Chile: Kast's mistake

By: Ricardo Israel - 25/01/2026

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José Antonio Kast's achievements in a short time were remarkable, as he founded the Republican Party in 2019 and won by a wide margin in the second round of the 2025 election. Expectations are high for his government, and his first test was the formation of his cabinet. In this regard, I believe he made a mistake that could have consequences for a short, four-year term without immediate reelection. Based on an "emergency government," he presented a proposal focused on public safety and economic development, which aligns precisely with his campaign promises. However, his error lies in failing to consider the factors that could constrain his administration. Given Chile's deep integration into the international community, he has overlooked the decisive factor in our current historical era: geopolitics, rather than the market.

To begin with, through a very comprehensive network of trade agreements, Chile thrives on international trade. However, today, globally, trade is conditioned by geopolitical directives, as recognized in the US National Security Strategy 2025, including the issue of tariffs. This document merely makes transparent what drives the decisions of the Trump administration, which in turn is a response to what Russia has been doing since Putin assumed power a quarter of a century ago. It is also what lies behind the fact that under Xi Jinping, China ceased to be a collective dictatorship and transformed into a personalist dictatorship that now challenges the US for the position of the leading superpower of the 21st century.

This is the changing world in which a significant part of the government's success will be determined, and that is why the signals sent with the formation of the cabinet were so important. This is doubly relevant because, before the government actually assumes office, and considering how incomprehensibly long the three-month period is between the election and the transfer of power, it is perhaps the most important act in a presidential or hyper-presidential system like Chile's. Furthermore, given the difficulties in fulfilling campaign promises, a correct understanding of what is happening in the world would allow for greater ease and speed in achieving success.

However, this isn't a column about the cabinet as a whole—where I would have liked to see more people who studied at a provincial public high school—but rather one focused solely on those appointments that directly impact the identified problem: the absence of the most decisive factor in international affairs today, namely geopolitics. Therefore, we will concentrate on the appointments to the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, as well as the signals being sent by a president-elect who has yet to take office but is already engaging in active regional diplomacy, particularly on immigration. Regarding these appointments, ideally Chile would make sufficient progress so that all ministerial appointments are subject to the same scrutiny and rigorous standards applied, for example, to the appointment of the Minister of Finance, the custodian of the public purse.

I only had the opportunity to interact with José Antonio Kast once, as I never had the chance to interview him for the radio and television programs I hosted in the 1990s and early 2000s, since he hadn't yet achieved the prominence he would later attain. I don't recall the day or year, but I do remember the place: it was a luncheon at the Apostolic Nunciature, at the invitation of the Vatican's ambassador at the time. I've never forgotten it, because, given my interest in the topic we discussed, the following day he sent me the documents that supported his position to my office.

I mention this situation because in the many years I interacted with active politicians, whether from academia or the media, no other deputy, senator, or minister ever acted that way, which immediately gave him an image of seriousness in my eyes, so much so that during the 2021 elections I uploaded a comment to the internet about what fascism was and why Kast was not fascism.

His seriousness convinces me that he has already read the most relevant document for understanding what is happening and why Trump and the US are acting in the way we are all witnessing. It is the National Security Strategy 2025, which describes the shift in international relations toward the predominance of geopolitics.

However, in my review of the backgrounds of the designated Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense, despite their distinguished careers in their professional fields, there is no indication that they are the people needed for those portfolios today. Nor do I find any specialists in this area among those on the very important list of personal advisors—those with daily access to the president, whom he consults constantly. This indicates a gap in the future decision-making process and in presidential advice, given that geopolitics currently predominates in the decisions that shape the world's course.

Indeed, the designated Minister of Foreign Affairs is Francisco Pérez Mackenna, a man with a long career as the General Manager of Quiñenco, the investment conglomerate of Chile's wealthiest family and owner of the country's most powerful economic group. However, his background is in investments, not in the issues that currently dominate international relations. He is undoubtedly a valuable person, but perhaps not the right fit for the current situation, and if there is a misdiagnosis, it is likely to affect even lower-level positions, such as ambassadors in important countries and institutions.

I get the impression that his appointment stems from the urgent need to reestablish relations with countries important to Chile, such as the US, Israel, and others, after the disaster left by the outgoing government in this area. The problem is that his profile corresponds to skills that were important in the recent past, but not now. The need to regain investor interest, especially in the mining sector, is understandable, but the point is that this already exists. Chile was fortunate to have a Free Trade Agreement with a large part of the world, including a country-to-country agreement with the US. Therefore, it is likely that the relationship with Washington will be recovered very quickly, as will the importance of Israel for the defense sector and other areas, for the simple reason that the new ambassadors of those countries have stated precisely that: their willingness to recover the position that existed before Boric's arrival.

The point is that today, large investments, and those related to so-called "rare earths" (which are neither "earths" nor "rare"), large investments in data centers or Artificial Intelligence, have not only an economic component, but also a geopolitical one, always with the backdrop of the competition for world leadership between China and the US.

In that sense, it is clear from the aforementioned Strategy 2025 that today the U.S. gives outstanding importance to Latin America using the same name as the Monroe Doctrine, the name of "Western Hemisphere," where it is clear that today the U.S. is not looking for a trade partner, but an ally, and that is a much more political than economic decision.

This is why some priorities are shifting among the major powers. In this sense, communications between heads of state are taking on a more geopolitical than economic dimension, and in this regard, it is necessary to prepare for scenarios where Trump's first phone call to Kast could be an invitation to join the so-called Peace Council, which not only seeks to rebuild Gaza, but could also be the beginning of a new institutional framework to replace functions currently held but not fulfilled by the highly inefficient UN.

Is Chile prepared to respond? If, starting in March or even now, President Kast asks his minister or the advisors of what in Chile is called "the second floor," what answer will he receive? Do they possess sufficient knowledge to guide him effectively? Will they respond immediately, or will they need to "study" the answer, given that delaying the response could mean being left out? Finally, will those consulted offer an opinion that anyone could have, or will they have the necessary expertise to present the president with the advantages and disadvantages of both accepting and rejecting the proposal?

My impression of Mr. Pérez Mackenna, whom I only know through the media, is very positive, but I believe his profile is suited to a bygone era, one that corresponded to the post-dictatorship period when Chile was seeking to integrate itself into the post-Soviet world, both politically and economically. Today, however, the priorities are different. Furthermore, this is Kast's government, not Piñera III, who already had someone with a similar profile to Pérez in Alfredo Moreno and a former Christian Democrat in Jaime Ravinet.

This comparison should be approached with caution due to the well-known political shortcomings of the former president during his two terms, however effective his economic management may have been, particularly in the rapid reconstruction of the country after one of the most powerful earthquakes ever recorded at the beginning of his first presidency. Being right-wing, Kast must also be wary of something that resurfaced with these appointments: associations with economic groups and the inevitable conflicts of interest, from which Kast had thus far emerged unscathed.

Meanwhile, the requirements in the Defense sector are equally demanding from the perspective of the influence of geopolitical factors. There, someone with a similar background was appointed: Fernando Barros, a well-known lawyer and leader in Capital Markets, Mergers and Acquisitions, whose firm was the first with a Chilean presence in New York. As a lawyer, he defended General Pinochet in London and also served as former President Piñera's lawyer for over 30 years.

Undoubtedly a distinguished career, but why Defense? He lacks the necessary expertise to lead a sector that will be subject to such profound fluctuations as international relations and the economy in the coming years. Furthermore, he only assumed the position after the resignation of a journalist, also without a known track record, who was unable to take the job due to a potential conflict of interest involving a family member.

The approach here must be impervious to accusations, given the current situation where, following the National Security Strategy 2025, the Pentagon recently announced a new defense doctrine, building upon the previous one, and where there is also a strong interest in Latin America. This, being the case with the U.S., has advantages, but also a history of disadvantages and highly unedifying, and generally unsuccessful, interventions. Chile can attest to this, considering what happened with the Nixon Administration after the election of Salvador Allende, for which there are thousands of pages of official documents, both from the White House and the CIA, in the investigations conducted in the U.S. Senate by the so-called Church Committee in the 1970s—something that still embarrasses the U.S.

Nothing should distract from the fact that there is a significant shift in US defense doctrine, and I express my doubts as to whether the new authorities and presidential advisors are aware of it. Among the names released, the presence of a true specialist in the field is noticeably absent. In this context, how will Chile position itself? What instructions will the new minister give for this new scenario? What are the presidential guidelines, given that the initial decisions are political and must be made at the highest level? This is not only new, but also far too important to leave solely to the generals. While their opinions should certainly be sought, it is also crucial to know whether the decision rests with the government, whether it will be passed on to Congress, or whether the presidency will initiate a national debate.

I think the decision is Kast's; it must be made before he is sworn in, and undoubtedly whatever is decided will be part of his legacy, the same one that has been left blank in this area by Boric, given the poor results.

Meanwhile, if the president were to consult his Minister of Defense for guidance on what decision to make if Chile's participation were requested, for example, in the situation of violence in Haiti, and using as a reference the actions taken by President Lagos in conjunction with the then Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General Cheyre, given that in response to the humanitarian crisis in the Caribbean nation, the UN Security Council approved Resolution 1529 on February 29, 2004, authorizing the deployment of a Multinational Force. On March 1, President Lagos announced the dispatch of a military contingent, which was deployed with remarkable speed in the Haitian capital on March 4.

Since the situation is the same or worse, what happens if the new president receives a call, not from the UN, but from Washington, for something similar? Even before that, will Chile be in a position to do anything, given that the armed forces are deployed in another theater, the Araucanía region, although there is still insufficient clarity regarding the rules for the use of force? Furthermore, is there complete clarity on what to do in Araucanía to ensure that this force is effective?

Furthermore, for years Chile has participated in naval exercises defending the Panama Canal, with the Navy playing a prominent role. The question is what role Chile will play, whether it will remain the same or be modified considering the new framework the U.S. has begun to assign to the Canal and the pressure being exerted to reduce Chinese influence in this key waterway. In this regard, I recall a private conversation years ago with President Lagos, who explained to me that this was being done for Chile's national security, since it was and continues to be one of the Canal's main users, given that a significant portion of the country's international trade passes through it. This raises the question: when and where, if anywhere at all, is Chile being considered in strategic terms today?

For the new government, what will Chile's stance be going forward, considering the competition between the US and China, and the importance of both countries to the Chilean economy? Will we adopt a different position, or will the decision at the highest level be to continue with both as partners? Has the new government considered whether this is sustainable in the new context? Is it still sustainable even under conditions where the new US strategy might aim to foster an alliance?

It's easy to conclude that, under the new circumstances, it won't be a simple decision for everything to continue exactly as it is now. Rare earth elements are key to new technologies, and the US received the same type of sanctions from China that Washington uses against other countries. Thus, in the midst of tariff negotiations, China conditioned its delivery of rare earth elements to the US for the defense industry, where they are also used extensively. The result was that the US yielded and granted China a special, equal role to negotiate the tariff issue calmly and without mutual threats—a nearly unique situation compared, for example, to neighboring countries or European nations, who quickly conceded.

The point is that the US took a long nap in these rare earth elements, and today China has a virtual monopoly, not only in production worldwide but also in processing within its borders, given the environmental restrictions in many Western countries. As a result, the US is now desperately seeking them wherever they may be, as demonstrated by agreements with countries like Australia and the pressure exerted on Ukraine in exchange for continued support for that country during the Russian invasion. It has struck me that no Latin American country has approached Washington to offer what the superpower so desperately needs. It's striking that not even those currently favored by the Trump administration, such as Milei's Argentina, have done so.

My impression is that, in this scenario of surprises, it should not be surprising if, given this situation, the US ultimately reaches an agreement with Lula, who, like an old fox, would forget all scruples and eat his words, given the fact that today he would be losing the elections to Bolsonaro's son.

In the case of Chile, I believe that, if it were decided that taking such a step is in Chile's interest, the signals given by the appointments in Foreign Affairs and Defense do not give the appropriate image, of understanding that the decisions today have a more geopolitical than economic characteristic, more of alliances, of new alliances to replace those that are being discarded, than of business partnerships, where everyone agrees.

Therefore, reading the new National Security Strategy 2025 (and the Defense Strategy 2026, although the latter is more focused) is also essential for everyone involved in economics and finance (and sectors like mining or energy) to understand the new context that has been added to globalization and geopolitics. For a country like Chile, it is necessary to clearly understand the framework within which it will pursue its desire to have good economic relations with both China and the US, since this document clarifies how Washington understands the competition with China, providing input for deciding as soon as possible how Chile will manage itself in this major power struggle.

I believe that part of the mistake Kast made in sending this message stemmed from his desire to compare himself to Boric, coupled with the perceived need to simultaneously improve the country's security and economy. All of this is understandable, but perhaps unnecessary, since what would be more appropriate is to forget about a government that set the bar so low and instead focus on comparisons with the transition period, where those who oversaw it managed to give Chile some of the best years in the country's history.

This success was achieved by focusing on two aspects, and only two aspects, which were precisely what divided the country: democracy in the political sphere and the market in the economic sphere. They did so through a plebiscite whose percentages essentially remained the same until very recently. However, Chile is now seeking a different path, as Kast's election marks the beginning of a new paradigm, a new cleavage, one that began with the rejection of the constitution that sought to change Chile in 2021, looking more toward the future than the past. From this arises the possibility of a new proposal emerging from a national agreement on what is needed. The opportunity exists to explore new forms of consensus-based democracy, perhaps centered around just two points: economic development and a high-quality democracy in the political sphere—something that is not currently being offered anywhere in Latin America.

In this regard, I remain convinced that the conditions exist for a new National Agreement, so I reaffirm what I wrote in the columns published in INFOBAE after Kast's victory in the first round, and a second one, on the same day of his victory on December 14.

The cabinet appointments were fraught with too many unexpected complications and were unnecessarily muddied by partisan disputes over positions and a tangle of conflicting interests. I believe the president-elect must return to the simplicity of the message that brought him victory, prioritizing domestic security and the economy, while internationally understanding the characteristics of the new landscape that has emerged. In the 1990s, the new international scenario that arose after the collapse of the USSR was clearly understood, and Chile benefited enormously, including the day when Finance Minister Foxley declared in Washington that Chile wanted trade rather than aid, a statement that led to the network of international treaties the country enjoys today.

This is a short-term government, but Kast will have a respite that other presidents haven't had: several years without midterm elections, time to forge a National Agreement to leave Chile with better institutions and something that has eluded other countries—the opportunity to get back on the path to development. This requires understanding that it takes more than one administration, and that simply asking for sacrifices isn't enough; rather, a vision of a broader scope than just addressing the immediate crisis must be envisioned. To achieve this, more than the internal disputes of the ever-rebellious right wing are needed; it requires incorporating the center, currently without representation—perhaps a unique opportunity for a majority that ideally lasts another three decades.

Having so accurately interpreted what was happening in Chile as a candidate, now, from the government, for the benefit of the country, Kast needs to accurately interpret what is happening in the world.

@israelzipper

-Master's and PhD in Political Science (University of Essex), Bachelor of Laws (University of Barcelona), Lawyer (University of Chile), former presidential candidate (Chile, 2013)

«The opinions published herein are the sole responsibility of its author».