Chile: What kind of government will Kast have?

By: Ricardo Israel - 15/12/2025

As is usual in Chile, the vote was held without incident, with results that were known immediately and as expected, José Antonio Kast (JAK), a politician with a long career who was a deputy for four consecutive periods representing the Independent Democratic Union, which he resigned from to create the Republican party as an expression of a more orthodox right, managing to defeat the left by a wide margin, at the age of 59, on his third attempt.

The question relates to the type of government: will it be a conservative administration focused on the urgent needs of the moment, that is, the promises of overcoming the country's multiple crises, such as security, illegal immigration, and economic decline, or will it surprise everyone by trying to seek a broader alliance, representing the new divide that, for the first time in democracy, has won a presidential contest?

Indeed, all the elections held democratically between 1989 and 2021 revolved around the paradigm established by the 1988 plebiscite that rejected General Pinochet's continued rule. These percentages were repeated in subsequent presidential elections, including the one in which Boric defeated Kast himself in the second round. However, a new differentiating factor has now emerged: the majority represents the forces that united to reject the proposed radical constitutional reform in the 2022 constitutional referendum. This majority has now, for the first time, triumphed in a presidential election, a result that maintains the 1980 Constitution to this day. This constitution also survived a second attempt at modification, this time promoted by Kast, which was also rejected in 2023—years wasted, a review and analysis of which I have undertaken in the book "Chile and its 360-Degree Turn."(1)

Boric's purported government of national reform ended in utter failure, as Chile's decline has been enormous, practically at every level. So much so that, perhaps for the first time since the return to democracy, the issues that dominated this last election were those championed by the right wing, such as economic growth, deregulation, and, above all, widespread insecurity, illegal immigration, and crime. Furthermore, Kast is set to become the first president to reach La Moneda Palace embracing the legacy of General Pinochet.

The question is what kind of government Kast will lead, since after the profound change brought about by the unexpected violence of October 2019, which could have not only brought down Piñera's government but also the democratic system itself, Chile entered a period of confusion reflected in a veritable electoral lottery, with many elections in consecutive years, each with a different outcome than the last. It was in this climate that Boric was elected, along with his radical program that dismissed the Chile of the post-dictatorship transition, internationally recognized as some of the best years in its history—the Chile of the democracy of agreements, which achieved, through major pacts, poverty reduction, economic development, and social progress, accomplishments that placed Chile at the forefront regionally.

However, against that Chile, Boric's alternative arose, and it seemed that, by the decision of the Chileans themselves, the country would become the third South American case of political, social and economic regression, joining Argentina from Perón to the Kirchners and Venezuela, from the democratic election of Chávez, although, of course, without the tragic character of the latter.

Kast will officially assume office in March 2026 with high expectations, but also with many fronts to address and, therefore, many problems to solve. The context is one of various crises, the greatest difficulty being the country's current sense of purpose, including its international projection. In this regard, the question is the classic one: What to do? To begin with, the right wing faces its historical problem, not just a recent one: the lack of a coalition culture. Just as in this election, where it could have won comfortably in the first round, it chose to approach it divided among three candidates, in a climate of confrontation, where the main adversary seemed to be those who thought alike—a situation only partially resolved in this second round.

Despite this, the country bequeathed by General Pinochet, the one divided into two irreconcilable sides, began to crumble, as sectors that were not yet very numerous, but significant, of those who were on the opposite side now publicly supported Kast, one of the most relevant events being the step taken by former President Eduardo Frei.

This coincides with another shift, in that today Kast did not generate fear or rejection in the center, while at the same time the cleavage—that is, the political division or fracture—of the watershed that for so long determined electoral results was modified. For Kast himself, this was a novelty compared to his first presidential run in 2017 (where he finished fourth) and the election he lost to Boric in the 2021 runoff, where he was defeated by the centrist vote, which perceived him as too extreme, repeating the result of the 1988 plebiscite.

How long will this new dividing line prevail? We don't know, and it will depend on the path Kast takes in his first days: whether he limits himself to seeking a right-wing majority plus the support of unreliable figures like Parisi's populism, or whether he shifts the conversation, deciding to seek a new majority—one that is both social and electoral—that allows him to govern under better conditions, considering two things: first, the electoral lottery manifested in different votes in each election as well as in the two constitutional referendums; and second, above all, avoiding the same fate that befell Piñera with the 2019 social uprising, with a violent sector that hasn't disappeared but is probably dormant, in addition to the total opposition he will face from both Boric's Broad Front and the more organized Communist Party.

For Chile, the best thing that could happen would be for Kast to surprise everyone and, instead of limiting himself to the difficult task of uniting the ever-rebellious right wing and its well-known confrontational spirit, to invite, under a different name, a new Concertación (coalition of parties) based on the centrist vote he received. This time, he would not only include remnants of the previous coalition, but also incorporate new voters and all those who wish to participate. He would try to replicate what yielded great results from the 1990s onward: the experience of a coalition of diverse groups around specific objectives. Hopefully, this would last for another three decades, not only to govern better, but also to once again seek to transform Chile, achieving something that no other country in Latin America has accomplished, just as there is no political force today proposing to focus on only two objectives: economic development and a high-quality democracy.

Kast already learned his lesson; his new party, the Republicans, swept the 2023 elections, obtaining a majority for the second constitutional process. However, they made the same mistake as those who had failed before with the far-left project, since, instead of seeking a unified consensus proposal, they opted for a partisan program, their own, which also resulted in a major defeat when their proposal was rejected in the referendum.

The original Concertación emerged as a center-left coalition to oppose Pinochet's plebiscite and was successful as a government precisely because it sought to build a majority from day one, understanding that the country was a single entity and that governments like Allende's Popular Unity or Pinochet's should not be repeated. Chile was more divided then than it is today, since a significant percentage of the population did not want democracy, just as another significant percentage did not want the market. Therefore, the Chilean transition was essentially just that: a grand agreement on precisely what divided the country, adopting democracy in the political sphere and the market in the economic sphere as the common denominator.

Therefore, if the path of a Democracy of Agreements is chosen, there is no need to reinvent the wheel, only to focus on two objectives and no more than two: economic development and quality democracy. Moreover, and equally important, the success of the Chilean transition was also due to its understanding that its establishment coincided with a major international shift in the 1990s, allowing it to adapt quickly. This facilitated Chile's swift reintegration into the club of democratic nations. It is within this international context that the transition makes its own contribution: the construction of one of the world's most extensive networks of trade agreements, encompassing the United States, Europe, China, Japan, the Pacific, and other regions. These agreements have sustained exports and enabled an economic modernization that has withstood all recent attempts at impoverishment, as well as the poor governance of Boric.

International affairs are not a favorite topic of the Chilean right, nor did they feature prominently in any of the eight candidacies in the last election. However, for that very reason, it could be an area that quickly brings Kast satisfaction, should he choose to pursue this path. To begin with, restoring good relations with the US and Israel (key for Chile's defense sector) can be done in a few days, and there will surely be an outstretched hand in both countries. But he shouldn't stop there, as the world is undergoing the greatest transformation since the end of the USSR. Furthermore, the US, as the country that created the post-World War II system of international economic relations, is now modifying its own creation, affecting both allies and adversaries.

If an agreement is reached with China, given the power of both countries, this will give rise to a new system to replace the one that is disappearing before our eyes. In this regard, Chile could quickly approach Washington with a long-term proposal, which, at present, could be related to what most interests the superpower: rare earth elements. No significant deposits have emerged from the region, and therefore the U.S. is searching for them in Ukraine, Australia, or wherever it can, given its need and delayed response. This also coincides with the recently published National Security Strategy 2025, in which the world's leading power appears with a renewed interest in Latin America—the "Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine."

This presents an opportunity for Chile to adopt a confident stance, and perhaps its abundance of rare earth elements could, in this new scenario, give it a strategic position similar to that of the trade agreements of the 1990s. At that time, this economic and geopolitical option complemented what the "Democracy of Agreements" had achieved internally, allowing Chile the fastest progress in its history, especially the development of a strong middle class, a creation of the market rather than the state.

Chile has erred in its notion of "exceptionalism" within Latin America, a notion that is not truly exceptional and has, moreover, harmed the country by hindering the functioning of its institutions, which have proven not always effective. However, Chile's true strength lies in its capacity to institutionalize creative and peaceful solutions, finding them even when everything seems to point toward confrontation. If it succeeded in the 1990s, with the necessary will, it can be done again.

Therefore, I believe a new and unexpected, even surprising, opportunity can arise for a Pact for Chile in the form of a Great National Agreement, open to all who wish to participate and sign it, ideally lasting 25 to 30 years, spanning several administrations, to be consistently followed one after the other. This would be unprecedented if successful, as economic development and quality democracy as a shared and lasting achievement have eluded all the countries of the region.

I believe the possibility of returning to the path that, until the violence of October 18, 2019, seemed to be the way forward, may have resurfaced. Chile, it appears, may have learned its lesson, and perhaps now, political forces can demonstrate the kind of common sense shown by the citizenry in two constitutional referendums, since, especially with the result of the first, Chile was spared the path that has ruined so many countries.

The learning process may have been costly, but Chile can be offered the opportunity to recover a path that was lost for years, that of the Democracy of Agreements, since there is in Chile as well as in the world, much evidence about what works as well as what has never worked, since there are paths that bring us closer to the elusive development and others that take us further away from it.

Political professionals are asked to act with seriousness and prudence to ensure stability; hence the importance of basic agreements on following proven paths of success in generating resources to finance collective rights, with the gradualness that makes them sustainable through economic growth and productivity, and at the same time, that the path leads to greater equality.

For a truly high-quality democracy, it's not enough to simply say that institutions function; they must function effectively, solving problems instead of creating them. It also requires that reason prevail over emotion and facts over rhetoric among the electorate. To achieve this, a national commitment to reforming the state is essential. The state apparatus is outdated and entrenched—a bureaucratic state whose modernization is indispensable in the 21st century.

For the Republican Party, the need arises to avoid repeating what happened when it achieved a majority in the second constitutional process, given that negotiation with other factions was seen as a capitulation and a partisan vision was imposed, which was ultimately rejected in the referendum. Chile's current situation demands building bridges rather than walls, and this implies recovering the flexibility that makes democratic dialogue possible, essential for addressing enormous expectations in the face of the total failure of Boric's attempt at a constitutional overhaul. In a scenario where these forces, now in opposition, could contribute to increased conflict, and therefore, polarization and populism on both sides.

For those who triumphed at the polls, responding to the trust of Chileans as well as the foreign residents who, after five years of residence, were able to vote, success should be seen in the way in which the historic opportunity that has arisen is taken advantage of, where it is not necessary to reinvent the wheel, but to recover the best of recent experiences.

Building agreements and solid majorities is the best way to overcome the threat of renewed outbreaks of street violence, as well as to manage the high expectations placed on the winners. There is a strong desire for profound change in areas such as security and crime, but the capacity to respond to these aspirations can take years, not weeks or months, and perhaps even longer in matters such as dismantling organized crime networks. Anyone who says otherwise may be lying. Hence the need to speak the truth and avoid empty promises.

Sincerity is not only an ethical necessity but also vital in a context where disillusionment can occur before the end of a four-year presidential term, which is not subject to immediate reelection. Therefore, we must examine what happened during the transition to democracy in the 1990s and how Chile's international reintegration as a democratic country took very little time, occurring immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Today, Chile has a similar opportunity for a foreign policy that prioritizes the country's interests over ideological indulgences, as was the case with the recently defeated government.

To that end, it is essential that those in charge of international affairs thoroughly read the U.S. National Security Strategy 2025, as it explicitly outlines the U.S. government's intentions in just 33 pages. This document is also advisable reading for the economic team, given the close relationship between tariff policy and geopolitics. Of course, this may only last for the remainder of Trump's term, as it is not based on consensus but rather reflects a divided and polarized U.S. (another lesson for Chile). However, even in that extreme case, the remainder of Trump's term will be half the length of Kast's, and with U.S. power, a new reality will undoubtedly be created, one that will be binding on the rest of the world.

This strategy reveals not only US policy toward Latin America, but also its search for allies in the region. Does Chile want to become one again? All indications are that it does, and for this, major international agreements are also a positive development, since the public will be asked to make sacrifices, and for this, it is better to have a narrative, a story, a vision, a goal—something a purely right-wing government lacks.

(1) These two constitutional processes are the subject of my book “Chile and its 360-degree turn”, Interamerican Institute for Democracy, Amazon, 264 pp, 2024.

@israelzipper

-Master's and PhD in Political Science (University of Essex), Bachelor of Laws (University of Barcelona), Lawyer (University of Chile), former presidential candidate (Chile, 2013)

«The opinions published herein are the sole responsibility of its author».