By: Ricardo Israel - 26/10/2025
In the US, a president's second term is usually dedicated to his or her historical legacy, seeking resources and a location for his or her future presidential library (Trump's is being built in Miami), and learning from the mistakes of the first. It's also a race against time, since starting with the midterm elections (November 2026), they become lame ducks, as the 2028 presidential race begins the following day.
Today we see themes from the former, such as the need for American power to not continue to retreat or competition with China, but with a pace and clarity of execution not seen between 2016 and 2020. Trump returned to the White House with a team of collaborators chosen for their loyalty proven during the judicial proceedings against him, who arrived much better prepared and fighting on all sides, whether adversaries or former allies, always focused on achieving certain goals.
To understand what's happening, I'll use a powerful and explanatory image: that of a historian from the future who, many years from now, looks back, trying to understand the years we're living through, not in just any country, but in the one that remains the leading superpower. I'm sure this person will emphasize that today, to achieve its objectives, the United States is nothing less than putting an end to what was its own creation: the post-World War II political and economic agreements. For reasons of space, we'll focus primarily on the international level. Moreover, domestically, the Democratic Party is so fraught with problems that it's by no means an effective opposition. It finds itself in the midst of a desert journey, without recognizable leadership and without proposals other than to reject everything Trump says or does.
Since an election is ultimately a choice between alternatives, the current irrelevance of the Democratic Party is not good for any democracy, and it is not good for the United States. This is so true that many of Trump's key policy decisions will be decided by the Supreme Court, which would otherwise end disputes in the only place where Trump seems to find opposition that can stop or delay him, which occurs at some levels of the judiciary. This is the case with tariffs and immigration policy, just to mention two issues that were key to convincingly winning the election: the economic situation and open borders. In this regard, it is not good to prejudge the fact that, rarely in a long time, there is now a conservative majority on the Supreme Court, as history shows that, on many occasions, the judges acquire a great deal of independence, which is the reason for the prestige of that Court.
When looking at the success and failure of the current transformation process, many economists make the mistake of adding and subtracting on the issue of tariffs and not considering that the geopolitical variable is even more important today, at least for the two most relevant actors, the United States and China. This is in addition to the error of those who base their analysis on emotion rather than reason. Furthermore, it is rare to fail to appreciate such great truths as the fact that the United States remains today the indispensable power for achieving objectives that no one else can obtain, not only ceasefires, but also that on the issue of tariffs, many nations quickly accept the proposal, for the simple reason that the American market remains undoubtedly the most important for them, as it is for the rest of the world.
Otherwise, there's no other way to go than to attempt this kind of analysis, since no one, not even the White House, seems to have a clear idea of what the future holds, except for the obvious fact that it will be shaped by the outcome of the confrontation, both economic and geopolitical, between China and the US.
It's not easy to do so for several reasons. First, so far, neither Trump nor his collaborators or those who write books, for or against, have emerged with a good analytical description of what is being attempted. Second, the conversation fails to elevate itself, as the public debate revolves around the total admiration of those who support him in every way and those, on the other side, who react against him simply because he's Trump. Some, or many, people dislike him so much that they don't bother to understand, judging him by intentions rather than results. Trump always gives his opinion, but he doesn't analyze. His information comes more from TV than from books; it's spoken thought, sometimes changing his mind on the same day. Furthermore, as demonstrated with the tariffs, he lives in a state of constant negotiation. "If I give you something, what do you give me?" seems to be a recurring theme in his character.
There is already a Trump Doctrine on the use of military power, both inbound and outbound, as was the case in Iran. The so-called Third World seems nonexistent, and Europe, irrelevant. His is America First, and perhaps for that reason, he claims to understand Xi Jinping well, speaking the same language, that of power. Although the US is a democracy, both try to ensure that their countries prevail regardless of what others think. Furthermore, supremacy today is also played out in terms of both industrial superiority and Artificial Intelligence. Xi Jinping seems to have formed the idea of Trump as a transactional negotiation, of concrete agreements rather than ideological principles. In any case, I am convinced that the advantage remains with the US and that sooner rather than later China will give in, no matter how much confusion is generated by the fact that tariffs rise or fall depending on how well or poorly Trump's interlocutors speak.
The Artificial Intelligence thing is particularly relevant, so much so that Trump transformed large technology companies into his allies in the objective of defeating China, which I understand, but I don't like, since the power they have acquired is such that I would have preferred him to fulfill his electoral promise that his role in the censorship that Trump suffered in the 2020 election would be reviewed, since a review of Section 230 is still necessary, which has given them privileges since the 90s that are dangerous to democratic health, in addition to granting impunity to companies, executives and owners by practically preventing them from being taken to court.
The reason why domestic and international politics in the US must be separated is clearly evident in days like these, given that the government has been effectively shut down since October 1st due to disputes between Republicans and Democrats, which are ultimately conditioned by the November 4th elections, some as hotly contested as the governorships of Virginia and New Jersey, as well as the positioning of both parties for next year's general elections.
Since Trump cannot seek reelection, the Republicans appear to have two presidential contenders already in the running, although they deny this. These are Vice President JD Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio. Today, Vance has a clear advantage. For the Democrats, they haven't achieved what the Republicans achieved between 2020 and 2024, when many primaries between Trump supporters and the more traditionalist Republican sector ended in Trump's undisputed victory. Nothing similar has been seen among the Democrats, so it appears the leftist sector has taken the lead, especially at the municipal level, as demonstrated by the case of Zohran Mamdani in New York. This sector no longer defines itself as social democrats or liberals, but rather as socialists.
In any case, if this is resolved in favor of this sector, it would not be unusual, as it occurred with the liberal predominance within it in the 1970s. It is common for political parties, especially those with movement characteristics as is the case in the US, to change orientation every few decades, responding to both internal changes and changes in the society of which they are a part. This also occurred in the 1960s when that party became the "rainbow" party of minorities, especially African Americans, after having been the party of the leaders of the KKK in the South, the feared racist clan, since the Republican Party was still seen as the party of Lincoln. Today, it has not yet shaken off what predominated in the last government, an expression more woke than social democratic or liberal.
At the international level, the scenario has not only been changed by Trump at a global level, but it has also been achieved at a specifically regional level, in places that had been of little interest to the US in recent decades (including the first Trump administration) as is the case of Latin America, since the current mobilization against transnational organized crime (Cartel of the Suns) and the regime change that is being sought, ideally without military occupation, in Venezuela, mark a change of scenario for Latin America, where sooner rather than later, as in the outdated Cold War, countries will have to choose, and this will define the type of relationship they will have with the US, although the difference is that on this occasion, the difficulty for those who support the US is to get the White House and Trump in particular, to maintain the interest now shown in helping them, which is true of both the Venezuelan democratic opposition and Milei's Argentina, it being strange that neither of the two has yet come to Washington with an offer of a far-reaching partnership that today is achieved with the lands rare that the US is desperately seeking, whether in Australia or Ukraine.
Today we see a White House that rewards closeness and punishes distance, clearly in the way it helps Milei and punishes Petro, since it is undeniable that both have earned their respective positions, although the Colombian has not enjoyed the same luck as the Chilean Boric, whose frequent attacks on Trump have also gone unnoticed in Washington.
In any case, it would not be surprising if, after a certain period of time, the US lost interest, given that Trump's international fate is fundamentally defined in two places, and the only ones with enough strength to give him the much-desired Nobel Peace Prize: the Middle East and Ukraine. This is also demonstrated by the fact that the seven other ceasefires achieved (such as the one between India and Pakistan) have quickly lost media attention.
Otherwise, regarding tariffs, the only relevant aspect is the negotiation with the country that, due to its economic strength, has been able to confront China on equal terms. This is the first real negotiation between the two countries, since China previously joined the existing multilateral framework, the very one that is changing today. Without a doubt, this negotiation is so important that its outcome will force every other country to join these new rules of the game, and after that outcome, it will be almost obligatory for the rest of the world.
Furthermore, if what is being modified is a system of multilateral rules, it is due to the fact that in international trade the USSR was a marginal player, since otherwise a bilateral agreement would have been reached, as occurred in Yalta or the aforementioned relaxation of tensions known as detente, that is, geopolitical power over the market. Furthermore, in the financial sphere, the rules were and are established by Wall Street, to the detriment of many small countries, or are still imposed by the US itself due to something as key to its power and national security as the US dollar, something where being challenged is simply not acceptable to Washington and which is at the root of the current confrontation with Brazil, which, moreover, began before Judge Alexandre de Moraes's ruling against Bolsonaro was issued, just as Lula's campaign against the dominance of the dollar began upon assuming the presidency of the minor BRIC countries.
What does the peace negotiations, or at least a ceasefire in Ukraine, depend on? Today, it depends on Russia, something Trump is clear about. And what does Putin want? The same thing he's demanded since taking power a quarter of a century ago. Furthermore, he also demands something from someone as different as Gorbachev in his memoirs, in the sense that the collapse of the former USSR was so rapid that there was no time to negotiate the borders of the new countries with the West.
Of course, Putin still doesn't want a ceasefire, since, even at great cost, he continues to win on the ground, a difficult advance measured in meters rather than kilometers. However, Ukraine doesn't seem capable of reversing that outcome, nor does NATO have the will to provide weapons capable of changing that reality, given that Russia's current deterrence has worked effectively, and it would use atomic weapons at the tactical level if it were in danger of defeat.
What does Putin want?
As the successor to the former USSR, negotiations with him should be conducted in a manner similar to that conducted during Kissinger's detente (Europe was irrelevant there, too), years after Cuba was in danger of nuclear confrontation. From that negotiation onward, this agreement became the new framework of power for international relations, in some cases until the demise of the USSR, and in others, until the arrival of Trump.
And why is it thought to be in the US's interest? For now, no gain is seen, but in the future there could be if, in the definition of the 21st-century major power, Russia were to move closer to Washington by moving away from its current alliance with China, since it was the US policy of canceling Russia as punishment for the invasion that created this current disadvantage for the US:
What does peace in the Middle East depend on?
Trump, as we have tried to explain in other columns, obtained a widely applauded ceasefire and something as difficult as the return of the hostages, but it is not peace. I am convinced that peace depends on the consolidation of the incipient alliance between Israel and the Sunni Arab countries in a treaty. However, in the specific case of Gaza, this depends on something Hamas has so far rejected, such as its disarmament, which has been aided by the military defeat of Iran and Israel's air superiority throughout the region. In any case, Saudi Arabia is making it conditional on the creation of a Palestinian state, but according to the US, we must now accept what has been rejected since 1948: coexisting with Israel as a Jewish state, a step that several Arab countries have already taken.
To prevail against China, Trump needs to define what was so important to victory in the Cold War: red lines that clarify for the rest of the world what is both acceptable and unacceptable for Washington, the situations that would lead to war, and what alliance it wants to lead to remain a superpower. Meanwhile, the current negotiations on tariffs have demonstrated how different the situation is with China, since, unlike the former USSR, it is a powerful economic player that simply does not accept the limitations the US wants to impose and is also capable of responding equally to sanctions.
A China that, although a dictatorship, also has politics within it, that is, a struggle for power, which is why its latest provocation took place by limiting the export of rare earths to the US, precisely when a summit between Xi and Trump was being reported. Since there is more geopolitics than trade behind it, there is no doubt that the meeting that the Central Committee of the Communist Party held recently, at a time when questions about Xi's leadership emerged, influenced this. As on other occasions, the leader responded by repeating his offensive against "corruption," a crime that carries the death penalty in China. This situation of responding to the US at party summit meetings is a reminder of how much harm was caused to the US itself by the mistake made in August 2022 by Nancy Pelosi when she traveled on an official visit to Taiwan, against the advice of Biden and the Pentagon, where Beijing's response was a mock invasion, a danger that has remained ever since.
Above all, confrontation with an adversary like China requires what the United States has failed to achieve: recovering its national unity, which has been defeated today by polarization, what I have called the Latin Americanization of its politics. That could be a task for Marco Rubio, someone who has far exceeded expectations, so much so that he is now the first Latino with a real chance of running for the presidency. He could also possess the capacity to bring back bipartisan politics to unite the country behind a vision for the future that only the United States can achieve: the reform or, ideally, the replacement of the discredited United Nations. Rubio also explains to the world where the United States is headed in seeking to modify its own creation, the post-World War II political and economic agreements.
@israelzipper
-Master's and PhD in Political Science (University of Essex), Bachelor of Laws (University of Barcelona), Lawyer (University of Chile), former presidential candidate (Chile, 2013)
«The opinions published herein are the sole responsibility of its author».