Why did Israel attack Qatar?

By: Ricardo Israel - 15/09/2025

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The truth is that it could have happened earlier, so the surprise with which some analysts greeted this action is unjustified, since Israel's attitude has changed since the Hamas invasion and the capture of the hostages. It's not just Netanyahu's doing, but state policy. Furthermore, the elimination of Hamas and the prevention of a repeat of 7/X continue to enjoy majority support, even among reservists, despite the massive and understandable demonstrations called by those who want the withdrawal from Gaza in exchange for the return of the hostages.

Although the US veto sometimes limits and conditions, there are forces that promote the prevalence of Israel's "red lines," that is, unacceptable behavior that automatically merits a response, such as, for example, that there will be no impunity for terrorism. On this occasion, there was an attack the day before; ordinary people, including rabbis, were murdered in Jerusalem, as acknowledged by an official Hamas statement. That decision was made at a high level, namely, the top leadership, which is currently in Doha, the capital of Qatar.

Moreover, it can do so, since after Iran's defeat, Israel has complete air superiority in the Middle East, including over Turkey, in the event of a possible confrontation, for example, in Syria. Furthermore, if anything characterizes Qatar, it is its ambiguity, given that after Iran, it is today, and has been for some time, the main financier of Hamas, in addition to serving as the headquarters for successive leaderships that have settled there. This should not be surprising, given that, along with Turkey, within the divisions of the Muslim world, Qatar is today the other government in the Middle East that is a tributary of the Muslim Brotherhood, the parent movement born in Egypt in the 20th century, from which Hamas itself is derived, and whose first leader was hanged by Gamal Abdel Nasser.

The spread of these ideas also led to Qatar becoming a major contributor to elite American universities, thereby influencing the antisemitism that took place on those campuses in 2024, as evidenced by lawsuits in the US, where these universities have had to pay substantial fines for discriminatory conduct that violated the law.

Qatar has been very skillful in three ways: first, serving as the headquarters, since the 1990s, for the main US military base in the Middle East; second, maintaining a close relationship with the Trump administration, including the donation (or extended loan) of a plane owned by the Emir himself for transporting the US president; but above all, third, its role as an intermediary has gained it international fame, so much so that mediation has been incorporated into the country's constitution. Hence its central role in the hostage issue, since not even Egypt's intelligence services have equal access to Hamas, while Doha continues to provide the money for the salaries of those officials who run the state apparatus still in its hands in Gaza. Thus, Qatar has been able to partner with the US while simultaneously buying peace with the violent. This is nothing original, but rather following a scheme that had previously worked for Saudi Arabia with PLO factions, in the days before the reigning heir and king, Prince Mohammed bin Salman, when the kingdom promoted the Islamic creed called Wahhabism, which still predominates in Qatar.

In fact, years ago, Qatar approached Iran, with whom it has established an important alliance on an issue of mutual interest: gas. This led it to distance itself from Saudi Arabia's orbit. It did so successfully that it has been able to survive this very public estrangement without problems. It also provided diplomatic support to the Houthis, when their main conflict was with the Saudi kingdom, and not with Israel as it is today. In any case, today's differences with Saudi Arabia have been overcome, and at one point they even manifested themselves within the Premier League, given that they owned different clubs.

It's not that Israel hadn't wanted to attack before, but for years it didn't do so due to the total opposition of the US, including the first Trump administration. But as we indicated at the beginning, today Israel has taken off the gloves, and whenever it can, it doesn't warn or ask permission, although apparently, on this occasion the objectives were not achieved, since according to Hamas, among the survivors was Khalil al-Hayyes, the main negotiator, but not his son along with five militants and a Qatari guard. And to make it clear where Doha's feelings lay, Emir Tamami bin Hamad Al-Thani himself attended the funeral ceremony for his son, reinforcing his closeness and that of his government, distancing himself from the attitude that Saudi Arabia has taken. This is additional reason to believe that this attack will not affect its rapprochement with Israel, although everything indicates that there will be no open agreement, as long as there is no Israeli gesture regarding a Palestinian state.

The attack on Doha was planned with Riyadh in mind, as the Israeli planes dispatched their missiles before penetrating Saudi or Emirati territory on their way to Qatar. The official military statement says it was a "precision bombing" against the "top brass of the terrorist organization," even though it failed to eliminate the most important individuals. For his part, Netanyahu claimed responsibility for the attack without US approval, later adding that "the Hamas leaders living in Qatar do not care about the people of Gaza, and they block ceasefire attempts to prolong the war indefinitely." Since these types of decisions are not personal but state-related, official policy has always been to hold accountable those who harm Israel or attack Israelis, Jewish or non-Jewish, as was made clear when the Israelis entered Syria, among other reasons, to stop a massacre of Druze at the request of their relatives living in Israel.

Furthermore, what is happening with the dissemination of the deaths of all those who participated in 7-X has been no different from what Golda Meir did when she formed a special squad to pursue all those who ordered the attack on Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics, a policy that is old and consistent enough to have worked as a deterrent in such a way that Israel was not the target of attacks by ISIS or Al Qaeda.

These are state decisions that will not change if Netanyahu steps down or is removed from power, although statements about increasing settlements do nothing to help and, on the contrary, harm the cause of peace, as do incendiary statements by some ministers. But as always, reality is not all black and white. In the past, Israel has often been heavily criticized for its policies, only to be imitated. This was evident in the 1970s when it was the first to act against hijacking. This was evident when a passenger plane was successfully hijacked after being taken over by terrorists (Ehud Barak, future prime minister, was among the commandos). These situations were frequent until Israel put an end to them with the famous rescue operation in Entebbe, Uganda, on July 4, 1976, for which they had to travel thousands of kilometers.

In this regard, I believe one of the mistakes the major international media outlets make is analyzing this war through Western eyes. This leads them to errors that some prestigious Arab media outlets don't, since they understand the Hamas of this world, having suffered from it, which is why similar groups have been banned in several Sunni countries. They may offer their opinions, with many disparaging remarks about Israel, its policies, and its leaders, but they are not mistaken when it comes to Hamas, nor do they swallow its false casualty figures or the film productions or simply exaggerated accounts of famine, which are reserved for Sudan. In truth, they better understand why it fights, what motivates it, and what characterizes Hamas, and that its priority is not a Palestinian state, but jihad.

Other times, it is Israel that has erred, as happened years ago in Jordan when its agents were discovered after attempting to poison a Palestinian leader, forcing the government to send the antidote. Years later, Mossad agents were identified attempting to carry out a mission in a hotel in the Emirates. However, in those situations, Arab governments were willing to find a way out, a willingness that is apparently lacking today in several European countries. This reaffirms to me that Israel's future lies in an alliance with Sunni Arab countries, including their active participation in the future of Gaza, distancing itself from the antisemitism that seems to have returned to the streets of Europe, although Israel is now also estranged from Canada, New Zealand, and Australia.

In this regard, I count myself among those who believe in the importance of Saudi Arabia joining the Abrahamic Covenants, although I am convinced that doing so openly is conditional on a future Palestinian state, even if Israel does not accept it today. However, the Arab world seems to be adopting a much more positive attitude than the European Union, whose official policy toward Israel seems to repeat the mistakes made in this regard by the defunct USSR.

Undoubtedly, President Trump didn't like the Israeli attack, given that Qatar is a "friend and ally," although this statement was qualified when it was added that it wasn't aimed at that country, but at the terrorists living there. In any case, he wasn't pleased at having been informed so late, only at the very moment the missiles were fired, and through the Pentagon rather than by a direct call to the White House, given the personal closeness Netanyahu and Trump had for Iran.

It's possible that if this didn't happen, it was perhaps so that the planes wouldn't be forced to turn back, as they were on their way to Iran after the US bombing, since, in Trump's words, by doing so he "saved Khamenei's life," which is probably true, given the intelligence the Mossad had on Iran's top leadership at the time. In any case, judging by the ayatollahs' defiant statements, everything points to Israel attacking again in the near future.

Despite the importance of essential US support, Israel has always sought to act independently. This is influenced by the fact that there are no US bases, nor has it ever required or requested US soldiers on its territory. In fact, Israel's entire decision-making process has always been in line with what Kissinger said several times: that being against the US is just as bad as being dependent on that country, alluding to Washington's sometimes abrupt changes and how domestic politics influence international affairs. In fact, the importance of the supply of arms and ammunition from this source is a post-1967 phenomenon and the status Israel acquired after its victory over its Arab neighbors in that war, above all, due to the decisiveness demonstrated. A war in which Israel triumphed with French Mirage aircraft, and where one of its first actions was the aerial bombing of the Liberty, a US spy ship, so much so that the families of the dead sailors were later compensated financially by Israel.

In any case, the US reaction to the bombing of Qatar has been distinct from the international hypocrisy that criticizes the Hamas leadership for having been attacked, but with little or no reference to the terrorist attack that provoked it, since no one in Doha was innocent. This is echoed by European politicians and the international press, where there is rarely any pressure on Hamas, which is presented as a rational actor, and blame is always placed solely on Israel, including the automatic criminalization of its leaders.

Qatar's outraged reaction to the violation of its sovereignty was expected, but in general, the response of Arab nations has been more understanding of Israel than that of many European countries. From Egypt to the UAE, they have limited themselves to statements, leaving the harshest language to the Arab League, without adding the threats that have abounded in Europe. This has been the case throughout this war, unless the meeting convened by Qatar for this Monday agrees on something unexpected that goes beyond the usual warnings to prevent such attacks from happening again.

For its part, the US has resumed an active role, and on Saturday the 13th, Trump had lunch with the Prime Minister of Qatar, the day Marco Rubio traveled to Israel for a multi-day visit, saying that the Israeli attack “will not affect the relationship with the US” and that the priorities have not changed: “preventing Hamas from regaining control of Gaza and achieving the release of the hostages,” which is always timely, since it has been forgotten that the war was started by Hamas, and perhaps the terrible destruction of Gaza would have already ended if the hostages had been returned.

I am certain that Qatar's role will not change, as it is this mediation that gives it a strong presence in its foreign policy. In any case, unlike an adversary of the Muslim Brotherhood like Egypt, though not the only one, Qatar's important objective has always been the survival of Hamas. These basic differences generally elude some communicators and analysts, especially those who analyze the world in terms of "good" and "bad." This is the reality, one that Israel accepts, as Qatar is today the best, and sometimes the only, way for messages to reach those in charge within Hamas, a situation that changes during the war, even in the physical location of its top leaders, currently in Doha.

In general, even if they are critical, global media outlets understand that great powers defend their interests, but they have a hard time accepting that a small country like Israel does the same. Furthermore, like Hamas in its own right, Qatar succeeded in convincing people to accept the narrative that they were trying to comply with Trump's peace offer and that it was Israel that was against it, when the facts showed that Israel had accepted the latest ceasefire proposal, while Hamas rejected it. Similarly, decisions by the Israeli Supreme Court, such as forcing the government to improve the nutrition of Palestinian prisoners, go unnoticed, especially when compared to the International Red Cross's indifference toward the treatment of the hostages.

My impression is that nothing catastrophic will happen to the current positive relations between Israel and the Sunni Arab countries, nor will it be the end of the Abrahamic Covenants or the hostages being condemned for the bombing, unless something unexpected is agreed upon beyond mere warnings at the meeting convened by Qatar on Monday.

Perhaps, ultimately, what happened with other Israeli wars, which are studied for a long time in military academies around the world, will be repeated. For example, in Chile, although I was never invited to discuss the topic, it always struck me that in the Army, due to its influence on the country's war zones with its neighbors, what was happening there was followed in greater detail than in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or in the universities.

If there are consequences, they will be short-term in the case of the White House. Europe is of little relevance here, nor is the UN, even though, by rare chance, a unanimous Security Council declaration was agreed upon, in which, in exchange for the US signature, Israel is not named. I believe, however, that if there are consequences, they may be something unexpected for many: that, to maintain his importance in the new international scenario, the Emir will have to make decisions regarding Hamas's leadership continuing to reside in Doha, perhaps helped by the fact that for security reasons they must now move to Turkey, since if Israel demonstrated anything, it was that it no longer operated something as dubious as a "military" wing of Hamas in Gaza and a "political" wing in Doha, when in reality they are one and the same.

@israelzipper

-Master's and PhD in Political Science (University of Essex), Bachelor of Law (University of Barcelona), Lawyer (University of Chile), former presidential candidate (Chile, 2013)

«The opinions published herein are the sole responsibility of its author».