Chile: José Antonio Kast and unforced errors

By: Ricardo Israel - 24/05/2026

I don't know if the president plays tennis, I don't even know if he likes it, but in that sport the expression of unforced error is frequently used, consisting of a mistake made by a player when executing a stroke in a comfortable situation, without being cornered by his opponent, unnecessarily sending the ball to the net or out of bounds.

And that is what has happened to a government, which, very quickly, in the course of just over two months, has gone from being the president with the most votes in modern history with 57% support to only 37% support in the polls, that is, little more than a third of what has been the traditional vote for the right, and all because of its own mistakes, just like in tennis, unforced, unnecessary errors.

What has happened is striking, since Kast had everything in his favor. The issues that secured his election were those that benefited him and that he had championed, such as economic growth and citizen security. Expectations for his administration were very high after such a failed government as Boric's. Above all, he was not only the first elected leader to acknowledge his support for Pinochet, but he also changed the paradigm surrounding election results. Since the return to democracy, the prevailing trend had been a repeat of the plebiscite result that rejected the general, while Kast's election demonstrated that the new majority was that of the referendum that rejected the constitutional proposal that rendered historical Chile unrecognizable.

The most surprising thing is the speed, which demonstrates two things: first, that the votes in the second round are borrowed votes, whose support can quickly disappear as also happened to Boric; and second, that, in the age of social media, there is very little patience in democracies, their situation being similar to what recently happened to British Labour and its Prime Minister Keir Starmer, it being irrelevant in this respect that one is right-wing and the other left-wing in their respective countries.

In the case of Chile, the chain of errors became visible from the response to something that practically affected every government in the world, namely the unexpected rise in the price of oil as a consequence of the events in the Middle East, since Chile has almost no oil within its territory. Although the errors had begun to be noticeable in the selection of its ministers, since there was a lack of understanding of the changes that had taken place in the world, as it gave the impression that in its political design the pursuit of economics predominated in international relations, when today geopolitics predominates, especially in the US, since the Trump administration, more than partners, seeks allies in Latin America.

Now, this time, the latest unforced errors occurred in something of much greater impact: local politics. Adding to this the international context, the fundamental problem for the new government is that it hasn't made, and still hasn't made, the transition from campaigning to governing—that is, from being a candidate to being responsible for the country. Furthermore, insufficient efforts have been made to lower expectations, allowing the idea that there were simple and easy answers to complex issues like crime to take hold. As a result, the time for integration that governments previously had has been reduced to a minimum; they can't even afford the traditional 100 days. And this isn't just in Chile, where Kast doesn't have a clear majority; to pass the laws he needs, he must negotiate support in Congress.

If we add to the above the fact that in some cases the selection of such important positions as ministers was unfortunate, appointing people without the necessary experience or track record, it gave the impression of a coalition still campaigning, forgetting that the first duty of a government is to govern, especially since that was expected as it was mostly seen as one of its attributes, given the very poor administrative management of the Boric government, popularly described as being run by students in training, so one of the expectations was that with Kast there would be people with knowledge of the subjects in charge, improvisation that forced the first cabinet change after only 69 days had passed, not only asking for resignations but also transforming other secretaries of state into dual ministers, demonstrating also that loyalty still prevailed.

In Kast's case, a significant part of his electoral success was linked to the slogan that Chile was in an emergency, at a crossroads, and therefore it was expected that he would act in accordance with that diagnosis. What has happened reveals serious design flaws, so in addition to failing to make the transition from candidate to government, he has also disproven one of the oldest truths of politics in a democracy: that those who accompanied you on the campaign trail and contributed to the electoral victory are not necessarily the ones who should continue to hold positions of power and authority once in government.

This is not an isolated case; other governments have faced similar difficulties with their original plans, but they have managed to overcome the setback, as was the case with former President Frei. In Kast's case, the opportunity for major reforms was missed, leaving the question of what kind of government he will lead, how he will meet the immense expectations that accompanied his electoral victory, and how he will adapt to a changing environment, including the favorable shifts that have occurred in the region, with several elected governments representing similar ideological leanings.

Regarding adaptation, the evolutionary principle established by Darwin in *On the Origin of Species* also applies to politics: it is not the strongest who survive, but those who adapt to change. Thus, during the campaign, Kast's diagnosis proved remarkably accurate, anticipating the needs of most Chileans—qualities that have not been demonstrated in government. The result has been damaging for the newly elected president, as his administration has become bogged down in a narrow debate with an opposition that offers him no recognition. Therefore, in this arena, Kast has much to lose and little to gain.

Kast has clearly understood that rather than isolating himself in La Moneda Palace, he needs to travel the country to stay connected with the people. He has therefore spent about a third of his time on campaign tours, perhaps seeking to replicate the highly successful electoral strategy employed by Álvaro Uribe in Colombia. However, nothing changes the fact that he needs the approval of his legislative package, the flagship of which is a proposal for adjusting public spending and reactivating the economy. Just to get it debated and accepted into the legislative process, he needs some votes he doesn't currently have. Even if he manages to secure them, as he seems to have done with a small populist party, he still needs a course correction, a shift in the nature of the ongoing debate. The opportunity to change course presents itself on June 1st, as that is the date of his annual state of the nation address, the first since his inauguration.

But what happens if he doesn't achieve the impact he needs? Therein lies the great political question of the moment, and my opinion is that a shift is necessary, an understanding that the government must provide answers and solutions, not a culture war, especially after Boric bequeathed him a country in clear decline, practically in crisis, according to every relevant indicator.

In that sense, I believe that in his public address, Kast must present a vision, convincing those who are not right-wing that a new majority is possible during his administration. The question is, why? My answer is that a change in the political climate, in the national conversation, is needed. It is in this regard that Kast has at his disposal the most successful example in the country's modern history: the Chile of the transition, which, in both its center-left and center-right versions, accumulated three continuous decades that changed the country for the better, transforming it from an average nation to one that led the region in many indicators of economic growth and social development.

The government today lacks a narrative; Boric is history, and the problems he left behind have become Kast's. These problems are so significant that, instead of polarization, Chile needs a grand National Agreement—a true National Agreement—with two objectives: to move towards becoming a developed country with a better, higher-quality democracy. The best example, understandable to all and readily accessible, is the one that has yielded the best results and is also recent: the so-called "Democracy of Agreements" of the transition, which transformed the country's landscape. Moreover, this was the strategy followed until it was derailed by the violence that erupted in October 2019.

Kast's election seemed to have brought that October era to a close, as his victory was forged by opposing street violence and constitutional extremism. In this process, what had been the mainstream of Chilean politics lost its representativeness, as the center-right and center-left practically disappeared, along with political expressions like Christian Democracy. Therefore, in Chile there are significant groups that neither feel represented nor have been invited to join a new political project, a sector whose requirements are that it be moderate and, rather, centrist.

Today Kast is president of Chile, but under conditions of a new national and international context, where decisions made based on impacts as large as the rise in the price of oil have not yielded the expected results, aggravated by an obstructionist opposition that seeks to bog down projects with an endless number of amendments in Congress.

The government needs to move beyond narrow debates and convene a broad national agreement with forces beyond the right wing that currently feel unrepresented, to address a national and international situation it has ceased to understand. Ultimately, it must seize and not squander the opportunity that has arisen to forge a grand agreement, where campaign promises must be part of a vision that transcends the right wing and temporary majorities, so that it can be continued by future governments, precisely as happened after the transition to democracy led by Aylwin.

This is an opportunity for Kast to overcome his current predicament. Essential requirements include ceasing comparisons with Boric's administration and instead proposing a vision focused on economic development and improved political democracy—two key objectives, and nothing more, given that his term is only four years and he is not eligible for immediate reelection. The way out of the current problems is to present a clear vision, a goal that acknowledges the reality of scarce resources, thus requiring all public policy to justify its existence.

The problem isn't one of communication, and it won't be solved by simply saying things better. Nor is it unique to Chile; it occurs in many parts of the world. This shouldn't be used as an excuse, but rather as an incentive to change the conversation, to incorporate the needs of the state, not just partisan interests. For example, it's crucial for Chile to maintain good relations with both the United States and its main trading partner, China. President Lagos, for instance, managed to explain both domestically and internationally that he wanted to sign the Free Trade Agreement with Washington but would vote against the 2003 invasion of Iraq in the Security Council.

The second-round vote was largely a rejection of the continuation of those who governed with Boric, a choice between alternatives, narrowed down to two. Now, what is happening today demonstrates the need for that temporary majority to become a supporter of a proposal that manages to include them and that sees Kast as something better than the lesser of two evils.

It must be accepted that the formula selected for the first stage of the government simply did not yield the expected result, so another path must be sought, taking advantage of the fact that it has a luxury that other rulers did not have, by not having elections for a couple of years, which has the additional advantage of enabling change, since if there was one characteristic in the many elections of all kinds that took place after the violence of 2019, it is that the electorate modified its opinion in each election in relation to the previous one, sometimes choosing the most opposite alternative, which is not confusion, but a search for something better in democracy.

For Kast, this self-inflicted crisis is an opportunity to propose a project, an idea that not only transcends the current moment but also endures over time, something that other governments can follow as a national task, a national mission. Today, even looking in the mirror, in the case of the president, it must be difficult for someone who had been doing well until he started doing poorly to escape this trap, where the elephant in the room is his own mistakes.

Kast must find and entrust someone capable of leading a new strategy, someone who can take charge of the coalition, because something has already happened that never occurred during the campaign or during his political wilderness: friendly fire, infighting, and even personal attacks among government supporters. If not at the beginning, Aylwin, Frei, Lagos, and Bachelet were able to find that person. It also happened to Piñera when he brought in someone as experienced as his cousin Chadwick, and even Boric did it by empowering Elizalde.

The moment for Kast has arrived, and it's reasonable to resort to the traditional approach in Chile, which is to support the Minister of the Interior so he can fulfill his duties with the power traditionally associated with being Chief of Staff—that is, the person who politically directs the government so the President can fulfill his role as Head of State. In other words, it's not enough to simply declare it; everyone must perceive that the person in that position has real power. To put it in perspective, the classic example is what Kissinger was to Nixon in international relations, only this time it's at the local level, and, of course, in a much more modest way.

Continuing with examples familiar to everyone, if for Clinton the need lay in him and everyone else understanding that the economy was the problem, today with Kast the problem lies in the design, with a "second floor" of advisors who have ended up harming the government by being given control and political direction functions that simply have no legal or constitutional backing, and who instead of bringing order to the government have thrown it into disarray by causing internal fractures.

The resolution of the crisis created by unforced errors lies exclusively in the presidential office, since Chile is not only a centralized but also a hyper-presidentialized country, which in general has helped institutions to function better than in other places.

In conclusion, it's time not only to acknowledge that a design that isn't working well needs to be modified, but to actually do something about it by changing the conversation. Furthermore, all cultural traditions have stories of things going wrong when you try to do good, but as a traditional Chinese proverb teaches, when the winds of change blow, it's better to build windmills than walls.

@israelzipper

Master's and PhD in Political Science (University of Essex), Bachelor of Laws (University of Barcelona), Lawyer (University of Chile), former presidential candidate (Chile, 2013)

«The opinions published herein are the sole responsibility of its author».