the plane back, told reporters that he was satisfied with what he heard from Xi, although, strictly speaking, nothing he said wasn't already official and long-standing policy. For example, he stated that China was against all nuclear proliferation and therefore Iran shouldn't have an atomic bomb, and that, as an international waterway, it couldn't turn the Strait of Hormuz into a kind of private lake by charging tolls. In any case, in the battle of narratives, the Chinese version of Taiwan stood out more than the US version of Iran.

There is no doubt that competition exists between China and the US for the position of leading superpower, and we know this because China is repeating, step by step, what Washington did to dethrone the British Empire last century. Given this situation, the only option is to avoid conflict.

How can this be achieved? In only one way: by negotiating, regulating, and making it predictable. Furthermore, there is a recent example of this: the Cold War. This historical period has a bad reputation, but it was remarkably successful, as two powers that were otherwise completely separate managed to regulate the conflict in such a way that, although there were many confrontations in which they supported client countries, they never directly clashed due to their unprecedented nuclear capabilities.

Even after Cuba, they were able to reach a basic agreement, known as détente, which regulated the conflict until the end of the Cold War. This was possible thanks to a concept whose importance should be rediscovered by China and the US: red lines. This means understanding what is unacceptable to the other side in order to avoid war. Among the topics discussed on May 14th and 15th, we don't know for certain what China's red lines were regarding Iran, but we do know that in the case of Taiwan, its independence would trigger immediate military action. In that sense, it's unclear whether a blockade of the island would be a red line for the US, especially since its consequences would be similar to or even greater than what has been happening with the Strait of Hormuz, given the island's importance in the production of advanced chips, on which the high-tech industry worldwide depends.

It is in this sense that both must learn from the Cold War, where not everything was negative. China and the US cannot avoid the Thucydides Trap, but they can learn to manage what separates them, starting with the self-imposed duty of each power to inform the other of its red lines.

The process of détente was achieved in the Cold War in politics and geopolitics. China and the US could aim for an economic equivalent, which could begin with tariffs, and then continue with a more general agreement. Given the magnitude of both economies, every other country will inevitably have to join, whether it wants to or not, and in practice, this would create new rules that in the 21st century would replace those from the last century.

Above all, there are red lines, of which at least three are necessary for both sides: tariffs as a first step in establishing economic rules, Taiwan as an urgent issue, and, above all, Artificial Intelligence, where the experience accumulated in managing the nuclear threat would be invaluable. The US and the USSR achieved such success in handling the atomic issue that this experience is applicable to AI, where, similarly, there is a danger that a lack of regulation could bring about the end of human evolution as we know it.

No one else can achieve what these two powers can, since their advances in AI are worlds ahead of the rest of the world, and it is also in their best interest, since there is no other technological advance that has the same potential to define on its own who will predominate in this century, a competition that is also expressed today in the fact that China has become a rival in the space race as well as the Chinese military doctrine places the dominance of space as the axis of future military supremacy.

It is undeniable that China and the US are not the partners once envisioned in Washington, as was the case under the Clinton administration. Today, the National Security Strategy 2025 represents progress, as after so much rhetoric, the US has reduced the competition to a predominantly economic factor.

Furthermore, viewing China as a threat also reveals a reality: for far too long, Washington refused to see China as its main, perhaps only, rival. In this regard, there was a long period of complacency, as evidenced by the fact that the US now depends on China for rare earth elements.

Both sides have gone through several stages to reach the current truce, which was agreed upon in the South Korean city of Busan last year. In any case, there is no doubt that China's remarkable economic success is partly due to the US, since the Nixon-Kissinger visit in 1972 opened the world to China, in exchange for China's commitment, after the chaotic Cultural Revolution, not to align itself with the USSR—a significant shift for China, but also for the US, given that President Truman dismissed General Douglas MacArthur in 1951 when he proposed attacking China with nuclear weapons, since China was fighting in Korea with "volunteers."

After that historic trip, the US was so pleased with the results that it mistakenly believed for years that economic openness would lead to democratization along with the development of a middle class of consumers, a process that made its politicians proud, who later applauded the “interdependence” and the massive relocation of factories to the East to “lower labor costs”, despite the deindustrialization that it brought with it in entire areas.

The previous process spanned from the Clinton to the Obama administrations. The shift came with Trump in the White House, who began confronting China politically and, after the pandemic, economically, as COVID-19 exposed the US's dependence on China for pharmaceuticals and supply chains. Trump brought this issue to the forefront, but it's now unclear where the ongoing negotiations will lead. Undoubtedly, China is a rival today, but it still has a long way to go to match the US, although AI could accelerate this process, in which, over the last few decades, China has been closing the gap year after year.

But will China achieve its goal of a more stable and predictable relationship? Is what we are witnessing the beginning of a new relationship of equals, like the détente with the USSR, even after its eventual collapse?

Incidentally, much has changed since then, and in this regard, it is essential to mention the process of globalization, a near future that is inevitably marked by AI, where geopolitics has become as important as, or even more important than, the economy, and where the institutions and alliances that were created after the Second World War are being modified, although it is not known what will replace them, although there are some certainties, namely, the competition between China and the US as well as the growing irrelevance of Europe.

How can the US have more influence over China? I believe the path lies in oil. Today, the US is the world's leading oil producer, and in the last year, China has lost access to two major suppliers: Iran and Venezuela. The current situation is so difficult for China that it undoubtedly represents an unbearable threat to its national security. Therefore, in the ongoing negotiations, the US should guarantee China's oil supply to build a foundation of goodwill, whether through direct sales or via its virtual protectorate over Venezuela. Furthermore, in transparent negotiations, this would counterbalance China's current dominance in rare earth elements.

The alternative will be far less appealing, as Beijing's response could be to increase its dependence on Russian crude oil and thereby deepen an alliance that has grown with an anti-American character. For China, respect is key, perhaps culturally more so than for a new superpower like the United States. In Beijing's case, they are acutely aware of being one of the oldest civilizations, an empire that, for most of its history spanning thousands of years, has been richer and more powerful than the West. Today, having regained some of that power, they reject the application of a "containment" policy similar to the one that succeeded with the USSR, but which is unlikely to be effective against China's current economic might. Hence the insistence on respect and equal treatment.

And in conclusion, we now await Xi Jinping's trip to Washington, where more tangible results than a climate of goodwill should undoubtedly be expected, since otherwise, if there is no concrete product, the word failure will be wielded, especially if the day of the midterm elections is approaching, and it will still not be clear whether cooperation or rivalry will prevail.

There will be mistrust, as evidenced by the fact that nothing received as a gift, not even a pin, was allowed on the presidential plane for fear of sophisticated espionage. The US would do well not to forget that China is a dictatorship, where Xi continues to accumulate personal power, so much so that the Constitution places his ideology on the same level as Mao's, as the country moves toward October 1, 2049, the centenary of the proclamation of the People's Republic. Xi must expect that China will then be recognized as the leading superpower over the US.

@israelzipper

Master's and PhD in Political Science (University of Essex), Bachelor of Laws (University of Barcelona), Lawyer (University of Chile), former presidential candidate (Chile, 2013)

«The opinions published herein are the sole responsibility of its author».