Colombia…and the wolf returns

By: Beatrice E. Rangel - 11/06/2025

Colombia, along with Brazil, Namibia, South Africa, and Zambia, is among the most unequal countries in the world, with 80% of fertile land concentrated in the hands of 2% of the population and a Gini coefficient of 0.54. This concentration is not only a product of colonial feudalism but also of the rise of organized crime within Colombia, whose illicit wealth has been transformed into land ownership. Although agrarian reform was attempted, it never became a reality thanks to thousands of tricks by landowners to prevent the implementation of agrarian reform laws. Similarly, the rule of law extends to some segments of the population, while others suffer the arbitrary actions and despotism of local leaders, big businessmen, and any armed bearer, be they a foreman, a police officer, a soldier, or a chief. In short, Colombia is not a nation that has experienced what the UNDP calls human development. Under these circumstances, not all Colombians are free. And those who are not free do not feel the slightest attachment to institutions, militating now and always in the ranks of violence. Thus, violence has been and is part of their vital metabolism.

This was reflected in the famous period of La Violencia (1948–1959). It is estimated that between 200,000 and 300,000 people died during that period. This violence was followed by guerrilla uprisings (1960–present); drug cartel wars against the state (1980–1995); and paramilitary violence (1994–2004). In all of these episodes, the civilian population has been decimated as a result of score-settling between politicians, drug cartel leaders, guerrillas among themselves, and against law enforcement or paramilitary armies committed to drug trafficking. In short, Colombia exhibits a history where both economic and political violence are part of the national DNA. And while a formal democratic system exists, it is riddled with loopholes through which the Colombian plutocracy has slipped in to preserve its monopoly on the reins of power.

During the truly democratic era, only Virgilio Barco seemed to understand that democracy was the twin sister of the free market and that the state's efficiency in delivering public services depended on opening up opportunities for the less developed strata to improve their financial situation. During Barco's administration, the two underlying problems of the waves of violence: inequality and the absence of a legal framework enshrining liberal democracy, were addressed for the first time. He left behind the 1991 Constitution and the initiation of peace talks with various guerrilla groups. It was under Barco's leadership that the M-19 surrendered its weapons. His successor, Cesar Gaviria, continued the policy of state modernization, upholding the reforms articulated by Barco. Gaviria also succeeded in arresting Pablo Escobar, head of the Medellín cartel, and continued the peace talks with the insurgents. Andres Pastrana attempted to put his personal stamp on the peace negotiations, but his plan was rejected by the FARC. The great achievement of his administration was Plan Colombia, agreed upon with the United States to combat the drug trade. Alvaro Uribe had to confront head-on the drug mafias and guerrillas who refused to accept dialogue. Uribe emphasized the fight against criminal violence and gave less importance to the modernization of the state. Juan Manuel Santos focused on peace negotiations, successfully closing a peace agreement that was rejected by the population in a referendum. Duque returned to the topic of state modernization, focusing on tax and pension reform. Petro has attempted to follow the destructive path of other Latin American leftist activists, such as those from Cuba, Honduras, Bolivia, and Venezuela. However, he has encountered a solid institutional wall erected by Barco and consolidated by Gaviria. Faced with this obstacle, he has resorted to ranting and using verbal violence against his rivals. This behavior, a product of his weakness for the use of certain substances, has made him a sort of scumbag, in whom the people see a disappointment; cults a danger; and the world an exceptional farce for Colombia.

This concise summary helps us understand what triggered the resurgence of violence in Colombia. Except for Barco, none of the democratic presidents understood that for there to be democracy, there must be freedom and a free market, and that these cannot exist in a country where 2% of the population owns the fertile land; where there is no modern infrastructure that allows mobility between provinces and cities; and where public services, the means of opening opportunities for the less fortunate, are constantly deteriorating. Poverty is thus perpetuated, and within it, armies of violence emerge. We have just witnessed the attack on Senator Uribe Turbay, perpetrated by a 14-year-old boy who confessed to committing the crime to ensure his family had food. In short, as long as there is such marked inequality and the absence of freedoms for all in Colombia, there will be violence.

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