By: Beatrice E. Rangel - 01/07/2025
Colombia, along with Uruguay, Costa Rica, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, is a nation that has managed to build a solid institutional framework over the years, allowing it to maintain its republican ethos in the face of many challenges, such as an authoritarian culture; a citizen preference for resolving conflicts through violence; and the emergence and consolidation of a narco-state.
The establishment of the rule of law has been key to Colombia's relative political stability and the progressive strengthening of its democracy. Gustavo Petro's term will end in 2026, and maintaining this event on Colombia's political calendar should be the most cherished objective of the country's elites.
Because beyond the verdict the Colombian people issue regarding the merits or lack thereof of Gustavo Petro's administration, there is a constitutional framework that determines the beginning and end of his term. Maintaining this constitutional order is essential for strengthening Colombian democracy.
Indeed, although few recognize this development as fundamental to the consolidation of the Colombian institutional framework, Colombia has enjoyed legal stability thanks to the fact that throughout its history it has only had four constitutions. And all of them have been the product of building upon the existing framework. This contrasts with other Latin American countries, where constitutional texts have not only been numerous (in some cases more than 60), but many of them represent complete breaks with the past.
The civic conduct of Colombians in perfecting constitutional texts has paid democratic dividends.
Therefore, even though the country is now shaken by the revelations of Alvaro Leyva Duran, former foreign minister of Petro's administration, Colombia's best option is to postpone addressing them until Gustavo Petro completes his term. By then, there will be enough time and resources to demand accountability from the then-president. And, incidentally, this accountability should also be demanded from the former foreign minister.
Removing Gustavo Petro at this time would be a deadly poison for Colombian democracy. A careful analysis of the polls on Gustavo Petro's leadership and mandate reveals considerable discontent among his own ranks, which comprise the D and E strata. However, this discontent is attributed to Gustavo Petro's inability to impose himself on the conservative sectors of Colombian politics, not to his incompetence. Furthermore, these same sectors believe that Petro's successor should strive to achieve the goals of democratization, inclusion, and social development that proved impossible for Petro.
With such a political framework, the removal of Gustavo Petro would only codify his image as the redeemer persecuted by the elites; further strengthen support for some of his programs that were frankly detrimental to Colombia's development; and confirm in the minds of many Colombians the belief that democracy is manipulated by powerful entities. This would begin to undermine faith in democracy, and the Colombian people could fall victim to the mirage of institutional destruction as a mechanism for progress. Over the years, the country could follow the model of Venezuela, where the removal of a democratically elected president ended forty years of democracy. And I wonder if it would be worth removing Petro to weaken democracy. At the end of the day, there are only a few months left until the end of Petro's term, and Colombian society has demonstrated a special talent for controlling his populist impulses by resorting to the institutional framework.
«The opinions published herein are the sole responsibility of its author».