Can impunity end in Venezuela?

By: Ricardo Israel - 25/09/2023

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Today, considering the type of dictatorship that exists and the doubts about whether Maduro will allow clean elections, in my opinion to find an answer, the existing situation must be divided into international, internal considerations and those related to the type of transition that will be followed, always, if the democratic opposition alternative comes to government. All three intersect with a very complicated element, what to do with corruption, when the administration of justice is not reliable and the government and the armed and police forces have been linked to transnational organized crime for years.

That is to say, the political change from dictatorship to democracy is not enough, since the latter is a necessary condition, but it may be insufficient, and, furthermore, expectations may be too high, so corruption could define a good part of the success. or the failure of the new authorities, if they win. A.- For the analysis, let's start with external considerations, warning that the content may seem harsh, but it is, nevertheless, realistic

First of all, regarding the International Criminal Court, will there be news soon? The doubts come from the delay, since the evidence is powerful. Also, because in general they have condemned Africans with a special accent, skipping to other regions or not completing any further investigation. Even in the case of Putin, because he is a power, it seems doubtful that in the end there will be a conviction, much less that the arrest order will materialize, especially if a negotiation process begins, given the stagnation of the war. .

Secondly, Europe continues not to provide the support that would be expected to the opposition, among other reasons, due to the influence of Cuba, and the maintenance of the revolutionary myth, for example, in the European Parliament. In the same sense, Josep Borell's actions, both with Venezuela and Cuba, have often been with the objective of safeguarding the interests of his investors.

It is the difference between rhetoric and the defense of interests.

Thirdly, in relation to the United States, the White House seems to have opted for oil more than for democracy, at least publicly this is what happened at the end of last year, in the meeting in Mexico between the government and the opposition, where they highlighted the facilities given to Chevron for oil extraction (see columns in Infobae of December 2, 2022 and July 27, 2023, “It's not democracy, it's oil” and “Can Maduro be overthrown?”, respectively ).

In this situation, the opinion and action of advisor Mr. González seems to predominate without counterweight, a reflection of the relative lack of power of other visions, such as, for example, that of the State Department. What seems to predominate in this advisor is the idea that he should talk to Maduro in exchange for concessions, so far, always minor. Furthermore, conditioned by a scenario dominated by the war in Ukraine.

It is not fair to criticize only the USA, especially considering that at least it has sanctioned human rights violators and corrupt Venezuelans, which cannot be said in general of Latin America, where the Uruguayan president Lacalle and some expressions of the president are exceptions. Chilean Boric. In general, indifference and support from other dictatorships in the region predominate, all strengthened by the open support of the democratic governments of Argentina, Mexico and Lula's Brazil, which wants to reintegrate Maduro into the system, and without any shame, to despite the condemnation efforts by the Secretary General of the OAS, Luis Almagro.

In any case, one should not talk about the absence of alternatives to the opinion of advisor González in the White House, without mentioning two facts: first, the disappointment in Washington and other countries due to the meager results of the support and official recognition given to Juan Guaido, where fifty countries did the same.

Any international criticism should also include Latin America, which does not sufficiently support the application of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, which is not only a constitutive treaty for the defense of democracy, but also, and for this reason, has been incorporated into the constitutions. from many of the countries. Furthermore, the disinterest of the United States, which does not seem to react even to Chinese penetration in the region, has its origins in the Obama government, where, although it was not recorded in any paper, everything indicates that the attitude that predominated in Latin America was that the USA should not intervene.

The second fact is the failure of Trump, who, through someone with extensive experience like Elliot Abrams, did everything possible to get the Bolivarian armed forces to support Maduro's departure, which was not successful. In the region there was indifference, except the cases of Duque and Piñera, who agreed to arrive at the Cúcuta border, only to not obtain results, but to subsequently suffer violent mobilizations against them, both in Colombia and Chile, although without US evidence of the Venezuelan presence in them.

Through conversations with colleagues who worked on the failed attempt to depose Maduro, I have become convinced of what I heard from them, that the biggest obstacle in the case of Padrino and other high officials was that even in the cases where they had compromised, predominated the corruption of which they were part (e.g. Cartel de los Soles, drug trafficking) as well as (attention Venezuelan opposition at this point), that no amnesty could prevent their prosecution in the event that in democracy Congress approved international human rights legislation, since that this single fact would repeal any amnesty, given the imprescriptible nature of crimes against humanity, so they could end up prosecuted and convicted, as had happened in other countries.

The bottom line is that there does not seem to be interest in many Latin American countries to recover a privileged relationship with the USA, with China's economic power being the differentiating element from what happened in the Cold War.

This is also expressed in the rather lower level of some US delegations in some changes of command in the region. Apparently, there is no greater interest (except in Central America, probably due to the immigration issue) in Vice President Kamala Harris, unlike the trips that President Biden himself made when he was in office for eight years with Barack Obama (and this is how it seems to me). presented the only opportunity I have had to talk with Biden when he attended the handover to Michelle Obama in 2014).

It seems that former Senator Cristopher Dodd has not always been interested either, who has been appointed Special Presidential Advisor for the Americas, among other reasons, to follow up on the rather irrelevant Summit of the Americas (Los Angeles, June 2022), where several leaders They indulged in spurning the invitation (which they probably wouldn't do with Xi Jinping).

Thirdly, China, Russia and Iran continue to demonstrate their support for the Caracas regime, and not even the invasion of Ukraine has generated a change of attitude among those who support Kiev, evidence of a possible future irrelevance of Latin America, in the post-Ukraine world, despite the potential it has to replace what Russia exports (food, metals, oil), including key metals for the energy transition.

At this point, there seems to be a clear responsibility of the voters who have insisted on electing governments that do not encourage foreign investment, which apparently will become another historical opportunity thrown away, by preferring to do exactly the opposite.

B.- I add internal considerations, always assuming that the elections will be fair, and for reasons of space, I will limit myself to five problems:

Firstly, the essential need for opposition unity, since, without it, you simply cannot win. The main lesson of the successful cases is this, and that this unity has been elusive in many instances in the past. Not only does the type of dictatorship that is Maduro make it difficult, but another lesson is that, to beat the dictatorship, the democratic opposition must make the greatest effort possible, to separate itself from the burden of going together with groups and people who are not totally democratic, as well as the corrupt in their ranks, which includes the functional opposition to the regime and paid for by it.

Secondly, the issue of international human rights legislation and the Armed Forces, where if the opposition wins, it could face the possibility of antidemocratic actions in the transition, as occurred in both Chile and Argentina. In this regard, there is no unanimous attitude in the region, since both Uruguay and Brazil have preferred to turn the page, while Argentina tried the generals and admirals who in the Military Junta were responsible for the 1976 Coup d'état, and, For its part, Chile has sentenced those responsible for human rights violations to long prison sentences, but it did not do so with those who led the 1973 Coup, the most notable case being that of Pinochet, who died in court after his arrest in England, but not condemned.

This is a key issue to define the type of transition and the place of criminal prosecution of senior military and police officers, both for violation of human rights and corruption. As it is likely that they do not wish to enjoy their ill-gotten fortunes in Tehran, the truth is that the country that could guarantee them the enjoyment of their money is the USA, since it is the only one that can do so, since, as has been demonstrated With Russian oligarchs, the movement of their accounts and investments can be paralyzed by the Treasury Department.

However, it is very difficult for an agreement of this type to take place, not only because of the possible action of the International Criminal Court, but, above all, there would be no way to stop judicial actions in the United States against these crimes. especially after the invasion of Ukraine.

Thirdly, what the opposition does to distance the regime from its international support could be key to its success, and in this regard, I hope there is already a realistic position on the debts with China and Russia (they are always paid) and I was able to talk publicly with them. The same applies to the attitude towards internal institutions, such as the Administration of Justice, the Armed Forces, electoral authorities, etc.

Both actions are not only important to convey a feeling of triumph, but can also help define the type of transition through which one will go.

Fourthly, the opposition still needs to define what happens the day after its victory, where having clarity as well as discipline appears to be essential to show not only governability, but also to reduce the fears of the undecided.

Fifthly, we must never forget that, given its power and willingness to use it, the regime is still in a position to surprise. I am not talking about how obvious repression is, but for example about last minute legal changes that have electoral impact, and also, above all, if Chavismo wants to remain as a political alternative even if it hands over the government, with a privatization that facilitates an uprising. of sanctions in the USA (this would be the case of companies linked to the export sector, including oil companies), and where the handing over of companies to friends and close friends could condition and influence in this way not only the transition, but also the future political system itself. . We must not only think about the case of the oligarchs in Russia and Ukraine, but also in Chile,

C.- The transitions are not exactly the same, but generally their teaching is divided into three types, a) rupturist (Nicaragua with the Sandinistas, and surely also after the Ortega dictatorship), b) negotiated (Uruguay, Spain ) and c) institutionalized (Brazil, Chile). Ruling out that there is an international or internal scenario for the rupture, it will probably be institutionalized (that is, it begins with the legislation left by the outgoing regime), so that, if all goes well, we can move on to a negotiation that allows institutions fully democratic, where commitments are also acquired, whether written or not, as Brazil and Chile also demonstrate.

The point is that the opposition has not yet defined its option, perhaps it is not yet the time, but everything will go better if it has taken that step, so if not now, it will need to have this point defined once the name of the opposition exists. candidate or only candidate, at least, who has been discussed.

That day it will be demonstrated that it is already speaking as a future government, from which point ambiguity does not always help, so at least the following will be needed:

First, clarify your position regarding international Human Rights legislation, and therefore, partially, regarding impunity.

Second, have a position vis-à-vis the civilians of the regime, since the dictatorship that is in power today is civil-military, which includes the ruling party, the so-called boliburgueses, those who have enriched themselves through corruption, drug trafficking, gold smuggling, etc. Also, although they do not immediately say it, whether the members of the so-called “collectives” will be judged, and whether it will be done with special or ordinary legislation.

Third, what will be the attitude towards those who have been at the service of the dictatorship in other important State institutions, such as, for example, senior judges, police, electoral commissioners, etc.

In other words, if social peace is going to be privileged, and a rapid and immediate transition to the new system.

Fourth, in that same sense, at least having talked and having a position about whether the foreign partners of the regime will be legally persecuted, not forgetting that Venezuela is an almost paradigmatic example of Transnational Organized Crime, although it is not easy, especially in transition conditions, seek the application of the Palermo Convention, the United Nations Convention that punishes organized crime.

Fifth, if there will be a trial of Maduro or Diosdado and if this will serve to give a definitive signal about impunity, that is, if these prosecutions of these and other responsible parties will be the starting point, an intermediate point, or the final point.

For these cases, unlike Argentina, the legal type of coup d'état may not exactly correspond to the political leaders, but would there be a will to try them for treason, given the handover of the country to Cuba?

Perhaps, for democracy and its stability, it is worth turning the page, as was done in former communist countries, where in general almost no one was prosecuted, but that is something that only Venezuelans can define, and if it is not It is still time for its open discussion, at least, it would be good for it to be discussed among the opposition leaders, among other reasons, to create trust between them, as it is such an important issue.

If there is no position on the matter, perhaps there is one on something minor, such as the fact of financing with public money to Chavistas from other countries, not only in Latin America, but also Europe, where there were people at their service, highlighting the case of Spain, with the leaders of the Podemos party, something no less minor, since they were part of a government coalition for years, of former Prime Minister Rodríguez Zapatero and former Judge Garzón, who is admired by many for having ordered the arrest in London of General Pinochet, but since his expulsion from the Spanish judiciary, he has distinguished himself by defending corrupt people in several countries (Venezuela, Bolivia, Argentina).

They are not minor issues, but for now, the fundamental thing is to win the elections and the unity of the opposition, and to achieve this, prevent, if it wins, the regime from attempting its own coup, perhaps declaring a state of emergency, or as it already has. has done, changing the name of the winner, proclaiming the loser.

Not only the USA, but also Latin America seems to have a defined position of total rejection of the military dictatorships of the second half of the 20th century, but there is still not the same unanimity in relation to the Castro-Chavez dictatorships, despite the Democratic Charter of the OAS. , a sign of hypocrisy that should not exist.

Of course, nothing is better than winning by a difference that no one can discuss, without making a fool of yourself. In this regard, fraud can be made more difficult by reducing the automatic support that the regime finds in electoral institutions. It is also the reason why it would also help to have a public relationship with international partners of Chavismo, such as China and Russia.

Neutralizing internal and external allies reduces the possibility of an internal coup or a State of Siege, as occurred in Chile after the opposition triumph in the plebiscite on the continuity of General Pinochet in 1988, where the position against two members of the governing board (Navy and Air Force) prevented the state of emergency from being declared that night.

The essential ally continues to be the United States. Without complexes, Venezuela needs the joint support of the White House and Congress to say that a falsification of the result will not be accepted, which would also help convey the feeling that the opposition can win.

I insist that they are not the same situations, but although the Chilean transition began with the legislation of the regime, when it called the 1988 plebiscite, the USA made its position very clear that it would not accept anything that would alter the popular will, when months before, it completely paralyzed the exports from Chile, upon “surprisingly” finding a couple of contaminated grape seeds, in what, without further confirmation, was clearly a warning of its will against the plebiscite, probably via its security services.

As a conclusion to this column, I leave the happy phrase of former Uruguayan president Julio María Sanguinetti, who said that “the secret of any transition is to combine the anxiety of those who enter with the fear of those who leave.”

Of any good and successful transition, I would add.

@israelzipper

Ph.D. in Political Science, Lawyer, Presidential Candidate in Chile, 2013

«The opinions published herein are the sole responsibility of its author».