When did Europe go to hell?

By: Ricardo Israel - 12/04/2026

"When did Peru go to hell?" the journalist Zavalito rhetorically asked in "Conversations in the Cathedral," Mario Vargas Llosa's novel, which has since become a global phenomenon, frequently used to describe other places. In my opinion, the author wasn't looking to the past, but rather using it as a powerful tool for analyzing both the present and the future, since understanding its origins allowed for improvements to that reality.

It is in this sense that I use it, that is, to understand what Europe did or what decision it made that initiated this stage of notorious irrelevance as a power, which is even more detrimental in these days of evident geopolitical dominance. Certainly, Europe remains an expression of history and culture, a destination for emigration and tourism, but it has undoubtedly made poor decisions, and in recent centuries, it is difficult to find another time when it mattered less than now, carrying little weight in the balance of power from a strategic point of view. Judging by what has been shown in the current Persian Gulf conflict, it does not appear to have hit rock bottom. Therefore, despite its history and the economic importance of its common market, everything indicates that we will have to get used to a world where its prominence will continue to decline. What we do not know is for how long, since its decision-making process is so slow and complicated that it does not seem likely to easily emerge from this prostration, a situation further afflicted by ills that hinder its recovery of its position as a power, such as naive idealism, moral superiority, and poor leadership.

It is also affected by a lag in innovation, evident in the small number of world-class companies in new technologies, a notable fact in a century characterized by competition between China and the US, a gap that will likely widen with the rise of artificial intelligence. Adding to this is the current situation of mutual annoyance with the US, which has arisen from Washington's decisions regarding Ukraine and has deepened with the White House's resentment of the lack of support it has received in its conflict with Iran. While this may not lead to the end of NATO, it will at least result in the redistribution of US military bases within the continent. Furthermore, in years of weak economic growth, the need for continued increases in European defense contributions will undoubtedly affect the valued welfare state that was created by the savings achieved in the past when the US financed a significant portion of defense, a situation now in doubt.

For me, the fateful moment when Europe lost its way, its sense of mission, and distanced itself from its magnificent traditions and history was July 15, 2003, the day Valéry Giscard d'Estaing presented the European Constitution. The former French president had been appointed president of the European Convention to draft a constitution that would summarize and simplify the various treaties. However, although it was signed by the then 25 members of the Union, it was a complete failure, as it was never mentioned again after the ratification process suffered a negative vote in referendums from two such important founding countries as the Netherlands and France.

However, in my opinion, the worst part wasn't there; the real failure was the refusal to include any powerful reference to what Europe was, specifically the exclusion of Christianity, even though Europe as a historical entity is undoubtedly a Christian creation. It was also regrettable that this selective omission occurred. It wasn't a matter of any specific article; as the minutes reflect, it was even left out of the enumeration of the cultural sources from which European values derive—a complete abdication reminiscent of the legal persecution suffered by those who foresaw current European problems, such as Oriana Fallaci. Without a doubt, the Christian heritage is at least as important as Athens and Rome in defining the essence of what Europe is and represents.

Given these difficulties, even the path advocated by John Paul II—emulating the successful approach of the US Constitution by using the Preamble to the European Constitution—was not pursued. It was in this preamble that the Vatican requested Christianity be mentioned. However, Valéry Giscard d'Esquadra, the drafter himself, cited a lack of consensus and therefore did not include it, leaving no reference to Christianity.

In my opinion, the lack of unity and a mission, even more than the electoral rejection in its first two votes, represented the moment when Europe screwed up due to the lack of a purpose for the Union, a problem that still affects it, since, unlike the American constitution, there was no explanation in the European project that gave meaning, motive and reason to the purpose for which different cultures, states and trajectories were uniting.

Incidentally, the blame for the referendum failures cannot be placed on the French politician who campaigned for their approval, but is better explained by the overconfidence of the elite and the media—an arrogant error that would be repeated with the successful Brexit vote in the United Kingdom years later. Something similar has happened for so many years in NATO with the lack of European interest in strategic and military matters, relying on the US and its resources to always be there, until the pitcher goes to the well once too often and finally breaks. In fact, during the years I chaired the Armed Forces and Society Commission of the International Political Science Association, the discipline's global body, which coincided almost exactly with the constitutional failure, the growing disinterest of my European colleagues in these matters was always noticeable.

Clearly the problem remains today, and behind it lies the difficulty of presenting and speaking as a unity of purpose, in anything other than economic union, since the Union seems to be only that, and does not desire geopolitical or military power, nor has it wanted to move towards a federal structure that represents something more than the sum of its parts.

Perhaps that is why, even now, after the shock of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, there is still no serious talk of a European army, a process that will necessarily be slow and laborious, but rather talk of a "military Schengen," alluding to the common space where internal controls on movement from one place to another have been abolished; that is, alluding to a kind of magical realism to obtain something that will require patience and resources, which, like the euro, corresponds to a process where there is a goal rather than a sudden act.

Moreover, today, the lack of purpose is evident in the attempt to pit China against the US, an idea that falls apart on its own, since, as a response to Trump's tariffs, the idea of presenting Beijing as what it is not, as an "ally," is hardly credible, and furthermore, no one on the horizon of leaders is capable of playing the role that General De Gaulle played in relation to the USSR, least of all Macron.

This lack of political presence of Europe is also an expression of a decision-making process that often requires unanimity from the outset for important decisions, which frequently turns into a real nightmare, and which in practice has led to a tremendous democratic deficit, since the solution found has not been good, as it consists of officials who have not been subjected to any validation by the voters, in the form of the European Commission, that is, officials appointed and only ratified in community bodies, who make decisions that go beyond their bureaucratic role, and like a Politburo they impose themselves on the countries, often confronting elected national leaders, who nevertheless do not coincide with the ideological tastes of the top.

Nor is this a new problem. This was already demonstrated by Europe's actions in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, when they asked the US to let the continent resolve this "problem" since the USSR had disappeared. Ultimately, they were forced to turn to the Clinton administration, which resolved the military issue by bombing Serbia. Moreover, even today, if the UK wanted to send its fleet to the Falklands, it wouldn't be in a position to do so overnight, nor would it likely have US support given the relationship between Trump and Milei, in the context of the current personalization of decisions in the White House.

Europe's struggle to maintain its relevance is particularly evident in the Middle East, which in some ways is reminiscent of the USSR. Like the USSR, Europe's tendency to blame Israel has prevented it from playing a significant role, as demonstrated by Spain's exclusion from the international body concerned with the humanitarian situation in Gaza, and France's exclusion from the peace talks between Israel and Lebanon. These countries are mentioned because both have repeatedly expressed their interest in and the importance of such participation. If Europe does not want Israel to disarm Hezbollah, this must be accepted as its prerogative. However, if Europe wishes to remain relevant, one would expect it to help Lebanon free itself from Iranian interference and regain its sovereignty. This is unlikely to happen, as the colonial powers that bore so much responsibility are no longer available to assist Lebanon with a truly effective armed force—a real one, unlike the UN troops.

Moreover, the Middle East is not a secondary region, which makes it difficult to understand the disinterest that Europe has shown in the issue of freedom of movement in Hormuz given its dependence on oil and gas from that part of the world, to which must be added the responsibility of the United Kingdom in the origin of the Israeli-Palestinian problem or that of France in the origin of the Lebanese tragedy.

The shortcomings are not limited to international politics; sometimes they are even more evident domestically, for example, in the failure of multiculturalism and the impact of an immigration policy that shows insufficient respect for traditions. Newcomers are not only not encouraged to appreciate the culture that receives them, but they are also denied the information necessary to understand a history that is magnificent in many respects. In practice, instead of integration, there has been destruction from within, a Europe that is becoming unrecognizable, where in some neighborhoods the police hesitate to enter, and Sharia law prevails over common law, even in Scandinavian countries.

This was discovered by several countries when, during the Syrian civil war, young people born and raised there traveled with their passports to support fundamentalist and even terrorist movements—the men to fight, the women to marry. Simultaneously, through new births in places where the population barely reproduces, these countries, being admirable democracies, begin to acquire electoral importance that increasingly influences political decisions, both domestically and internationally. This is evident in issues like Gaza and in the criticism leveled at the US for the bombing of the Islamic Republic, without paying due attention to facts such as the missile program that has proven it can reach any European capital from there.

It is undeniable that, although this is not yet reflected in the deployment of its military force globally, the US faces, on almost every other level, the challenge of China as a global superpower. Meanwhile, at its own level, Europe faces similar competition, though it seems unaware of it, from India, which in this 21st century is advancing by leaps and bounds to displace it from third place, both as a geopolitical power and an economic force, fortunately without aggressive behavior.

The terrible thing about what is happening to Europe is that it doesn't seem to be aware of the depth of its loss of importance. Two things are bad: the current situation is a consequence of decisions already made, and it's unclear how Europe can recover what it has lost in the near future. With the US and Iran meeting in Islamabad, we don't know what will determine success or failure in this third Gulf War. Until the situation is resolved militarily or through negotiations over the Strait of Hormuz, we don't know what the outcome will be. But for now, Europe is doing nothing to address its current irrelevance, even though, like the Russian invasion of Ukraine, it will be one of the hardest hit regions.

The result of individual decisions, where no one else can be held responsible, is shown in the aforementioned failure in the integration of immigrants, not only in comparison to other parts of the world, but also in the existence of segregated neighborhoods, where instead of feeling pride in both their family roots and the country where they were born, as well as which team to support in the World Cup, young people are forced to choose.

Similarly serious is the way Europe has made energy decisions that contribute to its current situation, not only through a nuclear policy that closed plants providing cheaper, cleaner electricity, but also through the imposition of true environmental extremism that banned fracking, which has greatly benefited the US, and led to the underutilization of gas and oil reserves in the North Sea, despite the fact that Europe has few fuel deposits. These decisions mortgage its future, since today energy is not just for heating and transportation, but above all, it is crucial for artificial intelligence, data centers, and Bitcoin mining, all of which consume vast amounts of electricity equivalent to the consumption of thousands of homes for months.

One of Europe's greatest achievements has been the creation of a zone of peace, which, after the devastation left by two world wars, has made us forget centuries of territorial and religious conflicts. In this sense, the current situation is not only a geopolitical problem, but also affects the very idea of a union. And although the United Kingdom remains, in practice, part of Europe, Brexit has already occurred, and differences will surely arise between countries, not only between liberal and illiberal governments, but also between countries themselves, including, after a long time, those seeking to assert national strategies.

This is what is happening in Germany, once the economic engine of Europe, but now in economic crisis, due in part to its inability to continue accessing the cheap energy that Mrs. Merkel believed she had found in Russia. Germany, which once enjoyed a privileged relationship with Mitterrand's France and which in recent years has sometimes sought international prominence jointly with Paris and London, is now not only rearmament for the first time since its defeat in the war, but is also experiencing what The Economist describes as "a revolution for German intelligence services." Both domestically and internationally, its secret services are "on the verge of acquiring new and sweeping powers," raising the question of whether the changes that immigration has generated in domestic politics will allow militant Islamism to emerge as a prominent threat—a concern fueled by developments in both French and British politics.

In any case, watch out for Germany, which, as then-Chancellor Olaf Scholz said in 2022, is at a "Zeitenwende," that is, at a turning point since the Russian attack on Ukraine, so perhaps it will seek on its own what it no longer finds in Europe or in the former colonial powers.

Besides the misfortune of not having been able to find a common element of unity and continental projection, having rejected Christianity as that element which it now lacks, I believe that the current situation of little relevance is also due to the fact that its current leaders have found it easier to imitate Chamberlain than Churchill, who was crystal clear in his attitude towards the Middle East and in appeasing an Iran that never hid for years that its atomic program sought the disappearance of a country called Israel, which should not be separated from what is happening today, just like the permanent attack on the US since the first day the Islamic Republic was established with the kidnapping of diplomats in 1979 and subsequent terrorist attacks such as the one by Hezbollah where 241 American soldiers died in Beirut in 1983.

Not only that, but Europe seems confused by the reappearance of an old problem: antisemitism, clearly Judeophobia, which has become an “electoral strategy,” as denounced by one hundred French intellectuals to La France Insoumise, or as the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights stated from Vienna in 2018, years before Hamas's invasion of Israel and the subsequent terrible situation in Gaza: “incitement to antisemitic hatred, harassment and fear of being recognized as Jewish: these are some of the realities of being Jewish today in the European Union.” This statement corresponded to a major study on the European Jewish population, in which around 800 Jews from 13 member countries were interviewed, and 96% reported encountering antisemitism in their daily lives.

In conclusion, I find it difficult to recognize Europe today, even three places that were important in my life and where I was happy. First, England, where I did my master's and doctoral degrees, which shaped me intellectually; Sweden, where I went for years during the summers to finance my tuition, and where I juggled three jobs, but which gave me the work ethic that accompanied my professional life; the same Sweden to which I later returned to teach at its universities; and Spain, where I earned my law degree in Barcelona, but in this century I did not want to acquire the nationality that was easily granted to those of us descended from the Jews who were expelled for refusing to convert in 1492, as I believe I would not feel comfortable with the level of Judeophobia that exists in that country where so few Jews reside today.

I feel that I have a connection with Europe in my blood, not only because of that family that had to leave Toledo and later arrived in Chile through my grandparents from Izmir, Turkey, but also because of my other grandparents who emigrated from the Austro-Hungarian Empire, my grandmother from Vienna and my grandfather, born in a village that is now Polish, all four after the first world war.

That is why, when I inquire about what has happened to a continent that, despite generating some of the worst in history such as colonialism or Nazism, I prefer to highlight its immense civilizing work that gave us some of the best of human history such as the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, so when I ask myself when it went wrong, I do so so that what made it great and admired can be recovered.

@israelzipper

Master's and PhD in Political Science (University of Essex), Bachelor of Laws (University of Barcelona), Lawyer (University of Chile), former presidential candidate (Chile, 2013)

«The opinions published herein are the sole responsibility of its author».