After the Summit: is there a chance for peace for Ukraine?

By: Ricardo Israel - 23/06/2024

Kyiv invested a lot of effort and time in the Peace Summit, but it did not give the expected result, as recognized by the usually silent Swiss, who served as its headquarters. Ukraine wanted to receive strong support as a country attacked by the invasion, which would isolate Russia much more, but that did not happen.

When it called this Summit, Ukraine was aware that support was essentially from NATO and the so-called West, that is, the first world, and that there was silence, indifference and even pro-Putin sentiments in some or many third world countries. that is, Africa, Asia and Latin America. However, approximately half of the invited countries arrived, and eighty signed the final declaration, with a Latin American presence greater than expected. However, Brazil, Mexico and ten others did not even sign it, which included the very important India. China, which usually participates in all forums, did not even attend at the request of its ally Moscow.

Russia was not invited and the final document contained not a path to defeat the aggression, but rather requests such as the return of deported children to Russia, nuclear security or maritime transit. For this reason, by not supporting the conclusions, those who did not attend or did not sign were tacitly supporting the invasion, it was enough to look at the map to realize that the absences of Asia and Africa were too noticeable, as is the position of the so-called “Global South” those that were once propagandistically called “non-aligned countries”, and not just those of the pro-Chinese BRIC. Also, for a Summit, in general, there were not so many heads of State or Government, since many countries were represented by lower ministerial levels. Even the main Ukrainian supporter, the United States, was present with her vice president, who was not even there until the end.

In short, the Summit did not give the expected result. Could there have been a different result if Russia was not present?

It would perhaps have been worse, since Moscow today only accepts total surrender and Ukraine's position is also strict regarding Russia's withdrawal, in any case there being the key difference between the attacked and the aggressor.

There does not seem to be an environment to advance on the path of peace, and if progress is made it would be more due to the triumph of one of them on the battlefield. There is even a setback in relation to the intermediations of Turkey and Israel, at the beginning of the invasion in 2022. In fact, between March and July of that year, Turkey sponsored negotiations between both countries and Russia's position was less demanding, in the sense that was limited to something that was also unacceptable then, since it demanded that Ukraine not join NATO, maintain Crimea and autonomy for the two provinces that it already controlled, and which today are four, integrated via referendum.

In 2022, that attempt failed for that reason and also for something for which today there is greater evidence, such as the assurances given verbally and in public statements by the US and the United Kingdom, of total support, until the victory of Ukraine or the defeat of Russia.

In the case of Israel, its management was due to a request from the US and in general until today it was a country that sought to maintain a balance, that of condemning the invasion, but not joining the sanctions against Russia, due to the special situation of understanding that they had (and continue to have) in Syria, despite having been on opposite sides in the civil war. There, the conversation was oriented towards similar proposals, in the sense of seeking an accommodation, which would allow (except for Crimea) the withdrawal of the occupying troops, and a neutral status for Ukraine, similar to that which Austria and Finland had in the Cold War. . It also failed, and today it is known that Ukraine let the US know that Prime Minister Naftali Bennett did not trust them because they considered him too “pro-Russian.” Unlike then, today the alternative is only victory or total defeat.

And the scenario does not seem auspicious for Ukraine, since the military initiative today belongs to Russia, the determining factor being the failure of the Ukrainian counteroffensive last year, a situation that ended in the removal of the respected commander in chief of the Ukrainian army and in the loss of support for President Zelensky, inside and outside Ukraine, so much so that elections were ultimately not held to renew a constitutional mandate that ended on May 20 of this year.

Does it mean there won't be any major movement until the US presidential election? So it seems, unless Russia decides to use these months to influence it with a total offensive in the final stretch, in the style of North Vietnam in the 60s, so, depending on the result of that election, due to the deep division that power experiences in this regard, has the potential to make a difference.

Now, despite the fact that the West for the first time lifted the ban on weapons that have the capacity to attack inside Russia, the truth is that the weapons promised last year have not yet arrived, nor the F-16s or the number of tanks necessary. to stop the many that Russia has, now that, at the end of winter, the climatic conditions are in place for it. In other words, to understand what is happening on the front, we must reiterate that, for at least a year, what we have been experiencing is a war of attrition, which has caused deep and terrible destruction in Ukraine, since, For example, in its electrical capacity, around 70% of the infrastructure has been destroyed, with insufficient defense against the missiles it receives daily.

And what will happen then with the possible escalation? What is done in the face of scenarios, such as the Russian threat of using tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield, or NATO's open presence of troops on Ukrainian territory? And because it is Putin, couldn't his threat be to “escalate to de-escalate” as he has done in the past? And in every escalation, moral arguments lose influence, from side to side.

The truth is that we are in unknown territory, with two new developments that even surpass what happens on the battlefield. On the one hand, a lasting consequence of the invasion of Ukraine is the Russian-Chinese alliance with the aim of replacing the international system built last century by the US, and on the other, in practice it has de facto concluded the agreement of what the behavior between powers that was achieved after the Cuban missile crisis should be62. That agreement survived until recently, in the sense that one bloc would not have troops or be a threat in the neighborhood of the other.

Today, Russia's threat to use tactical nuclear weapons is the deterrent that appears to be working for Putin, after Russia's performance against Ukraine fell short of expectations.

Everything points to a scenario, where there are probably not going to be big changes until we know the result of the November election in the US, since, to begin with, the recent security agreement with Ukraine is not a Treaty, but only a government agreement that is said to last 10 years, but that in reality is only valid until that day, and that will only continue and will also be reinforced, if Biden wins, in a situation where today the polls say that the first possibility would be for Trump.

If the war in Ukraine has shown anything, it is that the real rival for the US is China, hence there should be greater concern about the fact that sanctions have totally failed to deter Russia, than perhaps if the price of energy had it been lower it would have done more damage to Moscow than the sanctions. The fact is that Russia has performed its economy, now transformed into a war economy, higher than expected, including munitions production that surpasses the West, and not only the United States, and at a lower cost per unity, perhaps a consequence of an unusual complacency after the fall of the USSR, and not having foreseen scenarios of total and prolonged war, such as the current one that is taking place in Europe. And the greatest concern should arise from the fact that, if the sanctions did not stop Russia, all the more reason they would not work against China's productive force.

This new scenario is noticeable on multiple levels. This is how the final G-7 communiqué contains no less than 28 negative references about China. But the question is an uncomfortable one, is the G-7 with so many weakened leaders in a position to buy another confrontation? And that is a truth, since political realities show, unlike the 6 male leaders, that only the only woman, Giorgia Meloni, seems to enjoy a promising future in the years to come.

On the other hand, given the differences between leaders and countries, is NATO the best instrument to confront China in Taiwan, when it is not yet fully involved in Ukraine? Seen from another point of view, is NATO willing to reach a nuclear confrontation with Russia over Ukraine?

Is Europe? It is not a minor question, since we are in unknown land, but what does not change is that there is nothing like a “limited” scenario when it comes to nuclear confrontation. Tactical nuclear weapons also existed in the Cold War, but unlike Ukraine, the war scenario contemplated, before total destruction, a confrontation between hundreds of thousands of troops and thousands of tanks and planes before reaching nuclear weapons. Today, it is different, there is nothing in between and the use of tactical nuclear weapons would quickly become either the withdrawal of one of the rivals or a total confrontation.

Russia's greatest fear has always been, for centuries, falling into anarchy, not war. There is no doubt that they have been preparing to invade Ukraine for years, so even the use of frozen Russian assets to compensate for the destruction does not change the reality on the battlefield. The same thing happens with weapons, starting from the fact that it has been recognized at least by France and Germany, the existence of “contractors” today in Ukraine, advising these troops on the ground.

For this reason, I do not believe that the West should persist in the often-made mistake of embellishing Putin's words or not believing him. Every word he says must be taken seriously, so in addition to the threat of tactical nuclear weapons, we must accept that the current escalation will have a counter response from Russia. It is Putin who has said that "we have approached the point of no return", the only thing that blames - as usual - Washington, which would have "undermined strategic stability by unilaterally withdrawing from the treaty on anti-missile defenses, the medium range, and Open Skies”.

The only question is whether one way will be selected or it will be a combination of several, which could include further punishment of Ukraine, the attack on NATO countries in the vicinity or borders, attacks on weapons convoys en route to Ukraine, delivery of weapons to entities that are not States or support for military coups or use of Wagner troops (today a formal part of the Russian State) as in fact is happening and with success in the Sahel neighboring the African Sahara (with defeats for France), or greater support for guerrilla groups or independence movements, as was also done successfully in the Cold War, and a long etcetera, in short, not only Putin, but a Russia that is convinced that the quality of “power” it possesses is at stake in Ukraine. since the tsars.

Issues that are not minor for Europe. Can you do without the US? Or can there be security for Europe that does not consider the interests of Russia or the US? Is the path for Europe to accept an inferior status or return to de Gaulle's proposal for military autonomy? At least between France and Germany, renew the joint leadership that gave Europe better years? Or from another point of view, is it possible that, as happened in the Cold War, that the United States and Russia reach agreements on Ukraine without counting on Europe? Furthermore, a community that, if the results of the last election for the European Parliament, seems to be on the way to a strong political change.

Statistics show us that, in 1960, the current 28 countries represented 36.4% of the world's Gross Domestic Product (GDP), in 2023 the European Union will represent 13.8%. Militaryly, in 1990 at the end of the Cold War, the West German army was half a million strong, while today there are only 181,000 soldiers for unified Germany. Furthermore, although it is no longer formally part of Europe, in 1945 the United Kingdom Navy was one of the most powerful in the world, and today, its situation is so dilapidated that it does not have more than 10 submarines (some nuclear) and 24 ships of surface, that is, it could not even undertake an attack like that of Malvinas 82.

In other words, beyond its history and projects, the reality is that today's Europe lacks strategic vision as well as collective will, which together with the lack of investment in defense produces a weak global relevance in geopolitics, as without doubt has been shown by the invasion of Ukraine. Secondly, the Union is extremely slow in decision-making, with an inefficient and costly, unelected bureaucracy, with an open democratic deficit, and with its own agenda that has more than once confronted it with the member countries and that It served as a pretext for Brexit. Thirdly, its problems of internal cohesion are shown not only in the decision-making process, but in something more profound, such as the lack of a common purpose between the different countries, the problems with immigration that does not wish to integrate. and that rejects the culture of those who received them, as well as the terrible persistence of humanity's oldest phobia such as Judeophobia, as the situation in Gaza has demonstrated, to which is added fourthly, a political exterior characterized by colonialist remnants in some countries such as France, and with exercises of power based more on history, soft power and an unsolicited moral superiority that irritates rather than helps and does not sufficiently demonstrate power hard (hard power) that characterizes all other power. Finally, the weakness is shown in a factor that also harms Russia and China, an aging demographic, and like these two countries, except among the Muslim minority.

Putin does not stop. This Tuesday the 18th he arrived in North Korea for the first time in 24 years for a two-day visit. There is no doubt that the agreement for Pyongyang to provide munitions to Russia in Ukraine has been successful for Moscow, given the fact that Korean weaponry has always been Soviet-based. Washington has been surprised, so the recently signed Strategic Partnership Treaty between the two will also serve to ensure that the ruling family tyranny receives Russian cooperation in technology transfer (e.g. satellites), which is undoubtedly worrying for South Korea and also USA

None of the above should be surprising, given the way this relationship has grown since 2019, when Kim visited Putin in the Russian Far East in September, so we should also expect an upcoming meeting between Kim (once a pariah) and Xi Jinping. . Without a doubt, just as for Russia its alliance with Iran is occasional given its differences with Jihadism, with North Korea it is close and strategic.

And regarding China, a country that rarely makes proposals on nuclear issues, but that advances without pause in the number of devices it possesses, has invited a new Treaty where those who have these weapons undertake not to be the first to use them, initiative that did not receive much response, but with Beijing's patience, it will surely become a central element of its foreign policy.

In a Press Conference at the end of the G-7 Summit, Biden said the following: “By the way, China is not supplying weapons” (to Russia). He added that what he was doing was providing “the capacity to produce those weapons and the technology available to do so,” concluding that “in fact, he is helping Russia.” It is certainly an accurate description of what is happening, which shows how profound the US made a mistake in not foreseeing the consequences of Russia allying itself with China as a junior partner. Also, that there was naivety about the role that China would play, when both the State Department and the Pentagon expected China to exert pressure on Russia in Ukraine or be a kind of intermediary for the West, in exchange for the financial status quo, when China is today more concerned about geopolitics than its economy.

What can the US do?

Above all, an internal unity that it lacks today, with State policies that would allow it to undertake a profound reform of the international system, since the current architecture is unfavorable to it, despite the fact that it created it and continues to finance it. At the same time, recover the narrative that allowed it to win the Cold War, that is, trust in its own system, in addition to the return of the lost deterrence in the Middle East and elsewhere, containing the offensive - even within the US. - of Islamism, to overcome Wokism and goodism that influences too much today.

In addition to unity, the US needs to realize that it is not capable alone, since in 1945 it was almost half of the world economy and today it does not exceed ¼ of the world's nominal GDP. It is being challenged in Ukraine, the Middle East and Taiwan, with too many doubts, and as Gaza has shown, it creates confusion between friends and adversaries, by not always separating allies from those who hate what it is and represents.

In conclusion, the US always needs to remember the triple heritage that made the West great, that of the Enlightenment, the Greco-Latin and the Judeo-Christian, a clarity that its great traditional media do not seem to have either, which have lost the admirable level they once had. in the past, mired as they are in biased debate, and in the “agenda setting” of trying to tell declining audiences what to think, having fallen into what the English psychologist Peter Wason called already in 1960 the “bias confirmation", that is, favoring information that comes from previous hypotheses and emotions, leaving aside the verification of facts that may contradict us, in other words, fundamentally presenting what supports our previous beliefs.

@israelzipper

Ph.D. in Political Science (Essex), Law Degree (Barcelona), Lawyer (U. de Chile), former presidential candidate (Chile, 2013)

«The opinions published herein are the sole responsibility of its author».