Haiti, the limits of military intervention and the Bukele Solution

By: Beatrice E. Rangel - 04/11/2026

In Port-au-Prince, the power of gangs is measured by their ability to decide who can move about, which services operate, and the limits of state authority. Faced with this reality, the United Nations Security Council authorized the creation of a multinational force to combat gangs on September 30, 2025. The question is, what should this force do first for Haiti to regain control of its capital?

El Salvador, which is part of the group of countries tasked with guiding the mission, offers a starting point for considering this question. Imagine a rescue operation with a precise order: locate four missing technicians and repatriate them or, if they have died, recover their remains. Command would know what resources it needs, what decisions are within its purview, and when the mission can be considered complete.

Nayib Bukele ordered the deployment with a specific mission: to rescue the four technicians alive. He warned the Haitian gangs that he would respond with greater force if they harmed them. The Salvadoran government believes the four are still alive. Wilson Joseph, leader of the 400 Mawozo gang, maintains that they died during the ambush.

Such an operation is similar to the story of the Dutch boy who, according to legend, plugged a crack in a levee with his finger and prevented his village from flooding. His gesture bought time to repair the levee. An international force can also buy Haitian institutions time to recover.

The multinational force, on the other hand, has been asked to respond to several emergencies simultaneously. The scope of its mandate helps explain why it is advisable to judge its performance based on specific operational priorities.

Resolution 2793 authorizes operations aimed at dismantling gangs, in coordination with Haitian authorities. It requires respect for international law, including applicable human rights standards, and the United Nations due diligence policy.

The mandate also encompasses the protection of critical infrastructure and transit points, such as ports and airports, and the strengthening of the Haitian National Police through joint operations. It also includes supporting authorities in creating security conditions that allow for free and fair elections and assisting with programs to facilitate the departure of gang members.

The Security Council authorized a maximum of 5,550 personnel, including 50 civilians. Even with the full complement, the command would have to decide where to concentrate its resources. Reclaiming and maintaining strategic corridors, for example, would allow the Haitian police to resume operations in areas currently controlled by gangs and would facilitate the population's access to basic services.

This is where the problem lies for international organizations when they design these missions. Each objective seems reasonable on its own. The mandate becomes impractical when the same force is required to combat gangs, protect ports and airports, strengthen the police, and create conditions for holding elections, all at the same time. In Haiti, the first decision should have been what task the force could accomplish with the resources at its disposal. It is up to the commander on the ground to decide how to carry it out. It is up to the sending organization to decide what comes first.

Three lessons emerge for the hemisphere. The first is that a task force needs a clear operational priority. The second is that the law requires enforcement capacity. Dismantling gangs demands operational force, and arrests must lead to prosecutions. The third is that institutional reconstruction is the responsibility of Haitian civilian authorities. A foreign force can contribute to creating the security conditions for this task once the first phase, which is construction, is complete.

The success of the intervention will be measured by what Haiti can sustain after the force's withdrawal. If the Haitian police can keep the reclaimed corridors open and the civilian authorities can restore services and exercise their authority in those areas, the mission will have helped return to the state a capacity that is currently being contested by gangs. Otherwise, the same thing will happen as in the past. Bilateral or multilateral military interventions have not created the conditions for the Haitian state apparatus to function once their presence ends. The positive aspect of Bukele's decision lies in the fact that the military mission he has sent will likely achieve its objectives, and this will demonstrate to the multinational force created by the United Nations the virtue of concentrating military forces on concrete and achievable military goals.

Source: United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2793 (2025), 30 September 2025. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4089907?ln=es

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