Colombia: between Scylla and Charybdis

Beatrice E. Rangel

By: Beatrice E. Rangel - 02/06/2026


Share:     Share in whatsapp

The extremes appear to have prevailed in the first stage of the Colombian electoral contest. The political center has been relegated, and with it, the possibility of a moderate alternative capable of building consensus, which is key to democratic practice. Everything indicates that the country could end up governed by one of two deeply polarized factions, whose projects prioritize the concentration of power over the expansion of civic freedoms.

The real question is not which of the two candidates will prevail, but whether either of them understands the fundamental challenge facing Colombia: preserving and strengthening the institutions that have allowed the country to resist, for decades, the onslaught of authoritarianism, political violence, and social fragmentation.

Unlike other Latin American nations that succumbed to hegemonic projects, Colombia has demonstrated a remarkable capacity for institutional resilience. Its judicial system, relatively free press, electoral bodies, and active civil society have served as counterweights against attempts at excessive concentration of power. Therefore, the next government's priority should be to strengthen these institutions, not weaken them.

However, the proposals that dominate the debate seem to be heading in the opposite direction.

On the one hand, Iván Cepeda proposes expanding the role of the State through new social programs and the expansion of existing ones. He also proposes deepening the negotiation strategy with armed groups within the framework of the policy known as “Total Peace,” promoted by President Gustavo Petro. The stated objective is to integrate these actors into the political and social life of the country. However, the results obtained so far have raised serious doubts about the effectiveness of this strategy in reducing violence and restoring State authority in large areas of the national territory.

Cepeda has also advocated for reforms aimed at correcting the historical concentration of rural land ownership. While the problem of unequal land distribution is real and constitutes one of the deep roots of the Colombian conflict, any reform must carefully balance the objectives of social justice with the need to preserve agricultural productivity and the legal security of investments.

On the other hand, Abelardo de la Espriella proposes a response focused on strengthening security, building new high-security prisons, reducing the size of the state, and greater economic liberalization. His approach is based on the premise that state authority must be reestablished through an unequivocal demonstration of force.

However, neither project seems to adequately address the structural problem that threatens Colombian democracy: the progressive erosion of the political and administrative institutions responsible for channeling social conflicts within a democratic framework.

The strategy of confronting violence solely through increased coercion risks reproducing dynamics that have fueled the conflict for decades. Illegal armed groups operating in Colombia have developed independent sources of funding based on illicit economies such as drug trafficking, arms trafficking, illegal mining, and smuggling. Their adaptability makes a purely military solution unlikely to achieve lasting results.

At the same time, the policy of concessions and permanent negotiations without a parallel strengthening of the State's institutional presence also does not seem to offer a sustainable solution.

The Colombian armed conflict has left more than eight million internally displaced persons and has profoundly altered the economic and social structure of vast rural regions. Millions of hectares were abandoned, while criminal organizations filled the power vacuums left by the state. This is compounded by a fragmented, bureaucratic, and incomplete land registration and titling system, which in many cases is incapable of guaranteeing clear and effective property rights.

Without a profound reform of these institutions, any security or reconciliation strategy risks failure. Violence will not decrease as long as territories remain where the legitimate authority of the state is weak or nonexistent.

A similar situation exists in the economic sphere. Trade liberalization and integration into global markets are desirable objectives, but their benefits cannot be fully realized without sustained investment in infrastructure, education, innovation, and strengthening business competitiveness. The Free Trade Agreement with the United States has opened up significant opportunities, but structural limitations still prevent many productive sectors from fully capitalizing on them.

Ultimately, Colombia's great challenge is not simply choosing between left and right. The fundamental question is determining which project is best prepared to strengthen the democratic institutions that guarantee freedom, the rule of law, and economic development.

When institutions weaken, extremism thrives. And when extremism dominates politics, institutions are often the first casualties.

Therefore, the dilemma facing Colombia transcends the candidates and their platforms. Ultimately, it is a question of whether the country will continue to strengthen the institutional foundations that have allowed it to withstand so many crises, or whether, on the contrary, it will be drawn toward one of the two dangers evoked by Greek mythology: Scylla or Charybdis.


«The opinions published herein are the sole responsibility of its author».